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To the Youth of Dominica who wi3.1
replace these colonials before long
PREFACE
My interest in Comparative Government dates back
to ray days at McMaster University during the 1969-1970
academic year. My interest in that field was further
heightened when I came into contact with Dr. Howard
Wiarda at the University of Massachusetts. Studying
under Professor Wiarda I decided to specialize in the
area of Latin America and the Caribbean. During those
three years I worked with Professor Wiarda and other
graduate students at the University of Massachusetts, I
was able to grapple with the concept of political change.
'Writing my dissertation on Dominica, I was able
to utilize my knowledge of political change. I chose to
write on Dominica—a member state of the British West
Indies—because this is one of the areas I know well.
It is a small country which makes such a study manageable.
And besides, to the best of my knowledge, no complete
political analysis of this country is presently available.
Chapter I deals with the concept of "political
change," which has been used instead of "political develop-
ment." The latter word seems to impede agreement on the
theoretical assumptions which are essential to ensure a
clear cut understanding of the new nations in their
attempts to improve social conditions. In dealing
with
vi
politics, "development" seems to be too vulnerable to
value-laden concepts. "Development" as it has been used,
seems to imply change in a certain direction. In contrast,
"change" is a less specific concept on which wider agree-
ment as to meaning might be possible. It is more general,
and is less likely to have value judgments built into its
definition. It seems to be more neutral.
A chapter is devoted solely to an examination of
the many constitutions Dominica has had. Thus in a sense
Chapter II is an extension of Chapter III in that, it
examines the present constitutional arrangements in
Dominica in relation to past constitutions. The consti-
tutions of these colonial countries should always be
examined because they have conditioned the behaviors of
the actors in the political system.
Chapter III takes a look at the impact of colonial-
ism on the Dominican political system. The component parts
of the colonial situation are examined to determine the
possible effect these may have had on the present political
system.
The political parties in Dominica are analyzed in
Chapter IV. The functions of the parties are examined
to
see if they are working to produce a "better"
Dominican
society.
Chapter V describes and assesses the
activities of
*. TV,-? c -i <5 not the most powerful
the Black Power Movement. This s
vii
interest group in Dominica, but it is the only group
which has openly challenged the Government and other
supportive groups in the system. Presently the group
is weak, but its leadership is both young and intelligent.
It is getting more cohesive, and within a few years other
groups in Dominica, such as the Roman Catholic Church
and business elements, will be forced to reckon with it.
The many attempts at federating the British West
Indian Islands are reviewed in Chapter VI. There have
been two major attempts in recent times to form a
"Westindian" nation, both having failed.
Finally in the conclusion, the problems which con-
front Dominica are reviewed. Possible solutions to these
problems are stated.
I have tried to make this study as comprehensive
as I could. But it must be emphasized that this is a
case study which deals specifically with Dominica,
British West Indies.
The findings here do not apply to all countries
which were colonies. The problems of Dominica are unique
in some ways, but they are not all that different from
those found in the other former British colonies of the
West Indies. Many of the problems, such as poverty or
unemployment, are the same, but may be called by different
names.
The usefulness of this case study really lies in
viii
identifying and in attempting to solve the major problems
which beset Dominica. If the leaders can agree with me
that there are major problems in Dominica, then this study
has more than an academic effect.
At this point let me express my great appreciation
to Dr. Harvey E. Kline for accepting to chair my disserta-
tion committee. He did a fine job in questioning my ideas
on the subject. He was most sensitive to the need of
reading the sometimes disorderly manuscript very quickly.
Thanks are also due to Dr. Gerard Braunthal for
his many pointed comments on the study. He also did a
good job in helping me finish my last few days at the
University of Massachusetts.
Finally thanks are due to Dr. George E. Urch for
accepting to be the third reader of the study. These
professors only helped. The errors and interpretations
remain the property of this writer.
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CHAPTER I
POLITICAL CHANGE
Purpose
The purpose of this chapter is to present the theo-
retical framework for the study. It attempts to review the
literature on political change with a view to extrapolating
from the literature a meaningful description of what change
in the colonial situation might entail. This is to facili-
tate a clearer understanding of present day politics in
Dominica. One cannot simply dismiss lightly the literature
on political change, which has grown over the years, with
the trite remark that it is neither value-free nor appli-
cable to the emerging nations. This may be so, but ig-
noring it might be likened to building a costly road to
a certain point when there is one already available. By
all means new paths should be created, especially if they
lead to the desired destination more quickly, but the
contour of the old tracks can be of great help, especially
if these can be widened, precluding the great expense of
building brand new ones.
2Introduction
Writing in 1966, Alfred Stepan lamented the fact that
none of the major political scientists chose Latin America
as an area of specialization to test their theories about
nation-building. He was particularly disappointed since
the study of a Latin American nation would have helped
immensely in sharpening the tools used in studying politi-
cal change. The same can be said for the Commonwealth
Caribbean"'' countries since they too have many of the ills,
albeit to a lesser extent in some cases, that Afro-Asian
countries exhibit. The Caribbean v/as even better suited
than Latin America for testing the models on development
since they are relatively small. English is the main
language spoken and it is relatively cheap to travel to
and live in. But the Caribbean has been ignored, probably
because its era of revolution was not upon it yet, in
contrast to the exciting events in Africa and Asia.
Political change, and henceforth referred to as
change, is a very elusive concept which has aroused an
enormous amount of emotionalism. It is accepted that a
political system is not a static one which has led some
political scientists to look at the development of nations
-•In this study the term Caribbean will be used to
refer only to the former British Colonies in the West
Indies. The term will be used interchangeably with th
West Indies.
3as a mechanical process, meaning that development - reaching
to that "higher and better" level - can be planned. This
process has been deceptively likened to the building of a
house which "one can fashion to one's taste. "^ Milton
Esman writes of change as the ability to deliberately
fashion a community in a fixed geographic boundary.^ He
further states that innovative institutions engineer change
and it is when these institutions are institutionalized
that the developed society becomes inevitable.^ The
question is can an institution build a society? An in-
stitution may disrupt a society rather than build it. It
becomes more important for the institution to blend in
with the people that it is serving. Even then, there
is no guarantee that it will succeed in directing society
to that higher goal because institutionality involves a
complex set of interactions between the institution, with
its component parts, the people and, of course, the en-
vironment. To survive, the institution may have to
accommodate; if it cannot, this may be the source of its
demise.
^Karl Deutsch et al
. ,
eds., Nation-Building (New
York: Atherton, 1965), p. 3.
3
Milton Esman, "The Politics of Development Adminis-
tration," Comparative Administration , Group, Occasional
Paper, 1963, p. 1,
4
Ibid
. , p. 40.
4Political Change and Traditionalism
This mechanistic view of development may be the re-
sult of the low regard that the theorists have shown toward
what they consider a traditional society as opposed to an
advanced society, Rupert Emerson writes that the first
problem to be successfully handled in nation-building is
to destroy tribalism because of its disruptive force.
^
Still dealing with traditionalism, Claude Welch
sees "traditional mores" as an impediment to modernization.
The primary aim then is to v/eaken them. He quoted Gustave
LeBon, approvingly, "to respect tradition is a condition
of existence for a people, to know how to disengage from
it is a condition of progress." To second Welch's posi-
tion, S.N. Eisenstadt says that traditionalism retards
7
creativity and innovation. For this reason, it must go
because today, the very base of traditional instructions
have been routed, of course, by the progressive life.
CoS. Whitaker took off from where Eisenstadt left off and
tells the world that psychologically a traditional people
Rupert Emerson, "Nation-Building in Africa," in
Nation-Building
,
by Karl Deutsch, et al. (New York: Atherton,
1965), p. 105.
^Claude E. Welch, Jr., ed., "Introduction" in Politi-
cal Modernization : A Reader in Comparative Political Change
TBelmont, Cal. : Wadsworth, 1967), p. 9.
"^S.N. Eisenstadt, "Some new looks at the problem of
relations between traditional societies and modernization.
Economic and Cultural Chgnoe (April, 1968), p. 445.
5have seen the need to emulate the more advanced peoples.
The whole society of the new states must change con-
currently since no segment of it can be held back by
tradition no matter how deeply it is rooted. It has to
be so, since the influential part of the society will be
the first to enter the modern era, and having seen the
benefits of modernity, it will make the whole society
8
modern. Thus, Marion Levy writes gleefully that a uni-
versal solvent has penetrated the traditional society. It
does not matter hov/ this solvent came there, change is
9
always "in the direction of. . . the modernized society."
Perhaps the relationship betvyeen traditionalism and
development has simply been misunderstood. Further
analysis of this misunderstanding will be discussed below.
Political Development and Ethnocentrism
Concomitant with this belittling of traditionalism
is the blatant ethnocentrism which has characterized the
literature on change. Myron Weiner contends that it was
because of the tremendous impact of Darwin's evolutionary
C.S. Whitaker, Jr., "A Dysrhythnic Process of Politi-
cal Change," World Politics (January, 1967), p. 198.
^Marion J. Levy, Jr., "Patterns of Modernization and
Political Development," The Annals of the American Academy
of Political and Social Science (March, 1965), p. 30.
6theory of the survival of the fittest that Europeans sought
to impose their model on the "New World. ""^"^ By implication,
European governments were the fittest because they had
"developed faster and better" than African systems. As a
result, it became the "white man's burden" to direct and
hasten positive gov rnment. As a start, cultural diffusion
was the key to this new phase modernization. Eisenstadt
admits, to confirm what had already been suspected, that
the path to development came from Europe and spread during
the 19th and 20th centuries to South America, Asia, and
Africa. '^ Clearly, the non-Western models of governments'
(Latin America sometimes included), have been looked upon
12
as infants or as deviant examples of the Western experience.
But the zenith of European ethnocentrism is seen in the
following statement by B. Malinowski:
European agents [have] constitute jZj everywhere
the main drive in change; that they were the
determining factors as regards the initiative
of change; that it [was? they who plan, took
measures, and O.mporte3 things. . ., that they
withheld ; that they took away land, labor
and political independence and that they
•^^Myron Werner, "Political Modernization and Evolu-
tionary Theory," Social Change in Developing Areas ; A re-
interoretation of Evolutionary Theory , ed. by Herbert R«
Barringer (Cambridge, iXass.: Schenkman Publishing Co., 1965),
p. 105.
•"^S.N. Eisenstadt, "Bureaucracy and Political Develop-
ment," in Bureaucracy and Political Development , ed. by
Joseph La Palombara (pFTHceton: Princeton University Press,
1963), p. 98
12,
Analysis of
Peter Nettl , Political Mobilization, A Sociological
Methods and Concepts (London: b'aoer, 1967), p. l^J
7themselves £were] in most of their actions
have been determined by instructions, ideas,
and forces which had their origin outside
Africa. -^^
On first reading, it could be hypothesized that Malin-
owski was being sympathetic to the plight of the Africans,
especially when he writes about the taking away of African
property by the Europeans. But one quickly discovers that
the reverse is the case since he asserts elsewhere that
African culture had no discernible impact on other cultures.
He advises the British that "a wise control of the forces of
change can guarantee a normal and stable development" in
Africa. Malinowski does not state why change is needed
or why the British variant was meant to be imposed on Africans,
but Cyril Black gives a partial answer. Writing as late as
1966, he says that African traditional culture has proven
15
incapable of sustaining modern institutions, which the
Africans, presumably, want.
In response to those who not only want traditionalism
"•^B. Malinowski, "Dynamics of Culture Change,"
Social Change , ed. by I. Wallerstein (New York: Wiley,
p. 13.
^^Quoted in G. Balandier, "The Colonial Situati
A Theoretical Approach," ibid., p. 41.
^^Cyril Black, The Dynamics of Modernization
York: Harper and Row, 1966), p. i'^^'
8wiped out but the European variant of developed govern-
ment imposed, Henry Bernstein writes that the traditional/
modern dichotomy is too neat. All traditional societies
are not the same; in fact, the ideal traditional or modern
society is non-existent. Consequently, the idea that the
modern society is the "participant society""'"^ does not hold.
Those societies Daniel Lerner would label traditional are
also participant and the nature of participation in the so-
called modern societies is not even clear. Henry Bernstein
is of the opinion, and quite correctly so, that this di-
chotomy is purely heuristic. This model can serve as the
basis of a dynamic approach which shows a relationship
17
between traditionalism and modernity; that is all it can
do.
In addition, the assumption that modernity and tra-
dition are radically contradictory is a result of mis-
reading what tradition is all about in a so-called backward
polity. It also involves a misunderstanding of what moder-
nity involves in an "advanced" polity. It seems that the
close relationship between the two is not clearly understoo
^^Daniel Lerner, "The Transformation of Institutions,"
in The Transfer of Institutions , ed. by William B.
Hamilton
(DuHI^m, N.C: Duke University Press, 1964), p. ^i.
17Henry Bernstein, "Modernization Theory and the
Socio-
of Development," The Journal of Developmentlogical Study
Studies (January, 1971), p. 147.
9This has to be the case because no society relinquishes its
traditional mores totally. Elements of traditionalism
always remain as indelible marks on the new born society.
It is as though the umbilical cord of tradition has refused
to be cut av7ay because no instrument is sharp enough to per-
form the seemingly simple operation. The fact is in the
Western sense, "no society is wholly modern"; some part of
1
8
the old remains with the new. Indeed tradition can be used
to bring about modernity.
Concept of Change
After considering various approaches, it was de-
cided to handle this section topically. Only a few theories
which deal with political change will be discussed here. To
this end, it assesses the equating of political change with
functions, the handling of a series of crises successfully,
the growth in complexity of institutions, social mobiliza-
tion, integration, the existence of democratic institutions,
and the capacity of top leadership to control desired changes
in a political system. The section ends with a treatment
of the relationship between law and political change.
^^Robert Ward and Dankwart Rustow, eds., "Conclusion,"
Political Modernization in Turkey and Japan (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1964), pp. 444-5.
10
Barring the fact that Almond did not visit a "devel-
oping" country^^ before he built his models for their de-
velopment, one cannot minimize the impact that he has made
in the field of political development. In the introduction
to the book he helped edit, The Politics of the Developing
Areas, he endeavors to show the importance of the political
systems of the new states. He uses the systems approach of
structural functional analysis to show the importance of
the component parts of those political systems. Although
Almond does not deal specifically with the concept of politi-
cal change in that work, he implies that change entails the
ability of any political system to deal with any strains which
may impinge on it. He maintains that since all political
systems have component parts which perform functions to sus-
tain those systems v;here these functions have been performed
20satisfactorily, change has occurred.
It was in 1966 that Almond, together with Bingham
Powell tried to articulate an explicit concept of political
change. They wrote that " Change results when existing
structure and culture of the political system is unable to
19Gabriel Almond. Political Development : Essays in
Heuristic Theory (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), p. 21.
^^Gabriel Almond and James Coleman, eds., The Politics
of the Developing Areas (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1960T7 PP- 8-11.
11
cope with the problem or challenge which confronts it with-
out further structural differentiation and cultural seculari-
21
zation." The political system must be able to handle well
what Lucian Pye would later call crises.
Thus for Almond, the theory of political change
deals with functions. What he does is to stress the prob-
lem solving capacity of the system. It demands or draws
attention to participation and centralization. It links
new role structures and personal belonging. But there are
some unanswered questions. To what extent should both
participation and centralization be tolerated? Is partici-
pation absolutely necessary to keep any political system
alive? Further criticism of the systems theory can be found at
the end of the chapter, where the component parts of the
Dominican political system are analyzed. But suffice it to
say at this point that what detracts from Almond's descrip-
tion is his heavy emphasis on stability which gives one
the
impression that the dynamic system which he is after is
in
reality a very static one.
^^Gabriel Almond and Bingham P^^^^l^ ' f
'
^2|£|£|tix|
Politics : A Developmental Approach (Boston:
Little, Brown and
Company, 1966), p. 34.
1971), p. 102.
12
On a more mundane level, Lucian Pye describes change
as the successful handling of a series of six crises by a
23
country. These are that of identity, legitimacy, pene-
tration, participation, integration, and distribution.
Identity means simply that a people see themselves as part
of something they call their country. Some have argued that
the West Indies will never be a nation since its people have
not been able to identify with something called the West
Indies because they did not have to fight for their "freedom."
Legitimacy is the acceptance of the right of a
government to rule regardless of how it came to power. But
the accepted procedure for changing governments must be re-
spected by the contending parties in the political system.
Penetration is the ability of the governmental machinery to
go out to reach the people to ensure a certain degree of
participation. It also involves the conscious effort of
genuinely trying to reach out to the people with goods and
services. Participation is the deliberate encouragement of
the masses to partake in the running of public and private
affairs. Pye • s shortcoming is that he does not indicate that
extensive participation, which may jeopardize stability,
may not be a necessary ingredient to the survival
of a
political system.
^^Lucian Pye, Aspects of Political Development
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1966), pp. 63-66.
13
Pye refers to integration as the government's ability
to effectively coordinate policy to ensure its efficient
execution. Obviously, this is only one meaning of integra-
tion, but the other crises cover other meanings of the term
to a great extent. Finally, distribution means the sharing
of available resources with the polity at large. Pye cau-
tions his readers that these crises may not necessarily
occur simultaneously or separately. But when does one know
that a crisis exists? A nation may misread a problem and
act frantically to handle what it has diagnosed as a crisis,
and it turns out that such did not exist.
Pye's description is too neat and he could have been
more precise in indicating what each of these crises entails.
His analysis is too broad; for example, a participation
crisis for Burma may not be the same as one for Jamaica.
But, as if Pye did not create enough confusion with his
description of political change as the handling of a series
of crises, in 1972 a group of scholars probably thought they
were writing the definitive work on change by using the Pye
approach. All well-known scholars in the developmental
field, Leonard Binder, Dankwart Rustow, James Coleman, are
represented.
2\eonard Binder et al. , eds., Crises and Se^uen^
in Political Development (Princeton: Princeton
University
Press, 1971)
.
14
Leonard Binder leads the attack by charging that
political change entails critical changes of identity from
religious to ethnic, from parochial to societal groupings.
To handle the legitimacy crisis well is to change from "the
transcendental to immanent" realities. But contrary to
this belief, Jon Rosenbaum writes that the beliefs in the
nether world can be used to bring about modernization.
Superstitious beliefs may create "a credible coercive appa-
25
ratus in the formation of a functional political system,"
the same thing that people like Binder would like see happen.
The Machiavellian dictum that if religion can help to keep
the Prince in power, it should be used but otherwise it
should be destroyed comes to mind. Likewise, if a people
are steeped in other worldly beliefs, this can be used as
a starting point to bring a desired change which might
destroy those beliefs, but in a very deceptive manner.
Binder continues with his analysis and writes about
participation as the masses getting involved in the affairs
which touch upon their lives - in effect, the group should
become more important than the family. By implication what
the group can do for the individual the family cannot
do
as well.
^Son H. Rosenbaum and Peter C. Sederberg , "The
ult and Political Development," Comparative
Politics
Occ
(July, 1971), p. 566.
15
In dealing with distribution, Binder wants status to
be based on merit and achievement. He insists on a degree
of "control and management of capital," and also a "degree
of administrative and legal penetration into the social
26structure and to the remote regions of the country."
Change cannot take place where advancement is based on ne-
potism and ascription. Binder does not end his discussion
here but goes on to prescribe solutions to the problems of
the developing v/orld.
To him, the solutions of these problems rest with
the type of institutions these nations possess. If the
institutions are strong, complex, structurally differen-
tiated, the polity has a chance to develop; if it is not
developed yet, by extension its problems become solvable.
These institutions ,. namely , elections, bureaucracy, govern-
ment, to name a few, must be big to facilitate the increase
in services as the population increases. But Joseph La
Palombara warns that the extension of services does not
28
necessarily mean that modernization is achieved. Henry
Bienen echoes the same sentiment when he writes that change
entails effective political institutions, but hastens to add
26Binder et al., eds., Crises , p. 53.
^"^Ibid.
,
pp. 69-71.
2Qjoseph La Palombara, Bureaucracy and Political
Bevelopment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963),
p. 29.
16
that they could be competitive or decentralized in any
29
system. In fact, competition and decentralization are not
in themselves hostile to change. A highly locatized deter-
mination of political decisions may not be tantamount to
chaos. (The reverse might be the case; both Canada and
the Caribbean have demonstrated that point and even in the
United States, a most "developed" society, the trend is
toward local autonomy). Consequently, the literature which
equates change with an increase of power or complex govern-
ment must be read with cuation. Power does not have to be
moved from the village to the city and thence to the national
level. A decentralized government does not necessarily ne-
gate a degree of secularization that is required to perform
certain functions. But the degree of secularization,
observes La Palombara, will depend on the goal the nation
has set for itself. Pye still insists that the ultimate
test of change is the ability of a people to "establish large,
complex, but flexible organizational forms." Simultaneously,
there must be a multiplicity of individuals and procedures
to settle disputes. And even prior to Pye and Bienen,
*Henry Bienen, "What Does Political Development Mean
" World Politics (October, 1967), p. 141.
29,
in Africa,
^^Joseph La Palombara, Bureaucracy and Political
Development , p. 40.
^^Lucian Pye, Politics , Personality and Nation-
Building (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), p.
^i.
17
Samuel P. Huntington was equating change with a respect for
complex institutions. But he always warned that mass mobili-
zation or a highly politicized people could prevent the growth
32
of these complex institutions.
Using the differentiated syndrome as a guide, Wendell
Bell sees Jamaican society as being developed since there is
an increasing "scale of society." He was happy to report
that the elites were responding to the demands of the system.
Bell continues: "the organization of human effort had
become more intricate in Jamaica
,
and managerial and super-
visory personnel both in and out of government. . . had
increased in importance. Differentiation of function ,
specialization
,
rationality and impersonality had increased .
"
33
The society had developed politically. But by 1970, the
Jamaica Government has become increasingly repressive as
citizens and residents demanded more services which the
elites were unwilling to render. Bell was fooled into be-
lieving that mere passivity on the part of Jamaicans was a
sign of satisfaction, hence change.
^^Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development and
Political Decay," World Politics , (April, 1965), pp. 386-430.
Huntington has since changed his mind on change, m ''The
Change to Change: Modernization, Development and Politics,
Comparative Politics (April, 1971), pp. 283-322. There he
argues that it becomes superfluous to talk about change
since all countries automatically go througa that process.
^^Wendell Bell, "Equality and Attitudes of Elites in
Jamaica," Social and Economic S tudies (December, 1962), p.
429; (emphasis added).
18
On another level, Claude Ake sees political change^^
as nothing more than social mobilization. He concerns him-
self with the basic question which besets all developing
countries: which political system, with the minimum amount
of disintegrative effort, will in the short run bring about
social mobilization. Ake is convinced that the authoritarian,
paternal, identific, and consensual political system seems
to be the answer to the political problems of the developing
countries
•
The process of integration is change for Myron
Weiner. To him, integration could mean any of the following:
bringing ethnic groups together to form a nation out of a
state, establishing central authority with the periphery
acquiescing, linking the masses with the elite, having the
minimum value consensus to uphold a' social order, sustaining
a capacity to organize for a common goal or holding a system
36
together by whatever means available. In the final analy-
sis, political change concerns itself with "expanding
functions of the political system," so it has to deal with
the "new level of integration" which is essential to en-
sure a smooth functioning of the political system.
^^ciaude Ake, "Political Integration and Political
Stability: A Hypothesis," World Politics (April, 1967), p.
488.
^^Myron Weiner, "Political Integration and
Political
Development/' The HumaA Factor in Political Development ,
ed.
by Monte PalmeFTWaltham , Mass.: Ginn, 19/0), p.
i^-l.
^^Ibid., p. 194.
37Ibid.
,
p. 200.
19
supportive of Weiner is Claude Ake, who refers to the same
phenomenon, integration, as "building a coherent political
society,
• .
which involves an increase in cultural
homogeneity and value consensus. The society elicits
from the indivudual deference and devotion to the claims
38of the state." As a result, social communication is
broadened and intensified. Essentially these two writers
are dealing with the ideal, but are not outlining how
it is to be arrived at.
Disturbed by the inadequacies of the literature on
change, Fred Riggs introduces a new phenomenon to the
field. He dismisses the dichotomy between the traditional
and the modern society described earlier in this chapter.
Between these two societies, he puts what he terms the
39prismatic society. But by doing that he falls into the
same trap that those before him had fallen into, because by
his definition of the prismatic society, not fully modern,
not fully traditional, there exists no modern society since
no society drops all its traditionalisms. A more detailed
analysis of his prismatic society shows that he sees it as
a halfway house where elements of the modern society exist
Claude Ake, A Theory of Political Integration
(Homewood, 111.: The Dorsey Press, 1967), pp. 96-7.
^^Fred Riggs, Administration in Developing Countries
The Theory of Prismatic Society (Boston; Houghton Mifflin,
1964)
,
passim .
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side by side with traditional elements. In such a system,
certain people are favored because they have status. Law
and practices are obeyed to the best of one's ability but
are sometimes disregarded as the situation presents itself.
The problem with this analysis is that he gives the im-
pression that these very practices outlined above are not
performed in the advanced societies. They may be more
apparent in the new states because of their small size,
but these very practices occur in other parts of the world
and certainly in the advanced societies as well.
An additional problem with Riggs» analysis is his
introduction of administration as an independent variable
in the process of change. Administration is not static
and not independent. It demands a lot of support from its
environment. How it can effect political change drastically
is still not very clear and Riggs has created more con-
fusion than anything else. When he writes about formalism
(legalism) in relation to the society, he does not show
how it should be measured. For example, if
the law makes
school attendance mandatory, to Riggs that
would be a
degree of formalism. But, if in that same
society, many
schools remain unused, can a general
statement be made
that this society is prismatic since
the situation warrants
the disregarding of a law7 Testing for
formalism in re-
gards to school attendance in this
case becomes hazardous;
some children may be attending
school on a part-time basis.
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How can that be measured?
Also, Riggs gives the distinct impression that the
society is on an ascending order and is being dragged
along by the main variable, the bureaucracy. He commits the
same error that others before him had committed by insinua-
ting that the traditional order will inevitably disintegrate
and will be replaced by a higher and better one.
40Chalmers Johnson describes change as the capacity
of top leadership to engineer complex programs to stimulate
social and economic change. In the same vein, a few people
have seen the emergence of a charismatic leader as an interim
step to full political development which means that the
leader's primary role is to convince the people to accept
the state. As it were, he tries to handle the identity
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crisis satisfactorily. Immanuel Wallers tein conjectures
that this is particularly useful where there are deep seated
parochialisms. This sounds plausible and indeed is very
simple. But one must exercise caution especially after
reviev;ing the experiences of the developing countries with
self-appointed messiahs. If a country is looking for a
Messiah, so be it. But a charismatic leader, or what passes
for such, is not necessarily a good leader. Carl
^^Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change (Boston:
Little, Brown, 1966), p. 104.
^Wnuel Wallerstein, Afr^^: Tlr^ 9l In^^
pendence (New York: Vintage Books, 1961), p.
y^.
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Frederick v;arns that it does not necessarily provide
adequate type of leadership, though it certainly provides
power and selfishness and self-esteem which may preclude
innovations and new leaders with new ideas. No further
argument is necessary to demonstrate that point; the Caribbean
has more than its share of examples (which will be discussed
in Chapters Four and Six).
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Political change is often equated with democracy.
Talcott Parsons is surely representative of this thinking.
He writes that the terminal goal of the developed society is
to be associated with democratic minded leaders. This des-
tination seems to be based on the American model. Thus, the
beginning of this long process is sometimes seen as negative
and the phrase, the "non-Western political process," is used
to describe it. The change process is analyzed as "problems,"
"conditions," determinants," and a progression toward this
miUenium. Obviously, to achieve this a "stable democracy"^^
is mandatory.
an
^Varl Frederick, "Political Leadership and the Prob-
lem of Charismatic Power/' Journal of Politi^
(February,
1961), pp. 3-24.
^^Talcott Parsons, Sociological T_heorx^ Modern
Society (New York: The Free Press, 1966), p.
t^iy-
^^M;,rtin Needier, "Political Development and
Socio-
ar i\ieeuxeL y^tin America," Amer ican
Economic Development : The Case of La
,.eric ^
.^
Political science Revie^
^^^her articles and books which see
addition there are several °th ^^^^^
-^^^^"^ Development:
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La Palombara disagrees and says that the Anglo-
American model is not the logical end product of political
change. Democracy is utterly opposed to rapid change. He
further states that the degree of complexity of the political
system is not related to democratic forms.'^^ To re-emphasize
La Palombara' s point, Karl de Schweinctz^^ argues that the
political possibilities of the developing countries do not
allow for democracy. Because the developing countries have
been shown that there is a need to catch up v;ith the advanced
countries, they can ill-afford to practice American demo-
47
cracy.
Finally, political scientists increasingly are
relating law to political change. They argue that the
lawyers from the developing areas have all been trained in
the metropole and for this reason bring certain values back
to their countries. They become the leading politicians and
Measurements and Analysis," American Sociological Review
(April, 1963), pp. 253-64; Seymour M. Lipset, "Some Social
Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political
Legitimacy," American Political Science Review (March, 1959),
pp. 69-105; David C. McClelland, The Achieving Society
(Princeton: D. Van Nostrand, 1961 )
.
Joseph La Palombara, Bureaucracy and Political
Development
,
p. 10»
^^Karl de Schweinctz, Industrialization and Democracy :
Economic Necessities and Political Consequences TNgw York:
John V/iley, 1964), passim .
'^"''cB. Macpherson, The Real World of Democracy
(Toronto: Toronto UniversitTl^ress , 1966). Macpherson argues
that they have a form of democracy peculiar to them.
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get intiiTiately involved in the nation-building process which
often follov;s the state-building process.
Because of this fact, the pundits from the developed
areas are increasingly writing about law as the basis for
political change. Ralph Braibanti writes that law has acted
as a guide leading people to this "collective earthly exis-
48tence." Others have seen law as a major obstacle to polit-
ical change, especially in areas which were once under
colonial rule. It is argued that since these lawyers were
schooled in the metropolitan areas they were taught that
rituals can regulate almost all disputes. They somehow
believed that, and stopped any rapid change which is always
49
seen as disruptive.
Of course, to accept this analysis is to accept
Mr. Dunn's (quoted above) idea of change which essentially
means emulating the more advanced countries. What Dunn fails
to see is that a brake on rapid change may be positive con-
tribution to development (more on that at the end of this
chapter). Indeed law is related to political change, but
the socialization process goes much further than that. It
will be seen that there are other less tangible variables
which have greater effect on change.
Ralph Braibanti, "The Role of Law in Political
Development," International and Corporative Law of the Common-
wealth , ed. by Robert Wilson~(Durham, N.C: Duke University
Press, 1968), pp. 12-18.
"^^W.M. Dunn, 'Law and the Political Development of New
States," Social and Economic Studies (March, 1971), p. 20.
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Critique of the Systems Approach
It was suggested at the beginning of this chapt(
that the system theory would be used to explain and describe
the political situation in Dominica. Thus, it is here that
the shortcomings of this approach will be outlined, as far
as the author can discern, in an effort to bypass the pit-
falls of those before him, who have used the same approach.
System is here defined as an organized and apparent
coherent body which tries to explain the inter-relationship
between identifiable variables. "Identifiable" must be
emphasized since unidentified variables may be just as im-
portant as the identified ones. Even v;hen other variables
are identified, the exact nature of their impact will prob-
ably never be made clear. Secondly, it is assumed that
within this structure, the variables are sub-structures in
themselves; even the individual is a sub-structure, in the
sense that he possesses within him multiple variables.
Thirdly, it is assumed that this system has a structure
which implies a definite boundary and that its sole reason
for being is to remain stable, to revert to a level of equili-
brium, a situation where all parts function as they were
meant to. Obviously, this is a ticklish problen^ especially
when one tries to identify how a certain element was meant
to function. Then, finally, there is feedback based on
inputs and outputs which eventually change the nature of the
system, presumably in a positive way. By extension,
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degeneration has no place inP± m this scheme of things.
The system theory demands i-h;.^-y ^itiiiianas t at an assortment of
Skills are available to ensure its smooth operation. The
system is continually growing more complex and for this
reason demands individually trained experts to man the
emerging multi-complex structure.
All these factors sound good, but there are innu-
merable problems. First, one must set clearly where the
boundaries of this system are to be marked. In a con-
tinually shrinking world, boundaries are getting more
blurred by the hour. Where would one set the boundary of
the Dominican political system? Does it include British
politics? It is true that Dominican politics will never
affect British politics, as much as the British can still
affect its politics, but what happens in each system may
affect the other. For example, if for some reason civil
war were to break out in Dominica and the British overreacted
by deploying troops who went on to destroy Dominica, the
British Government would surely be adversely affected by
this action. There is no question that if Britain decides
to cut all aid to Dominica, this will change the nature of
Dominican politics in one way or the other. Does that mean
that the Dominican political system may have to include
outside limits?
Secondly, the system theorists give the impression
that all the identifiable variables act in a reciprocal
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fashion: people, things, institutions. The terminology
employed is, to say the least, ambiguous if they are to
be applied in all situations. For example, "interest
aggregation," "communication," "rule application," and
"adjudication" are always used with general applicability,
with little or not regard for the specific situation under
study. The theorists fail to realize that a mass demon-
stration in Dominica may be as much interest aggregation
as a wife insisting to her husband president that women
deserve better treatment in the society. Labelling both
as interest aggregation with no explanation does not seem
correct. One critic writes that "a demand from a union
leader might be both interest articulation and communica-
51tion;" therefore, how does one label an action when it can
fall under two or more rubrics?
Thirdly, reasons for failure in the system are some-
times tautological. The explanation for failure is simply
put: the system failed to respond to the challenges of the
time. The theorists never ask the critical question of why
were demands made or v;hy they had to come sooner or later?
What really happened to bring about the system's downfall is
never explained,
Joseph La Palombara raises that very point in his
"Macrotheories and Microapplications in Conservative Politics:
A Widening Chasm," Comparative Politics (October, 1968), passim ,
^^Alexander Groth, "Structural Functional ism and
Political Development: Three Problems," The Western Political
Quarterly (September, 1970), p. 489.
52
^^Ibid.
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Fourthly, there is the problem of relationships.
Why should one problem precipitate a crisis? Could it not
be that the crisis was already in the making for years
and it took one small event to set it off? in addition,
all crises should not be labelled as pathological, as the
system theorist implies. Further, hov; does one test the
system to diagnose its adaptability or disintegration
over a period of time? As Alexander J. Groth correctly
asks, v/ho is to say that an urban riot is more destructive
to a system than the non-production of first-class music
5 3by a nation?
Finally, the over-emphasis on specialization because
of the so-called complex nature of the system seems to
be uncalled for. Because a nation has a shortage of
manpower and it finds its several structures being manned
by a few individuals is no sign of its inferior nature or
its impending breakdown. The reasons for breakdown are
far more complex than a lack of specialization. And,
obviously, to go along with the several experts is to
accept the need and inevitable democratic structure which
the system theorists see as the best v/ay to maintain the
^^Ibid.
, p. 492.
29
system on tho desired course. Groth argues that the
opposite might be the case since democratic tolerance may
precipitate atomic behavior. Open discussion does not
necessarily lead to the maintenance of social order. By
the same token, the autocratic system may not be more
capable of distributing the services of a system. Groth
calls upon the theorists to be more realistic in their
model building by incorporating some history into them.
La Palombara calls on them to explain the "black box,"
55the system, or go back to political science to explain
the basic structures of the government. Only then can
they get fancy v/ith their explanations since by then the
box vjill no longer be black, nor v/hite, but transparent.
With these warnings in mind, we turn to a
diagrammatic sketch and description of the Dominican
political system which has undergone very little change
from the time it was a colonial polity to its present
status of Associate Statehood - semi-independence.
^"^Ibid.
,
p. 493.
^^This point was made by Joseph La Palombara at a
lecture at the University of Massachusetts during the Fall
of 1972.
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The Dominican Political Syst<
The first major characteristic of the Dominican
political system is that it is very small. This makes
anonymity impossible. Second, the walls surrounding the
various groups are not impregnable. m fact, the diagram
shows that all the groups, save one, in the system are
connected in one way or the other. The ruling party is
in the center of everything and draws all other groups
into controversies at will. The bureaucracy is under the
power of the ruling party, with the local government
agency replacing the trade union as an agent of political
socialization. The trade unions have since struck up a
relationship with the Employers Union, which has some of
its key personnel in the ruling party. The dotted line
from the ruling party to the Black Power movement indicates
attempts made by that party to communicate with the Movement.
The Movement has not returned the courtesy since, in its
opinion, the ruling party has refused to tackle the major
problems of agrarian reform in the country. But one may
notice that all other groups have not tried to communicate
with the Black Power Movement, though they have all shown a
fear of it by their actions and pronouncements.
Another major characteristic of the political system
is the fact that both the ruling party and Black Power
Movement are highly influenced by outside forces. The
ruling party has kept a close association with other
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British Caribbean Government c; c-u t^Lnme us. These governments have
shown a desire to c^-f-Fc^r-^T tt^t
.ffec.ively contain any revolutionary
elements which might upset the existing system. The
Black Power
.^.ovement has been influenced by two sets of
people. First, it has close ties with other movements
like it in the Caribbean, and also corresponds with leaders
who have been forced to live in places like North America
and Great Britain. Thus, presently, the Movement in Dominica
is fighting an uphill battle, as the government has all the
machinery to stymie its drive.
The other elements who might otherwise join the
Movement to fight the Government have weighed the credits
and debits of such a move and decided against it. They
may be able to see the demise of the present system in
the long run but have chosen to disprove the Marxian rule
that even the bourgeoisie will join the inevitable revolu-
tion to hasten the destruction of the system. Instead,
the so-called opposition has joined forces with the
Government on the major issues, such as keeping the system
as it is. These elites have enough power to prove the
Easton assertion that constitutional equilibrium will always
be maintained in a political system as long as the various
5 Gclasses agree on the rules of the game.
David Easton, The Political System (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1963), p. 296.
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Although the elites have accepted the system and
are generally satisfied with the scheme of things, those
who do not rule want to rule. They want to enjoy some
of the prestige that goes with ruling. For this reason,
members of the opposition party will precipitate a con-
flict which ends in crisis. A minor issue can bring about
a conflict which can be helpful in any political system.
It can keep the Government from being too lackadaisical in
dealing with the various interests. But crisis develops
when the response to the precipitated conflict is a show
of power. Thus, since 1967, Dominica has experienced two
major crises which began as conflicts. The first sur-
rounded the renaming of a street from Queen Mary Street to
Freedom Street, the name of the party which made the change.
The second dealt with the inability of a high school
principal to communicate with a handful of boys.
The first conflict ended in a crisis because the
Government responded by initiating legislation in the
National Assembly to dissolve the local body, dominated
by Freedom Party members, which had changed the name of
the street. The Freedom Party responded by including the
entire island in the struggle and marched to take over the
national government. The second ended in a crisis (it
was a crisis since all the teachers left and the school
closed down) because instead of intervening peacefully to
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investigate who was wrong, the government began accusing
the Opposition Party of running the school. This was the
same charge the school boys had levelled against the
principal v;hen he refused to see them.
Both of these crises cost the people a tremendous
amount of money and the waste of valuable time. There are
no signs that this pattern v/ill not repeat itself in the
future. The government is increasingly gaining support in
the rural areas and encouraging a fight between the rural
and urban elements. The Opposition Party is equally bad.
It lacks any form of unity and many of its members lack
credibility. But one group which stands to gain is the
Black Power Movement, It is the only group which has had
regional appeal in the entire Caribbean. The leaders in
Dominica still feel that they can keep the Movement down, but,
increasingly, the machinery of police and army is losing
its monopoly on violence. The Movement has its own share
of violent elements. And besides, it is making a con-
certed effort to educate the people politically while it
continues to draw support of all kinds from the outside.
At present the system has shown no signs of changing.
The power wielders have a firm grip, but they are losing
their hold. Within five years, they will have to reckon
with the Black Power Movement in Dominica.
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CHAPTER II
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN DOMINICA
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to present a brief
constitutional history of Dominica, to put the study in
perspective. Having described the location, size and popu-
lation make up of the island, the study moves to an assess-
ment of the Spanish, French and British occupations.
It is significant to note that the story of
Dominica really begins in the 1880 's, when Britain saw fit
to rule the island directly to protect the population
against the upper class elements. This move, a good one in
intention, turned out to be a major obstacle in the advance-
ment of the island toward the intended goal of self-govern-
ment. This had to be so because the person sent out of
Britain to supervise that job did not want any "trouble"
with the elites. It was one thing to protect the natives
but it was another to ensure that protection. The Governor
had his own career to protect and, further, he had to live
with these elites. For these reasons, he played it safe by
keeping government at the minimum.
One cannot ignore the importance of the colonial
constitution. It has always been a crucial variable in the
political system of former British colonies. In these
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colonies, the British had impressed on the leader the im-
portance of a constitution; though, they themselves never
bothered to write one for themselves. The Caribbean leaders
took the British very seriously. One cannot cynically
appraise the constitutions of the Caribbean Islands. Any
such appraisal is an indication of a lack of understanding
of this instrument in its environment. One will always be
fascinated by the independence constitution of a former
British Caribbean colony because it marks the beginning of
a very tenuous situation. In colonial times, a constitution
existed; but the Governor was above that constitution. Now
the leaders are told they cannot assume a similar position,
though many try to. It becomes fascinating to see how the
leaders react to the new situation. A piece of paper is now
supreme and not the European.
Another good reason for reviewing the constitution
is the fact that it may derive its sustenance from the socio-
political culture, and in the process, may alter that cul-
ture or be altered by it. It becomes important to look at
the fine print to uncover the amount of "spirit" that is
needed to keep the constitution operational. For, in viewing
the Dominican constitution, if it leans heavily on props
which are non-existent or alien to Dominica, trouble will
inevitably ensue. In addition, various contending parties
may enter the ring to interpret what might become a useless
piece of paper. If the constitution is based on a model
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which best suits an "advanced" country, and there are in-
dications that it does, trouble might also result. If there
are "rules of the game" which are frequently disregarded,
breakdowns could become an established fixture of the system.
Certainly, the constitution is not the only important
variable in the colonial system, but it cannot be ignored.
And it is precisely for this reason that it is being re-
viewed here.
Location - Size and Population
Dominica (pronounced Dom-in-ee-ka) is the largest
of the six Associated States of the Caribbean, with an area
of 287.9 square miles and a population of 70,000 (1970 census)
The people ar-e mostly of African descent with some European
blood. The population of J-iominica is said to be 99% mixed,
though by 1973, they all considered themselves Black.
Located between Guadeloupe to the North, and Mar-
tinique to the South (French islands), on latitude 15° 30"
(N) and longitude 61° 15" (W), it forms part of the Windward
Group (not to be confused with the Dutch Windward group,
see map on following page). Although so close to these
French Islands, the relationship between them is often
negligible. Most Dominicans speak a French-Creole, spoken
in both Martinique and Guadeloupe, but its British background
has precluded any French connection. Very few Dominicans
speak pure French. If they do, this is no indication of
the
Dominica in relation to the other islands in the Eastern
Caribbean
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French impact on the island. From time to time a group of
French students and, increasingly, adults visit Dominica,
only to be tucked away in some hotel. The native Dominican
may come around to view them. The visiting French people
may even be warned to beware of Black Power advocates who
may try to indoctrinate them. Should such an attempt be
made, they are warned, the police should be contacted im-
mediately."^ In any case, the Dominican youth must keep his
distance, since he does not understand or speak French, in
spite of the amount of French that he is taught at the
schools. The Government has not seen the need to encourage
the use of French but by 1972, the new wave was to learn
Spanish since plans were in the making to establish some
kind of relation with Venezuela, some six hundred miles
away.
Let it be made clear from the start that Dominica
is a land full of contradictions. Its leaders can be very
unimaginative and incompetent. It is not unusual to hear
the expression "typical Dominica" whenever something goes
wrong. Anyone who studies Dominica's history closely, comes
out with the idea that somehow nothing goes right for this
unfortunate place. The following section will support that
hypothesis
•
^Based on informal interviews with vacationing French
students in Dominica during the Summer of 1972.
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The Historical Overview
The Spanish and Dominica ^
It is reported that Christopher Columbus came upon
Dominica on November 3, 1493, He named it Domingo in honor
of the day on which it was sighted. The original name of
the island was IVaitikubi. But this name change was an
indication of things to come, the virtual annihilation of
Dominica's original inhabitants, the Arawaks and Caribs.
Thus, the years 1493-1635 marked the heroic attempts of the
Carib Indians to prevent the Spanish from taking their
island.
Very little is known about the history of the Caribs
other than that they were very fierce and ate human flesh,
preferrably non-European, They lived in the smaller islands
as they had pushed the less warlike Arawaks to the bigger
^
islands. They v;ere on their v;ay to exterminating the Arav;ak
men, when they were interrupted by the Europeans, Dominica
still has some of its Caribs but these have been made cul-
turally part of Dominica, though they live on a reservation,
the only one of its kind in the Caribbean,
Columbus and his men did not remain on Dominica
since prospects for getting gold. were bleak. The inhabi-
tants had given them a little less than a warm welcome.
See Joseph Borome, "Spain and Dominica," Caribbean
Quarterly (December, 1966), pp. 30-46.
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During the 15th century, the Spaniards returned to
Dominica but were unable to establish themselves in the
area because the Caribs were too unpredictable. Because of
this situation many Spaniards tried to convince the Queen
of Spain that Dominica should be taken forcibly but she
refused, believing that the Bible could do the job of
domesticating these natives. And since Dominica was too
small to be made into a separate province, it was placed
under the province of Puerto Rico. This was to increase
the revenue of the Church and to pay for the maintenance
of the colonial administration.
But as the 16th century came to a close, Spanish
interests moved away from the West Indies to attend to more
pressing problems at home. The Spanish Armada was defeated
in 1588 and at the same time both the French and British
were hurriedly trying to establish themselves in the
Caribbean. At one time, the Spanish thought seriously of
trying to reassert their dominance over the Caribbean by
sending their nationals to reside there. But this came to
naught as the harsh reality was only too clear: the golden
century of Spain was at an end. Besides, this last effort
was underscored by the move of the French to annex Dominica
by Treaty in 1640, when Pierre Breton, a French priest set
foot on Dominica. The Spanish never did settle Dominica.
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The French and Dominica
To mark the beginning and end of the French occupa-
tion of Dominica is a problematic affair since it was during
that era (1635 - 1804) that the island changed hands no less
than fourteen times. Thus to label this era (1635 - 1805)
as the French occupation is at best a neat way to get around
a complex problem. There is no doubt that the French left
an indelible mark on Dominica. This is reflected in the
language of Dominica today. As stated, the majority of
Dominicans understand and speak a French-Creole. In addition,
the many names and customs introduced by the French still
persist today.
From all reports, it seems that the French had a
better encounter with the Caribs of Dominica. The first
French inhabitants were Friars; the laymen were not too
interested in Dominica because it was too rugged and in-
timidating with its v/arlike Indians. But somehow there were
more enterprising Frenchmen who were willing to brave all
the hazards. These v;ere less fortunate Frenchmen who failed
to make it elsewhere and decided to try their luck in
Dominica. But during that time (1660 's) the importance of
Dominica was in the accessibility it offered to the French
islands of Martinique and Guadeloupe. It was also in that
very year, 1660, that Dominica was being signed over to
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the Caribs,^ as though it did not originally belong to them.
This 1660 treaty came under the scrutiny of both
the British and French in 1686, when the French claim was
contested by the British who were settling in nearby areas.
The problem was temporarily settled in favor of the French,
because the British were not strong enough to forcibly land
on Dominica. The dispute over ownership flared up again in
1715; but this time, the British v;ere more concerned with
St. Lucia, which was a better area. As Dominica was so
close to St. Lucia, there was no harm in acquiring Dominica
also. The British claim was even more "justified," since
"Indian" VJarner, son of Sir Thomas Warner, was Governor of
Dominica. Such a heated dispute ensued that both warring
nations suggested that they withdraw their claims and leave
4Dominica neutral.
The War of Jenkin's Ear fought between the British
and French, was to interrupt life in Dominica for four
years (1744-8). Both the French and British fought hard
for ito The ensuing peace treaty signed in 1748, at Aix-
la-Chapelle, made Dominica neutral. This neutrality was to
last eleven years, when the strategic value of the island
This treaty was "signed" between the Caribs and the
French. By this treaty, the Caribs agreed to have Dominica
as long as they relinquished their claim to St. Kitts and St
Croix. An account of this treaty is contained in Cuthbert A
Burns, History of the British West Indies (London: George
Allen and Unwin, 1965)., p. 222.
^Ibid
. ,
p. 265
.
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was again recognized.
The war (1759 - 1763), again fought between the
British and the French, brought Dominica under the wings
of the British. It was during that time that the British
chopped up Dominica into estates, sold them to British
nationals and used the money to fill Queen Charlotte's dowry„^
Not a cent of the proceeds was returned to the colony„ But
although the British flag flew in Dominica, the French
people were already entrenched there. When the French re-
turned in 1778, their job was made much easier because of
the presence of a huge French population. But the French
soldiers committed the unforgivable mistake of burning
Roseau, the capital city, and, in the process, earned the
antagonism of their people since their property was des-
troyed. Consequently, by 1795 the remaining French people
in Dominica began to change their allegiance to the British
who had shown greater compassion. As it turned out, by
1804 when the French returned to occupy Dominica, they were
successful initially but were quickly routed by their own
mistakes. In the first place, they had already lost the
respect of their own nationals. Secondly, they lacked the
courage to fight on even after great successes. But the
British remained and held on tenaciously, regaining Dominica
Alec Waugh, The Sugar Islands : A Collection of Pieces
V.'ritten about the West Indies (New York: L. Cassell, 1958)^
pp. 281-284.
^Cuthbert A. Burns, British West Indies , p. 520.
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in 1805. The saga, of Dominica under British began to take
shape.
The British and Dominica
'^
The first phase 1805-1897
. The slave trade to the
Caribbean ended in 1807. Slavery itself was outlawed in
1832, followed by a period of apprenticeship between 1832-
1838. This last period was intended to cushion the shock
of freedom for the Negro and the acceptance of that fact
by his former master. The story of the Negro begins with
his plight to make it in a free but alien world. With the
passage of the 1831 Brown Privilege Bill,^ the Whites wrongly
assumed that the upper crust of the Negro element—the
Coloreds—would push for more rights for the Negro. Little
did the Whites realize that this "threatening" element could
have been effectively coopted, and in the process dominated.
In fact, the Coloreds did fight the Whites, but the former
never intended to include the lov;er class Negroes in any
gained benefits. The fighting Coloreds were acting on their
own behalf and not that of anyone else.
This section relies heavily on Joseph Borome, "How
Crown Colony Government Came to Dominica by 1898," Caribbean
Studies (October, 1969), pp. 26-27. But the interpretation
of the facts is that of this writer,
^The Bill granted full political and social rights
to all non-Whites.
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What emerged in Dominica were three group interests,
two active and one very much passive. The passive section,
the masses, were included in the conflict, only when it
suited the purposes of the two other groups.- The two active
participants were the Whites, clearly in the minority
numerically, and the more prosperous Negroes—the Coloreds
also a minority in relation to the masses. This conflict
shed light on the intentions of the contestants. The two
privileged groups were intent on not paying taxes for the
upkeep of the colony. Though in all fairness to the upper
class Negroes, the Whites had a greater obligation to pay
for the colonial administration. Before emancipation, they
received the benefits of the colony and even continued to do
so after emancipation.
This era marked the quintessence of elite politics
in Dominica, The bankruptcy of the politicians of the day
was ably described in the following remark: "The politicians
were ignorant of the principles of government. They were
9
uneducated and revengeful."
The first major fight came in 1850 when the Colored
leaders were intent on enfranchising the masses although they
9The Dominican Colonist
,
July, 1854, quoted m
Joseph Borome, o£_. cit .
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knew that the latter was mostly illiterate. This was seen
as necessary to ensure the Colored elites continuous domina-
tion of the Assembly. Quite obviously, the Whites were
afraid of that move since it would mark the -end of their
mastery of not only the Assembly, but also the society.
The masses were not enfranchised, and the next
fight centered around making the Assembly ° a wholly nominated
body to ensure wider representation of the people at large.
Keeping in character, the Colored elites were opposed. They
were sure to be replaced with more "acceptable" elements;
elements who could work as a team to improve the island.
The Whites were for the idea, although there was no guarantee
that their interests would be protected. But the fact that
one of their own, the Governor, would be making the appoint-
ments, was soothing enough to make the idea acceptable.
By the 1880 's, there v;ere other issues which com-
manded the attention of the Colored elites. Dominica was
in a British federation with the Leeward Islands (Antigua,
St. Kitts, Nevis-Anguilla and Montserrat), but few Dominicans
were allotted key positions in the national government.
Other nationals held key posts right in Dominica. This time
the Coloreds were led by a certain William Davies who was
determined to remove Dominica from that federation.
"""^From 1898, when Crovm Colony Government was intro-
duced in Dominica, the Executive and the Legislative bodies
formed the Assembly. .In 1951, the Assembly was renamed the
Legislative Council, With Associate Statehood, the Legisla-
tive Council has been renamed Assembly.
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The idea of enfranchising the electorate was brought
up again in 1886; but this time, it was at the suggestion of
the Governor who intended to "displace a conflict" he was
having with the Colored elites. His plan was to get the
people politically conscious to help hiin defeat candidates
like Davies who had proven themselves a "nuisance."
The Colored elites were quick to catch on and informed
the masses of the "conspiracy". But in the process, they
demonstrated their disregard of and lack of trust in the
people, whom they so frequently used in their fights against
the Whites. They could have allowed the Governor to en-
franchise the people. Then they could go on to beat him
at his own game, by defeating the cronies the Governor would
have put up for election. They were intensely aware of their
own inadequacies, and were unwilling to put their "record"
on the line. They had none. Besides, had they been de-
feated, they kneiv too well that what they had tried to avoid,
paying their fair share of taxes, would have fallen squarely
on them. By then, they v/ere the biggest shopkeepers and
land owners of the territory.
By the 1890 's the Governor of Dominica had had
enough of the reactionary elements in the Assembly, He
requested direct supervision from the Crown, Before this
could take place, the British recommended that Dominica be
placed in the Windward group (Grenada, St- Vincent, St. Lucia
and Tobago). The Colored legislators were so delighted that
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they quickly filed legislation to have Dominica removed from
the Leeward Federation. The British were not about to grant
the request. Instead Britain decided to give Dominica a
sum of $15,000 (BWI), provided that the colony accepted
direct rule from Britain.
Britain was willing to give the aid, but it wanted
direct supervision of the allocation of those funds. At
first, it appeared that Dominica was to lose its partially
elected assembly and become a fully-fledged colony. But
Davies was quick to see the writing on the wall, and took
"his case" to the people by telling them that the anticipated
move was tantamount to depriving them of their freedom. But
in reality, Dovies may have been afraid of losing the
ability to stymie all unfavorable tax legislation in the
Assembly. Had he said that, he would have had no case.
But the idea of deprivation of one's liberty went well with
the people*
With the proposed Bill to have Dominica ruled directly
from Britain defeated, the Assembly, as was the custom, dis-
solved and new elections called. When the votes were counted,
the Governor had gathered enough elected representatives to
have Dominica become a Crown Colony,
The second phase 1898 - 1950 , The era between 1898-
1950 in Dominican history was one characterized by constant
confrontation between the King's representative and the
elites of the island. This era marked the "conquered
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colony, phase in the island's history. it was an era of
frustrations and travail, as the Dominican elites constantly
put the British on the spot in an effort to have them release
the island from colonial bondage.
The Assembly, to be described below, was make up of
six Official and six Unofficial^^ members with a Governor
having a deciding vote in case of a tie. All members of
that body were VJhite with the exception of two. Thus, there
was no question that Templer, the one representing the
Governor in Dominica at the time, would have little trouble
in working with the "representative" body, since this was
the exact composition of the Assembly when Dominica was
voted a Crown Colony. His job was even made easier by the
passing away from the scene of William Davies and A„Do
Lockhart. Lockhart refused an Unofficial seat, although it
was continually offered to him.
In the meantime, the promised money for Dominica was
received. It was used to build the much needed roads. Be-
cause there was little planning, the result of the under-
taking was a little less than a success.
An Unofficial member of the Council was one who
supposedly represented the masses. The Official member
was supposed to do the same, but it was generally accepted
that he would side with the Governor on all issues.
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Templer was succeeded by the youthful and energetic
A. Heskeith Bell. For all intents and purposes, Bell niust
have been a good administrator, for he gained the respect,
admiration, and praise of all elements of the Dominican
society, including those who at one time had little to do
with any English official. His tour of duty in Africa may
have been beneficial to him where he must have learned a
great deal about black people. There seemed to have been
little question about Bell's competence for he was quickly
removed from Dominica and rewarded with a more prosperous
post elsewhere in the Empire.
But the good work of Bell was not enough to hide the
harsh realities of the unrepresentative nature of the Crown
colony system. Agitation began in Grenada and spread to the
neighboring islands, such as Dominica. The elites of
Dominica moved to join the bandwagon to demand more repre-
sentation for Dominica.
In 1919 a Representative Government Association was
created in Dominica by members of the upper class. Its sole
purpose was to fight Crown Colony Government. One year
later, widespread protest against the colonial system in-
tensified. Increasingly, the British got more sensitive
to these requests and sent out a Commission of Inquiry under
1
2
the command of Major Wood to investigate the problems of
The Colonial Office, Report by the Honorable E.F.L o
VJood on His Visit to the West Indies and British Guiana , Dec.
1921-Feb. 1922 (Cmd. 1679) (London: Her Majesty's Stationery
Office, 1922.
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the islands.
As a result or in spite of l-Jood's recommendations,
a new constitution was introduced in 1924. it made pro-
visions for a Governor to preside over the Assembly which
was made up of six Official and six Unofficial members. The
Official Members with the Governor formed the Executive
Council, the administrative arm of the Government. This new
constitution was advanced in that it made provisions for the
election of four members of the Unofficial delegation to the
Assembly. The other two on the Unofficial side were still
appointed by the Governor. This in effect marked the
beginning of the demise of Crown Colony Government in
Dominica.
The provision for the election of four members could
be interpreted as a reversal of the pre-1898 conditions of
elite domination of the political system. In spite of the
introduction of rudimentary political participation in
Dominica politics, one still has to wonder whether this
type of participation can eliminate elite domination in
politics. The four elected on that first occasion support
the idea that elite domination of the political systems
always seems inevitable. The first elected officials were
Cecile A. RaV'/le, representing Roseau, the Capital. He was
a Trinidadian, v;ho had since made his home in Dominica. For
his services to West Indian and Dominican politics, he has
been acclaimed a national hero. The other representatives
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were A. A. Baron, from the Northern district; H.D. Shillingford
representing the Eastern section, and Sidney L„V. Green,
representing the West. Anyone who is familiar with Dominican
society must agree that these four did not and were never
really representatives of Dominican society. They could not
sympathize with the plight of the poor Dominican since they
were so steeped in making it big in their own businesses.
They were, in Dominican parlance, Nogocions (big shots). In
any case they wielded very little power in the Assembly. They
were outnumbered by eight representatives. And besides, the
Governor had the power to frustrate any "deviations" to
maintain control. The system was meant to tantalize the
people who came close to power. V/hen they attempted to grab
power to use it, they were denied it.
The Dominican leaders were determined to wrest more
power from the British. To this end, in 1927, they formed
the Tax-Payers Association, followed, in 1931, by an associa-
tion named Constitutional Reform. Both were simple pressure
groups, and, as the names imply, were composed mainly of
those who were directly affected by the modified Crown Colony
Government. This writer does not accept the view that these
leaders were motivated to obtain "liberty" for their people.
The people would have remained in the same conditions of
poverty had the local elites initially been made rulers of
Dominica.
In 193;? two significant events occurred in Dominica
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which affected Crown Colony Government, First, the six
Unofficial members of the Assembly, including the two ap-
pointed by the Crown, stormed out of the Assembly in protest
against the system. It is not clear what
-precipitated
that event, but there were so many things wrong with Dominica
and so little was being done, that a walkout was justified.
The second event, which will receive greater attention in
Chapter Six, was the conference held at St. Gerard's Hall,
Roseau, presided over by Dominica's Rawle. This conference
was not only attended by Dominicans but by all leading
politicians in the Caribbean. The topic for discussion was
ways and means to have the British give up their tight con-
trol of all the islands.
Between 1932 and 1936 nothing substantial took place
in Dominica. After the 1932 Conference, the Caribbean leaders
had much praise for each other and in the characteristic
Caribbean fashion, everyone lost interest in the idea of
federation.
In 1936, another "advanced" constitution was imposed
on Dominica. This change provided for a majority of Unoffi-
cial members in the Legislative Council. But again, it did
not bring any meaningful change. The Governor still retained
the power of absolute veto on any piece of legislation (an
14idea which received praise from the local newspaper.
'^F.A. Hoyos, The Road to Responsible Government
(Barbados: Letchworth, 1959), p. 57.
^Chronicle, September 24, 1949, p. 6*
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The Governor's judgment counted far more than the other
parts of the Council.
Since the Second World War was already then in the
making, and utmost loyalty was demanded from the Crown, the
situation quieted dovm a little. But between 1938 - 1939
riots broke out all over the Caribbean, beginning in Jamaica
in the North to Trinidad in the South, including Barbados
which was least expected to go against the Crown since it
had prided itself as being little Britain. The riots were
not initiated by the elites of the islands, as they had too
much to lose financially, but by trade unionists, who were
by any standards, very poor. The trade unionists were forced
into prominence by the very elites who could have helped to
better social conditions. The riots of 1938 were not
politically motivated, but they soon took on a political
character as the political elites, like Bustamante of
Jamaica, joined the fighting to benefit themselves. The
system had created a situation where partially educated
people, local elites, used the people's fight to further their
own careers. These are the present day politicians of the
islands. .
The political elites quickly seized the cause of
the people and became heroes. In a sense, the elites were
a retarding force to this revolutionary drive because they
were the ones who reached a compromise with the British.
Had the fight been left in the hands of the masses, little
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compromise would have been made. There would have been
more massive destruction, but Britain was now being criticized
by its own people for the way it had "joined forces" with
the island elites to keep the poor in their places.
The war years (1940-45) saw an air of domestic
complacency, but also emergency measures undertaken in the
island to successfully prosecute the war. As soon as the
war was over, the fight against the Crown began again.
Nineteen hundred and forty-five saw the emergence of the
first island-wide Trade Union Movement, under the leader-
ship of A. Christopher Loblack. But Loblack had to wait
until 1949 to show his close connection with tne people.
He successfully prevented the estate owner of Geneva Estate
(VJestern part of the island) from forcibly expelling
"squatters" from the land. Loblack was so strong that the
Governor himself, with an entourage of native policemen,
had to accompany the owner of the estate (Nassief, a foreigner)
to meet the people,"'"^
Adult Suffrage - 1951 and 1959 Constitutions
Adult Suffrage and 1951 Constitution
Britain was always reluctant to allow the natives
of its conquered colonies to select their rulers. This fear
was sustained by the fact that the leaders of these polities
1 5The Chronicle (Dominica), December 7, 1949, p. 8,
5 7
had shown themselves to be great opportunists. These
leaders were able to manipulate the system to arrive at
their goal. But the refusal to allow the people to chose
their intermediate leaders should have been .followed by some
form of training to acquaint the people with the idea of
voting for their representatives. Britain believed that
somehow the people could learn on their own. When the time
was ripe, they would be allowed to choose their own govern-
ment. By 1951 the 21-year-old-Dominican was able to exer-
cise that British given right.
Adult suffrage
. The coming of adult suffrage did
not cause great stirrings in Dominica. In fact one prominent
citizen, who at that time was the editor of a leading news-
paper, told this writer that it was "no big thing." Adult
suffrage was proclaimed for the Dominican, and people voted
in the ensuing elections . On further investigation, this
assessment turned out to be correct. The leaders were
apathetic and even apprehensive about the ability of the
natives to select their leaders. The people were even less
moved. They certainly had little knowledge of its meaning.
In fact, right about that time, the nascent banana industry
was being pushed. The papers v;ere criticizing the British
for not paying more attention to that event rather than
giving the people adult suffrage. The paper went on to say
'•^Interview with J.H. Carlton Grell, who WaS the
editor of the Dominica Tribune.
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that Dominicans did not need adult suffrage?'^ It is
also interesting to note that the then editor of the major
paper in Dominica, The Chronicle
, was a politician and was
in the process of running for the mayoralty. of Roseau. He
did not see the contradiction in his position of wanting to
serve, and at the same time not wanting to be appointed by
those who he desired to serve. But today, the political
elites are sounding a different tune. Though one can still
suspect their contempt for the people's ability to choose
their leaders "rationally," they all say that the intro-
duction of adult suffrage was not a mistake. Their reasoning
is that it had to come some time.
The basic structure and philosophy of elite
domination of the Dominican political system did not change.
But the new Order in Council- (adult suffrage) had the
following provisions which deviated from past practices:
(1) Literacy qualifications were abolished which
allowed the unlettered to mark his ballot with an "X" next
to the symbol of the candidate of his choice.
(2) The ovmership of large property as a provision
for candidacy was dropped. Now anyone who can muster f25
can become a candidate. This did not have the effect of
increasing the quality and quantity of candidates since the
•^•^The Chronicle
,
(Dominica), April 5, 1950, p, 5.
'^The Dominica (Constitution) Order in Council, 1951
(London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1950), p. 4.
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very ones who had run previously continued to dominate
Dominican society.
(3) The Government was given the chore of compiling
lists of all eligible voters throughout the. island and to
make them available in public places to ensure that everyone,
twenty-one years and over, was placed on them„
(4) The secret ballot was introduced, with proper
provision to ensure "secrecy" for the incapacitated to cast
his vote,
(5) The sale of intoxicating beverages was pro-
hibited on election day„ This last provision has not closely
been adhered to, but since all parties have broken that
provision, it goes unnoticed.
(6) Finally, a district residential qualification
of six months was imposed on voters, but no restrictions were
placed on candidates.
This last provision has had negative results in
Dominica. It is not certain how many voters are disenfran-
chised because of this provision, though it really does not
matter. The Government has no adequate measure to check
one's place of residence. But the non-residency requirement
for the candidates is not the best provision. It was based
on the British view that once one is elected, the national
interest will somehow be served over any local interest.
This view should hold more so for a small island like
Dominica, but it does not. Once a candidate is elected.
GO
invariably, he pushes for his own district. And in the
present era of party politics in Dorninica, a govornmenh can
wJthold services to any district which did not vote for it.
An added anomaly of this fact is the relative ease with
which a national figure can change his constituency and win
in his "adopted" district. He can place weak c^mdidates
in "safe" districts and himself run in a "difficult" area
where he is sure to win because of his national appeal.
In the event that he loses he can make a weak candidate
resign, force a by-elechion and get himself elected. The
"forced-oub" candidate is given a job in the Government.
The 1951 Constitution
. The provisions of the 1951
Constitutions were good in principle, but they did not
change the power relationships in the society. The Governor
could allow them to take effect, since whatever the outcome
of an election, he st;ill had sufficient power to keep the
elected at bay by his power to veto everything.
The nature of this constitution was such bhat pro-
vision was made to have a majority of the members of the
Legislative Council elected. This might give one the im-
pression that Dominican politics were at long last dominated
by the people. In theory, this was the case but in practice
the people were dispensable. The majority of the Legislative
Council was popularly elected, but the Constitution sti-
pulated that if the Legislative Council "failed to pass a
bill or motion wd thin such time and in such form as the
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Governor may think reasonable and exp pd.-^ni-, the latter at
any time in his discretion may.
. .declare that such bill
or motion shall be in effect as if it had been passed by the
1
9
Council." Ultimate control of Dominican local politics
remained in the hands of Britain.
The 1956 "advanced" constitution
. There was a
vague attempt in the 1956 Constitution to transfer some
responsibility to the people's "representatives" by ear-
marking the Executive Council as the "principal instrument
of policy." But the Governor remained the ultimate head
of Government, giving and taking power away. The law was
very explicit. He could ignore the Executive Council "in
any case which was of such a nature that in his judgement
Our British services to the masses would sustain
material prejudice by reason of his consulting with the
20Executive Council." He could also act with prior approval
of the Secretary of State for the Colonies in Britain,
contrary to the advice of the Executive Council "in the
interest of public faith, public order or good government"
and in the interest of financial concrol at any time when
the colony received money from Britain to balance its
1 9
The Dominica Constitution , 1951 , Article 12,
paragraph 3, (Emphasis added.)
^'^Great Britain, The VJindward Islands Royal Instruc -
tions (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1956)^
Article 12, paragraph 3,
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21budget (Dominica has remained on the British "payroll"
for a long time).
In this Executive Council, the elected members held
half the number of available seats. Membership to it was
not based on membership in a party, but on the basis of
having been elected by the Legislative Council. in that-
Council, both elected and non-elected members were to be
found. All members of the Legislative Council had an
equal chance of being selected to serve on this "policy
22making body." Those elected to the Executive were named
Ministers and were made "heads" of departments. Each de-
partment had a Principal Secretary appointed by the Governor
The secretaries were above the Ministers but could not
dismiss them. Any Principal Secretary could submit dis-
agreements directly to the Executive Council without the
23prior knowledge of the Ministers,
The possible power struggle which could have
ensued was alleviated by the fact that the first set of
21The Dominica (Constitution) Order in Council ,
1956 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1956
)
Article 13, paragraph 2,
22Great Britain, The Windward Islands Royal
Instructions , Clause 21, section 1.
^^Ibid.
,
Clause 8, Section 3 (f).
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Ministers in the Dominican system were not the best. They
realized their limitations and vented their frustrations on
the British rather than on the first three Principal Sec-
retaries who were all Dominican and had served in the
Colonial bureaucracy for some time. But clearly, the
position of the Ministers in the Executive Council was
tenuous at best, because the Governor had the authority to
declare a seat vacant at his own discretion. For all
intents and purposes, the Executive Council was responsible
to the Governor and not the Legislative Council.
Dominica's thrust into that brave new world in
1956 was a little less than spectacular. In the first
place, it can safely be said that there was absolutely no
training in the workings of a ministerial system. Appar-
ently no one knew about it anyway. To be sure, an English-
man was sent out to "train" Dominicans on the v;orkings of
the British House of Commons. The accounts of the three
lectures were reported in The Chronicle which praised the
Englishman for the splendid job he had done," Of course,
the naive and unpretentious Dominicans did not see the
stupidity of the whole affair. They could not understand
that the operational structure of the British system was
24
An Englishman named D.W.S. Lidderdale prepared
Dominican leaders for the nev; ministerial system. He de-
livered the following lectures: a) Parliamentary Government
in Britain, b) How the House of Commons Works - General
Principles, and c) How the House of Commons Workd - Rules
of Procedure. The Dominica Chronicle reported that Lidder-
dale was able to "keen the audience spellbound with the
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just not applicable to the Dominican context precisely
because "the spirit" which accompanies the British system
could not be transplanted to their own leaders.
The 1959 "more advanced" Constitution
. The 1959
Constitution was not that much more advanced than the 1955
Constitution. The Executive Council was kept as the prin-
cipal instrument of policy, but this time it was explicitly
stated that it would be "collectively responsible.
. .to
the Legislative Council. In theory, that was a good idea,
The Governor was part of the Executive Council. Thus, if
this provision was observed, he would have come under the
scrutiny of the Legislative Council. in addition, there
was provision for a Chief Minister. He had to be an in-
dividual who, presumably, vsfould command the respect of a
majority of the members of the Legislative Council. This
was hard to achieve since the underpinning structure of a
party system was non-existent in Dominica at the time.
This was another one of these contradictions found in the
colonial situation. An instrument was imposed on a people
fascination, grandeur and beauty of every aspect of his
subject matter since this knowledge could hardly be found
in books." February 11, 1956, p. 7,
25Dominica Imperial Instrument no, 3 of 1959
,
Statutory Instrument 1959 no, 2199 . The Dominica (Consti -
tution ) Order in Council , 1959 , (London; Her Majesty's
Stationery Office, 1959), Article 12, Section 2.
^^Ibid. , Article 13, Section 1.
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to bring about "political advancement" but no foundation
was erected to sustain this "progress." Out of necessity,
a very tenuous party coalition was created (discussed in
Chapter IV), and it subsequently suffered the fate of "new
wine in old wine skins."
In consultation with the Chief Minister, the
Governor appointed three other Ministers from the Legis-
27lative Council. The intent of this new constitution
was to bring Dominica up to the same level of political
development as found in Jamaica and Trinidad to ensure a
better working of the proposed federation of 1958. But
the Governor still retained the absolute veto over all
legislation. He had to consult the Council, but could
act against its advice if "law and order was being dis-
turbed." The Governor did not use his veto power frequently
but the fact that he could may have had a dampening and
intimidating effect on the Council members.
General Characteristics of the Dominican
Political System Before 1967
The following seems to be the more salient features
of the colonial constitutions of Dominica. The Colony was
tightly controlled by the intimidating power of the Governor,
Britain inserted this power in all Dominican constitutions
because the British taxpayers' money was being used to
Ibid
.
, Article 14, Section 2
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sustain Dominica. On the other hand, the machinery to
sustain parliamentary government was not encouraged and
could not be encouraged because of the nature of the system.
The system gave all power to one man, a principle which
clashed with both modern British tradition and the par-
liamentary system. The parliamentary system demanded the
machinery of a party system to ensure a comprehensive policy.
The system demanded discipline from groups who sought to
win elections to implement their programs under their own
power, regardless of how wrong these may be. Then it
becomes incumbent on the Opposition, which will have de-
veloped, to convince the people that it can do a better
job than the ruling party.
Unfortunately, that was not the case in Dominica.
The system allowed individuals to v;in elections, but did
not allow them to be responsible by being forced to im-
plement their declared programs. This writer finds it hard
to believe that the British did not allow elected officials
to exercise power only because Dominica could not balance
it own budget and needed British financial aid. This
denial of power must have been rooted in the fact that the
British did not have faith in Dominican leaders. And quite
understandably soj the leaders of Dominica did not prove
themselves capable of ruling themselves. They could not,
because they were never given a chance.
If British colonial policy had been meant to develop
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Messiahs like the Governor
-i 4-
,
u tiLn , It w,->3 surely successful in
Dominica. But this was not i-u^the intention of the British,
British colonial policy failed because the desired objec-
tive, to "guide the colonial territories to responsible
self-government within Ithe Commonwealth in conditions that
assured the people concerned both a fair standard of living
and freedom from oppression from any quarter" did not
always materialize. in fact, this overly cautious nature
of British policy did keep Dominlci, and others like it,
in a state of immaturity. And when Dominica "arrived at
statehood," it did not know the responsibilities of an
"adult."
The nominiting system h-.3 p-'-rsis ted. It has been
increasingly used to place inccnp'^tent people in the Assembly
It was meant to be used to get ^n'-rving people who might be
intimidated by the pains of ei-'C' oril politics to sit in
the Council. But it has been u.':.''"1 to provide seats in the
Council for defeated candidat-j.-
.
In the final analysis, •"•'•'^ c -nnot accept a statement
by Lord Beswick that the islan'la .'-.-v/.* .^n had a "long ex-
perience with democratic gover r:'«''r,t , - " The intention may
^^Quoted in D.W. Strx\"--''' ';J-itish Colonial Public
Finance," Social and Econornji', .?JL (June, 1967), p. 195.
^^Great Britain, P.ir;! ' V rebates. House of
Lords Official Report , (Lon'i" ^ .ijesty's Stationery
Office, February, 1967), p- '
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have been to achieve that. But the authorities fell far
short of the mark.
The 1967 Constitution
In 1967 Dominica became an Associate State of Great
Britain which meant it was "no longer a colony," it has
internal self-government and Britain is responsible for its
defence and foreign policy. The exact nature of this
arrangement is still developing and the only way to under-
stand is to look at the provisions of the latest Dominican
Constitution.
The Setting
Sir Ivor Jennings wrote, the "constitutional
developments in the dependent territories are not
always empirical because these places have different origins
30
and traditions." Although the British relied on the "man
on the spot," the Governor, Constitutions for the colonies
emanated from 6, Downing Street. The Constitutions were
first debated in the British House of Commons and then
discussed with the leaders of the colonies just around the
time of their independence. The leaders in turn, imposed
them on the people. To be sure there have been deviations
from this rule, but Dominica is not one of them. The 1967
^"^Ivor Jennings, The Approach to Self Government
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Pres.-, 1956), p- 165„
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constitution was made and approved in London. This writer
even suspects that not too many Dominicans are even aware
of its existence.
It is important to understand the economic and
political background in which this constitution was imple-
mented. Dominica is small and sparsely populated, making
administration very costly. Minerals are non-existent. In
fact, Dominica has been a victim of boom and bust in the
Brazilian style, albeit on a smaller scale. The latest
saga of Dominica was the folding up a trucking company
which had promised great prospects for development and
employment. The banana industry, the life line of Dominica,
is ailing very badly. Even tourism, a one-time thriving
industry, has been crippled by the latest v^rave of West
Indian nationalism. The Government has tried to help, and
keeps repeating that things will be better, but conditions
worsen and jobs get fewer.
There is a general shortage of skilled labor since
the skilled Dominican can command better salaries elsewhere.
Those who remain are not called on to help because they may
be of a different ideological bent. This policy precludes
meaningful cooperation with the Government,
Dominica is no longer a grant-aided territory, but
still receives sizable aid in the form of schools and
teachers from Canada, Great Britain and even the United
States
,
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The bureaucracy is not the best and is very ineffi-
cient. Quoting from the Report of the Director of Audit for
1970 the following statements adequately describe the state
of affairs in the bureaucracy, beginning with the major
department, the Treasury Division:
Z.^J^'f^^''''"^ ^^^^ Sank Reconciliation sus-ceptible to audit has not been prepared since 1968."^^
Ministry of Agriculture, Lands and Cooperatives:
"52 -_This Ministry has repeated its performance ofprevious years, by failing to submit any statements.It^might well be that it has lost count of its
outstanding debts during the period 1968-1970
and its account book was inaccurately kept."
Ministry of Education and Health:
.
.expenditure was exceeded by a total of$42,541.54 BWI without the necessary authority
of virements or special warrants, and store
recording remains unsatisfactory. " 33
Ministry of Communications and Works:
.^.has fallen in line with other departments by
exhibiting to some extent a lack of proper control
over expenditure, the amount of $659,602.00 were
exceeded ivithout the authority of virements or
special warrants. "34
31Report of the Director of Audit on the Audit of the
Accounts for 1970 (Roseau: Government Printing Office, 1971),
p. 7.
32Ibid
. , p. 8.
33Ibid
. , p. 9.
34Ibid
. , p. 11
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Ministry of Home Affairs:
"the errors brought to light in the cash book appearto be the result of carelessness and disinterest
on the part of the officer responsible for the
record, " ^
The above speak for themselves and require no fur-
ther comments. These are the few errors made public; others
remain hidden.
The constitution refers to advancement in the
civil service system on the basis of merit. It is assumed
that all persons are equal until one has surpassed another
by way of one's work. For example, the British bureaucracy
may be able to tolerate and handle well the appointment of
individuals in key positions purely on the basis of party
affiliation. And surely that is not the only variable con-
sidered in making appointments to the British bureaucracy,
since the appointee is usually competent in his own right.
What is being argued here is the fact that in Britain the
appointees to the bureaucracy may belong to the party in
power but they are as qualified as any other person who could
be considered for the same jobc The Constitution assumed
that this practice would be followed in Dominica, where
appointees would be party men and would also be qualified.
35
Ibid
. , p. 12,
This writer has been able to discern greater
irregularities in the course of his research which he can
not document here.
72
such has not been the case as both key members of
the two major parties admitted to this writer that neither
organization had enough qualified men to fill the available '
political jobs. Thus, the critical function of elite re-
cruitment in both the bureaucratic and political realm needs
to be handled more seriously.
The present recruitment pattern in a system may be
a reaction to previous custom; but if the present system
demands a certain procedure or pattern which is not available,
the system itself may crack under the heavy strains that may
follow. It may be reshaped if it is sufficiently flexible
or be completely destroyed. But under no circumstance will
it remain the same if the factors which su3tain it are
radically changed by the personnel who man its sustaining
elements. It is too early to predict the future of the
Dominican political system, though already heavy strains
have been brought to bear on it.
It is no secret that recruitment to the bureaucracy
and the parties has been along particularistic lines while
the system is demanding universlaistic principles, as will
been indicated later. The civil servant is so aware of
that fact that he is unable to express his opinion in the
newspapers. He is forced to pass his opinion to a sympa-
thetic editor who in turn composes a letter for him and
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publishes it under a pen name.^'^ Quite obviously the civil
servant is forced out of politics and sees it as the game
of a chosen few with large followings-
This condition precludes mass participation in
politics (participation defined here as taking part in
decision making, etc.). it is the small group which can
convince more people to its persuasion and which becomes
the dominant party. Such a party becomes very hard to beat.
All benefits which come to the country from the outside
arrive in its name.
The Component Parts of the 1967 Constitution
The entire constitution will not be examined. It
is only those parts which this writer believes that have to
function well to ensure success v;hich will be reviewed here
the Governor, the electoral process, the Assembly, and the
Judiciary,
38The Governor
. The Governor is the ceremonial
head of State and has no legal responsibilities for running
the Government. He is supposed to be dignified and above
party politics since his constituency is the whole of
Dominica. Holding office at Her Majesty's pleasure, he may
37Interview with a prominent editor of a leading
paper in Dominica.
•^
^he Dominica Constitution Order 1967 (London: Her
Majesty's Stationery Office, 1967), pp. 20-21.
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be allowed an additional five years duty after the first
five, the traditional term of office. In the past, a
Governor could be elevated to a higher post elsewhere if
he had done his job well. This practice is- unlikely to
continue in the Caribbean. What is more likely to happen
is to allow a man an indefinite tenure, especially if he
satisfies all interests well.
By inserting the phrase "at Her Majesty's pleasure"
when referring to length of office, Britain is showing
concern over that office, lest it be used as a political
prize. Britain does not want that now, but in the heyday
of colonialism, that is exactly how it was treated. Be
that cs it may, the vagueness of the phrase, "Her Majesty's
pleasure," demonstrates the British lack of appreciation
of Dominican patterns of behavior. The governship should
be used as a political prize. Since the Governor does not
have the role "to protect" the masses against the "irrespon-
sible," "demagogic" local politician, his job could be used
to reward a faithful party follower. But the British
rationale for the protection is to ensure a second term
for the Governor who would otherwise be replaced after a
39first term.
Presently the Governor of Dominica has very little
political power, but he is the highest paid public official
of the territory. Thus, rewarding a loyal party official
with that job is quite appropriate.
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Apparently both the British and Dominicans are
operating under different assumptions. The British assume
that the Governor is head of State because he attaches his
signature to legislation, while all Dominican bureaucratic,
business and political elites admit openly that the Premier
is the de facto head of State.
In effect Britain is forcing a spirit, a kind of
"gentleman's agreement" on Dominica, where it is not
necessary. it tells an incoming government to accept,
without question, a man appointed by a previous government.
It is more appropriate to have this office as a political
prize than that of Speaker of the House, Public Relations
Officer, or even Local Government Commissioner. The Office
of Governor has become negligible, ineffectual and very
subordinate to the Premier of the country. The offices of
Public Relations and Local Government Commissioners are
critical ones, since they can help build up a credible
image for the government in its efforts to penetrate and
communicate with the people. In addition, if local govern-
ments are organized well, there is no question that these
could provide able leadership for the national level, even
though the emerging leaders may oppose the government. In
the long run the national interest v/ill be served.
The Constitution itself shows the futility of the
^^Based on interviews with twenty political elites
and forty-five bureaucratic elites.
76
Governor, since he cannot act on his own, but in conjunction
"with the cabinet... He attends no Cabinet meetings. He
is given .'the power" to remove the Premier and the Cabinet,
but this is superfluous because of the nature of the
arrangement. m the past, whenever this was attempted,
crisis was precipit ated/^ Presently, there are many things
working against the Governor. He is a local man, which
takes away from him
..the respect" which was afforded the
European. As a local, he just does not have the finesse
or charisma that his predecessor possessed. An effort has
been made to keep him on par with the European-born Governor
by keeping all the dressings and ceremonies that Dominicans
are so used to. But these do not lend credibility to his
person. He remains a "juju," "a mas," "a papishow.'"^^ of
a papiermache.
It was anticipated that these external trappings
would create legitimacy for the Black who occupies that
office. But the fact remains legitimacy is one of those
concepts that is hard to transfer. The European had legi-
timacy because he v;as white and because he was put there by
the Queen. His intellectual background was not important.
A constitution has never been suspended by a Governor
but one was suspended in Grenada in 1962. Rioting broke out
when the leader of the dismissed government contended that
the Governor had no right to suspend the Constitution.
42These are Creole-patois words meaning a clown on
display.
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No one in the colony cared about that anyway. His decora-
tive medals and MBE's and Sir's and OBE's were sufficient
to make him competent. Attempts have been made to give the
local the same titles, but somehow he is pLagued by the
fact that he is a local. The situation is even aggregated
by the known fact that the present Governor of Dominica
got his post not so much because he was competent, but
primarily because he had always allied himself with the
Government in power. Dominicans have not cared too much
about their present Governor. They only poke fun at his
speech defect. He stutters a great deal.
It is not being argued here that the Governor should
have his dictatorial powers restored. This writer believes
that the office should be abolished in its present form,
since it is too costly. In a society where unemployment
is about forty percent, and the average pay is only $100
a month, the office of Governor becomes an expensive luxury.
His annual salary is in the range of $13,200. He has an
annual allowance of $3,000 duty free and in lieu of customs
duty he receives $1,200, payable during the period of per-
formance in Dominica. For domestic staff, he gets an
43
additional $1,300. The present Governor already has
43
In addition he receives retirement and gratuity
benefits: gratuity equivalent to 1/10 of the aggregate of
the salaries paid to him during his term of office and an
annual pension of 1/2 of the salary paid to him at the
date of his retirement. If he has a previous pension, he
will not receive that one.
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retired from a job as Secretary to the Windward Islands/^
But the Ordinance does not say that he could accept this
last retirement if the money received is greater than that
of the previous position.
The Electoral Process/^ Elections in most small
countries can be a risky business. it becomes even more
risky when the small country is carrying out the process
by "itself" for bhe first time, as is the case in Dominica.
The basic assumption of the Dominica constitution
is that free elections will decide who wields power. The
winner will assume office, while the loser will wait in
readiness to form a government should the ruling government
falter for whatever reason. But the size of Dominica makes
electioneering both easy and difficult. Most constituencies
contain about two thousand voters. These are further
broken down into smaller sections, to facilitate voting.
The supervisors of these polling stations are supposed to
be non-partisan but some "break the law" and campaign
secretly for "their" condidates. Thus, there is no telling
46what form this campaigning may take.
44 . .Dominica Official Gazette
, "Governor's Emolument
Ordinance 1967 ." (Roseau: Government Printery, 1967), p. 4,
45The Dominica Constitution Order 1967
, pp. 32-34.
46This writer was reliably informed by the son of
a top civil servant that during the recent election in
Dominica (1970), his father campaigned secretly for the
Dominica Labor Party. In addition, there have been charges
made against the Labor Party for promoting certain members
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Smallness is an asset, since the candidates c.
easily reach their voters. But this smallness is al:
.conducive to buying votes through various means such as
throwing a party in a constituency. Smallness leads to
gossip and false accusations, which may lead to unnecessary
confrontations.
In Dominica, the Governor, supposedly non-partisan,
supervises and runs elections. This does not mean much.
The only implication of this provision is that the report
of the elections can be picked up from the Governor's office,
The supervisor of elections has always been a civil
servant. For this reason, he has always been intimidated
by the incumbent government .
"^"^
The method outlined for setting up the borders of
the constituencies seems pretty safe, at least on paper.
But the spirit which should go along with it does not seem
to be present. The Speaker of the House, a political
appointee, is Chairman of the Constituency Commission, which
is made up of four other members. All are appointed by the
of the Police Force immediately after the said elections.
These charges seem to be true in part, because there were
relatively unknown policemen who made it to the top in a
short space of time. They could not have made it on ability,
since there is no objective test in Dominica v\;hich seeks to
evaluate the performance of policemen,
47
In an informal interview with the last supervisor
of elections, he told this v;riter that during the court
fight of the two factions of the Dominica Labor Party, a
top Government Official wanted him to favor the LeBlanc
faction of the Party, It is interesting to note that the
Courts subsequently decided against the LeBlanc faction. This
did not matter since LeBlanc v;ent on to v/in the elections (1970)
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Governor, two with the Prer^ier's advice and two with the
advice Of the leader of the Opposition. From the start,
the Commission is heavily in favor of the ruling party be-
cuase members of that body are prone to be .highly partisan.
Except for the Speaker, membership in the Assembly or in
any public service disqualifies one from membership on this
Commission. Legally, this body can act on its own and
generally a member will vacate his seat every time the
Assembly is dissolved. Anyone on the Commission can be
removed if he becomes incapacitated or misbehaves as
determined by a Commission appointed by the Governor. A
charge of misbehavior can only be brought against a member
by the party which appointed him. The report of this
Commission must be presented to the Assembly as soon as
possible. Any modifications of the report can be carried
out in the Assembly by a procedure outlined by the ruling
party. This may lead to many charges of gerrymandering
districts to ensure the return to power of an incumbent
government. This eventuality is mitigated though, by the
fact that no modifications will have to be made in the
Assembly since the prepared report of the Commission will
reflect the wishes of the ruling party.
There are several flaws with the Commission. As has
been said, it favors any ruling party. The Speaker, in
British fashion, is supposed to be non-partisan, but this
is not the case in Dominica where he always has been a
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staunch member of the ruling party. Secondly, the two
members appointed by the Government are supporters of the
ruling government. They are given instructions as to how
the constituencies should be divided. On the other hand,
the two appointed by the Opposition are also highly par-
tisan. The only way the Opposition members can come close
to having their way is by taking their cause to the people.
If they can generate enough sympathy to effect a major con-
frontation with the Government, they may influence the
Government. But in its present form, a government can
increase or decrease the number of constituencies at will
to ensure its success at the polls.
For this reason, in regard to elections, the
Constitution is too legalistic and formal. It does not
take into account that politics in Dominica revolve around
rewarding friends and punishing enemies. This writer is
surprised that the present electoral process has not caused
major confrontations, although the 1970 election reports
48speak of a tense atmosphere which prevailed in Dominica.
The House of Assembly . The Dominica political
system is unicameral. The legislative body is called the
House of Assembly. It is made up of eleven elected men,
representing as many constituencies (districts). There are
in addition, three nominated members, two of whom are
"^^Dominica, Report on the House of Assembly General
Elections, 1970 , (Roseau: The Government Printery, 1970), p,
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Government nominees, including the Deputy Speaker, and
an Opposition nominee. The House is dirocted by a Speaker.
The Attorney General is a member of the House, he could
either be a civil servant or a political appointee. In
either case, his role is to defend the government.
The Cabinet. The Cabinet is made up of the Premier
and four other Ministers who meet every week, to "discuss"
public policy. Cabinet members are termed Ministers and
they now head departments or divisions. They are appointed
to their posts, even before elected, by the Premier, who is
also leader of the majority party. But the Constitution
specifies that it is the Governor who appoints them of-
ficially. Those elected on the slate of the majority party
who do not hold the title of Minister are presently referred
to as Parliamentary Secretaries. (Formerly they were called
Ministers Without Portfolio). The latter can substitute
for any absent Minis I, er. But Dominica, in its typical own
way, has had the "normal" situation persisting for some
time, where Parliamentary Secretaries are not qualified to
substitute for absent Ministers, far less to take over the
job permanently (Chapter IV).
It might be incorrect to assert that the Cabinet
system in Dominica is not working if the past history of
Dominica v/ith Cabinet Government is used as a yardstick
for evaluation. But since the Constitution was nob made
by Dominica, one mu.Gt admit that the imposed system has
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failed. The Cabinet system of Government meant that there
would be collective responsibility, but that did not pre-
clude individual inputs into the decision making process.
In fact, it anticipated and demanded a differentiation of
functions to reach a higher level of collective responsi-
bility. It required that many avenues be considered before
a plan was implemented. As will be shown in the following
chapter, collective responsibility in Dominica has meant
one or two men's responsibility. The majority of members
in the Cabinet seldom make an input into the decision making
process
.
Procedure in the House of Assembly
. All the tri-
vialities of the B-itish House of Commons are to be en-
countered in Dominica. The House of Assembly in Dominica
meets every six months to tell the people what has already
been decided by the ruling party. Since only a majority
is required to enact most legislation, and any party with a
majority forms the Government, meetings in the House to
present programs become a mere formality. The meetings
only build up unnecessary tensions v/hich have the negative
effect of making the people think even more unfavorably of
the politicians. Making it harder for the Government to
have its way is not the answer. The answer seems to lie
in finding better qualified men to take over the government.
The following exchange between the Deputy Premier and the
Leader of the Opposition on August 17, 1972, is fairly
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typical. It demonstrates the level of debate in the
Assembly.
The Leader of the Opposition was requesting more
time to consider a five year plan for Dominica which the
Government was about to enact.
Y^^^W^h^—^^^ the Opposition_(T,,^ Mr. SpeakerI would like to make a suggestion to Thi^House.Interrupted by Nr. Armour, Deputy Premier (P.P.).
^Peaicer, please tell the Honorable Leader of theOpposition that suggestions are not allowed in theHouse.
Mr Speaker
: Mr. Moise (L.O.), you can make a motionbut suggestions are not allowed here.
Answer (L.O,); Mr. Speaker, I cannot make a motionbecause I know it will be defeated the composition
of the House at the time was 8-2-1 against him
.But I would suggest that we postpone debate on thefive year plan. This would give us some time to read
u-t the plan had been a secret before that day . We
should also leave out some elected representatives,
including Ministers, who have no mind of their own.
Mr. Armour (Do?.) : Mr. Speaker, under no condition
we should allow that. These people are paid $600 a
month to come here twice a year. They have no excuse
for not knowing what's in the plan. Besides, Moise
is an illiterate, he will not be able to understand
the plan anyway,
Moise to Armour : Shut up you pig, I don't see how
they could make you a lawyer.
There is no question that the caliber of this
exchange is very low. Any ruling government has it so easy
that the Deputy Premier could tell this writer that the
political system has failed. It is always taken for granted
that Government will have its way and counting of votes is
rarely attempted in the House.
The Speaker of the House has shown himself to be
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very partisan. Merely Ayearst is wrong when he writes that
political advancement has taken place in the Caribbean
because the presiding officer, the Speaker, favors no
side.'^^
The Judiciary, The 19G7 West Indies Act intro-
duced a common judicial system for all the Associated States
of the Eastern Caribbean. There is also a common Judiciary
and Legal Services Commission for the territories. The
system consists of a Court of Appeals and a High Court.
The Queen, on the advice of the Lord High Chancellor, ap-
points the Chief Justice while the Puisne Judges (High Court
Judges) are appointed by the Legal Services Commission.
_
Tenure ends because of age (for the Justice of Appeal age
65, and for the Puisne Judges age 62), sickness of body or
mind, and misbehavior. Misconduct is determined by a
tribunal of judges which has power to look into issues at
hand and make its recommendations. Removal from office
because of misconduct can only occur on the advice of the
British Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. Only the
Premier of each territory can bring a complaint against •
the Chief Justice.
The judiciary remains regional and seems to be above
politics. Its powers also seem to be great. The Constitu-
tion does not specifically state that there is judicial
4 9Morely Ayearst, The British West Indies : The Search
for Self-Government (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd.,
1960), p. 163.
^^The Dominica Constitution Order, 1967, pp. 58-59.
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review of legislation passed by the Dominica House of
Assembly. But judicial review seems to fall under the
clause which states that the Assembly may make only laws
which the Constitution allows. And there is no doubt
that the Court can interpret the Constitution. This is
another area which the framers have taken for granted.
They assume, maybe incorrectly, that the spirit of co-
operation will always prevail between the judicial and
legislative systems.
Finally, the highest court of appeal is the Privy
Council in Great Britain. This attachment to the Privy
Council is an umbilical cord which holds Caribbean law
to a high level giving it credence and legitimacy.
Conclusion
The Constitution is meant to be supreme. Up until
now, no one has paid much attention to it. In fact, ivhen
Government denied due process to a group of misinformed
students, who went around insulting White people (Chapter V)
,
the Opposition reported joyfully that Government was doing
something positive about this problem. No one saw the
contradiction in this stance and all condemned the boys.
Increasingly, it becomes clear that there is no assurance
that basic human rights will be protected in Dominica. In
fact, those v;ho need this protection most cannot afford to
lose such rights.
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The new Constitution has added new elements, such as
equality before the law, which have traditionally been taken
lightly or ignored. Law and order may take precedence over
everything else. Conditions for such are ripe indeed.
The judiciary may not remain as apolitical as now.
It has managed to survive all political manipulations, but
its future is not that bright. The politicians of the is-
lands will be filling this agency with personnel. Like in
all advanced countries, that is the way it should be, but
the stage is now set to involve this body in the realm of
politics
.
The personnel to the judiciary will be coming from
the ranks of Attorney Generals and Magistrates, as has been
the custom. The only difference is that the present Magis-
trates and Attorney Generals are appointees of the local
politicians. And, increasingly, those who are raised to
these posts are the Government's sympathizers. There is
no guarantee that they will remain loyal to the Government
after they become judges. But the temptation to support
their former superiors, or be influenced by them, can be
great.
If the effects of smallness have any bearing on
aspects of Dominican life, the judiciary will not escape
this effect. As the judicial system gets situated in its
environment, it will suffer the same fate as other component
parts of tne political system. The politicians may be able
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to influence decisions. It can safely be said that the
new Constitution is proving too comprehensive and uninteL
ligible to most Dominicans.
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CHAPTER III
THE BRITISH VARIANT OF COLONIALISM IN THE
BRITISH WEST INDIES
This chapter deals with the colonial condition as
it existed in the British Caribbean. it is divided into
six sections. After raising some questions about the de-
finition of a colony, the study assesses the colonial
situation vis-^-vis the metropolitan area. The social,
psychological, and political impact of colonialism is
next examined. The chapter ends with a look at the type
of political leader that the colonial condition has pro-
duced, and with some basic questions which can hopefully
be tackled throughout the rest of the study.
Defining a Colony
There are about as many definitions of a colony as
there are writers on the subject. Each writer has found
it necessary to define a colony to suit his ideological
orientation. But in all the definitions this writer has
uncovered, one point comes out clearly; and that is, a
colony is established when a stronger power has asserted
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its superiority over another territorial entity.
^
addition, one writer, Archie Singha., has added a new di-
mension to the ide^^^l r.-FI ea of a colony. He
..akes a distinction
between conquered and settled colonies. ^
„e sees the
British Caribbean islands as settled colonies which were
later treated as conquered ones. This distinction is not
sin^ply academic. A settled colony enjoyed the privileges
Of British citizens. On the nth^r- y.^.^^un o her hand, a conquered colony
had limited rights.
The Colonial Situation
The colonial situation is a special phenomenon which
has not received the attention which it merits. The ten-
dency has been to look at the colony as an extension of
the metropole, which emphatically it is not. it has
its own component parts and has a dynamism which can be
discerned on close examination. This is not to play down
,
s legalistic and static definition see HansKohn, Ide a of Nationalism
, a study in its origin andbackground (New York: Collier, 195777 ^ T^.—^F^a
very polemical definition see John Kautsky, The Politi-
cal Consequences of Modernization (New York: John Wiley1972 ), p. 60
A. Singham, The Hero and the Crowd in a Colonial
PQ^ity (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 101.
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the Close connection between the colony and the colonial
power. In fact, somehow this connection acquires its
own dynamism and get institutionalized in the colony. ^.
Thus the connection becomes paradoxical - it is there
but has become a part and parcel of the colonial situation.
The colonial condition in the Caribbean was not a
happy one. it was so great and intense that a backward
island like Dominica was never influenced by its more
advanced French neighbors of Martinique and Guadeloupe.
It is true that the people of all three and Haiti speak the
same French-creole language, but that is not due to any
direct influence of either Martinique or Guadeloupe. Of
course, the influence of Haiti is out of the question,
since it is too far. French-creole is spoken in Dominica
because the French once occupied the island.
British colonialism in the Caribbean had the effect
of destroying any cohesion that existed in these societies.
Where cohesion never existed, it was not allowed to take
root. It even destroyed the island's integrity. There
were no further divisions to be created in the Carib-
bean, nature had made it easier on the British, Its
colonial rule only heightened and accented those divisions.
Yet a tenuous unity emanated between the natives and the
dominating European. The indigenous culture, whatever
little amount that was available, did not affect the
imposed European culture, which did n^^-
,
n ot completely remain
the same for long. some kind of marriaae ofg convenience
emerged.
writing of the Caribbean experience, Hugh Tinker
says that the colonial impact was far deeper there than
elsewhere since the resistance to colonialism was at a
mlni.u.. There was no unifying element of, say, an
Indian religion type to offer meaningful resistance.
^
Philip Kason adds that the Caribbean is the essence of
colonialism.
-The imposed spiritual yoke is far greater
than the physical force which lay in the background." He
continues, "nowhere did this happen more completely than
in the Caribbean."'*
It is somewhat ironic that Crown Colony Government
was brought about to eradicate what slavery had brought
upon the Caribbean countries. Crown Colony Government
lasted for some sixty-nine years in Dominica (1898 - 1967)
3„ ^ .
" n
Tinker, "The Impact of Western Democracy onAsia," Democratic Institutions in the World Today, ed. bvWilliam Burraeister (New York: 195'8T7~p. 97.
Philip Mason, Patterns of Domin ance (London-Oxford University Press, 1970), p7 276";
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and after all that, the living reminders of the slave
syste. are so apparent. The old huts surrounding the
Great Houses are around. Agricultural wor., detested
after slavery ended, is detested today, because little
'
effort was ^ade to show its value. The words "driver
and gang" with all their derogatory connotations are
still used on the large estates when one refers to a
group of field hands and a leader-supervisor. The per-
sistence of the slave mentality, reinforced by the
'
colonial condition, has led Eric Williams to write that
"Emancipation has left the new freemen as much de-
pendent on and at the mercy of his king. Sugar, as he
had b'.en as a slave, And where sugar has become less
important, bananas, "green gold," has stepped in to take
its place.
Politically it was assumed that a benevolent
democratic British Government would gradually confer
self-rule on the natives,^ but in the meantime the
Caribbean area was used as an administrative experimenting
ground. Such experiments would not have been tolerated
Eric Williams, The Negro in the Caribbean (New
York: Negro University Press, 1942), pp. 17-19.
Paul Blansh.ird, Democracy and Empire in the
Caribbean (New York: Macmillan, 1947), pp. 79-80.
xn the .other country.^ F,,ther. the «est Indian islands
were only too happy to be associated with the British to
reject their close friendship with one another.
A colonial Situation in the Caribbean developed as
soon as the British had explicitly asserted their superi-
ority over the natives. This assertion was .ade first in
the area of economics when the British companies took it
upon themselves to run the oil industry in Trinidad and'
the bauxite in British Guyana. Gradually this assertion
entered the political sphere and thence the social sphere
by a policy of discrimination and segregation.
^
The colonial situation is a collective fact. It
is a sort of relationship between human groups; it
involves intercommunication , ^ but it always remains one
of dependence and subordination of the dominated. ^°
7John H. Lee, Colonial Development and Good Govern-ment; a study of the ideas expressed by the~B?itISh officialClasses in planning decolonization 1939-T964 (Oxford"Clarendon Press, 1967), p. 3.
gMarian Mushkrat, "Some Characteristics of Colonial-ism and Its Product, African Nationalism," African Studies
Review (September, 1971), p. 222.
9Rene Maunier, The Sociology of Colonies
, Edited
and translated by E«0. Lorimer (London: Routledqe and Keqan
Paul, 1949), p. 5.
Thomas Hodgkin, Nationalism in Colonial Africa
(London: Oxford University Press, 1956), p. 20.
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Fanon writes that this relationship degenerates into one
Of lust on the part of the colonized. The native wants
What the settler has^^ and the settler is aware of that
fact. The European in such a situation also undergoes
tremendous psychological strains. He is aware of the
heavy toll that his assertion of heroic superiority has
taken of him. He is constantly worried about his numeri-
cal minority status and "hovers the constant fear that
the natives might some day overpower him."^^ The
colonial situation in the Caribbean was most cruel.
The Reluctance to Give Up Colonies
One is often amused at the reluctance with which
colonial powers relinquished some of their costly colonies
One is even more surprised at the overreaction of the
British during the Anguillan crisis in 1967.
Clearly the rationalization for maintaining the
Caribbean colonies was based on the assumption that the
""^Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (New
York: Negro University Press, 1960), passim .
12Robert Louis Delavignette, Freedom and Authority
in French West Africa (London: Oxford University Press,
1950), p. 353.
west Indian was incapable of governing hi.self. Britain
-ight have been afraid of the despotism of local leaders.
It was also believed that the feeble financial resources
of these islands precluded independence,
John S. Furnivall writes that colonial policy ^
was dominated by the economic motive, followed by the
humanitarian element to justify further policies. Thus,
it is safe to assume that independence for the Caribbean
^
was ruled out from the very beginning because of its' tremen-
dous source of sugar and other commodities for the British.
But the general reluctance to give up colonies is
echoed in what Ivor Jennings has to say about independence
for some countries which were showing signs of not being
able "to make it." He writes that another six months of
imperial rule would have helped India, two more years
would have put Burma on the right track, and Ghana would
have benefitted from another year's experience with
domination. ''^ Had he written about Trinidad, he would
13John S, Furnivall, Progress and Welfare inSoutheast Asia : A Comparison of Colonial Policy and
"
Practice (New York: The Secretariat, Institute of"
Pacific Relations, 1941), p. 5.
14^. ^Sir Ivor Jennings, Problems of the New Common -
wealth (Durham, N.C: Duke University Press, 195877^
p. 23.
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probably have said another so „any years could have helped
Pri.e Minister Williams correct the racial problems of his
country.
But Lucian Pye has written that the r.ajor flaw of
the Burmese political syste. has been the inability of the
leaders to communicate with each other. Would the re-
commended two years correct a problem the British could not
correct in the many years they dominated that country? Why
the magic number of six months or two years, while the
British had so many hundred years and they did not get
these colonies to be viable nations?
The reluctance to give up the colonies seemed to
have been couched in the absurd idea that they w.ere being
prepared for self government. Self government was never
defined and one suspects that it often meant an increased
familiarity of the natives with the British way of life
so "that the peoples under temporary tutelage shall be
enabled and encouraged to participate in the more sophis-
ticated culture. The British conveniently ignored
the fact that these dominated peoples had governed them-
selves long before Europeans infiltrated their midst.
As John Plamenatz writes, the colonies may have been
15Lucian V7. Pye, Politics
,
Personality and Nation-
Building : Burma' s Search for Identity (Boston: Little,
Brown and Co., 1966), passim .
1 6
The Times (London), June 22, 1949, guoted in
J.M. Lee, Colonial Developmen
t
, pp. 14-15.
governed badly by European standards, but .-by their bru-
tality, Europeans have proven themselves unfit to govern
others...^^ If the intent was to prepare the datives well
to ta)ce over the reins of government someday in the future,
how does one explain the rush with which an
.'advanced"
constitution was thrust on the Windward and Leeward Islands
during the early sixties? It was done to bring them on
par with Trinidad and Jamaica in order to form a federation.
Of course, this is an unacceptable reason since "advanced"
constitutions by British reasoning do not bring with it
experience. It is still very puzzling when one looks at
the slovenliness with which Britain has given the islands
a chance to rule themselves. The British should have
listened to this pithy remark by Plamenatz that "there are
many countries independent which are not free, and no one
would suggest that they ought to be deprived of their
independence in order to make them capable of freedom, "^^
or of ruling themselves.
John Plamenatz, On Alien Rule and Self Government(London: Longmans, Green, 1960), p. 35. '
1
8
Ibid,, pp. 22-23. For a defence of the colonial
svstem see The Colonial Problem ; A Report by
_a Study Group
of Members of the Royal Institute of International Affairs
(London; Oxford University Press, 1937).
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Since it cannot be discerned why Britain has been
reluctant to release it<^ r-r^c-t-i.s costly colonies of the Caribbean,
it would seer, that it is just too proud to do so. The /
colonies cost it a great deal (see chart on aid, p. ),
but the British still feel that they have not been given^
enough credit for the wonderful work they have done for
the natives. m British eyes, the natives are ungrateful.
This lack Of appreciation is a sure sign of ir^maturity which
precludes independence. Finally, it is the general feeling
of Dominican leaders that the present generation of British
leaders should not be blamed for the poor conditions and
inadequacies of the islands since whatever damage was done,
occurred at an earlier period of history. This is correct,
but it is because of this abuse that the present genera-
tion of West Indians have had to live in poverty. Had
much of the money derived from the islands been invested
there, the story today might have been better.. Thus, the
apparent hostility of the present West Indian generation
towards the British today is not without justification.
But the indictment of the colonial condition has
not all come from those affected by it. There have been
British critics who have voiced their objection to the
attitude of the British toward the colonies. Ruth Hinden
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writes that: "Wp PRr-T 4- -i .-v,!
-^e LBritishJ cannot teach and preach
democracy and liberty and equality between all .en, far
less to practice these principles.
. . without challenging
the syste.-. which exists because of the very opposite
principles.!^ Another critic, Sydney Olivier, a former
Governor of Jamaica, stated:
.'it is impossible for any
white Official to understand that these people fCaribbean
natives] are poor.
, . and what they produce costs them
a physical and intellectual labor of which any white man
would be simply incapable under similar conditions ^0
He was a little too sympathetic with his assertion that a
white man could not work under similar conditions; anyone
can work under any conditions if he has to. But the point
is wall taken: what do these hungry people care about
democracy when they have daily cares about the basic
necessities of life?
One of the most biting criticisms of the idea
of preparing the natives for self rule came from Plamenatz
Ruth Hinden, Empire and After (London: Essential
Books, 1949), p. 169.
20 Sydney Olivier, Letters and Selected Writings
,
edited by Margaret Olivier (New York: Macmillan, 1948),
p. 32.
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Who simply says that "foreign rule, in the very nature,
is undemocratico "^-^
Today, Britain still has colonies in the Caribbean
and this will be the case for a long time to come. The
study will now turn to an analysis of the social and
psychological impact of colonialism on those who have and
are experiencing it.
The Social and Psychological Impact
of Colonialism
In the Caribbean, the social and psychological
impact of colonialism has been a lasting one. A distinct
new culture was created in the Caribbean since the orig-
inal inhabitants were annihilated. Whatever culture the
slave brought with him from Africa was wiped out. He
was discouraged to continue in his old ways and could
not even communicate with others since a conscious effort
was made to keep people from the same tribes apart in
order to contain any rebellion. Consequently, a European
society emerged in the Caribbean for which the British
have taken the credit. They had done such a good job that
it was reported that during the 1938 riots in Jamaica
2 ] Plamenatz, On Alien Rule
,
p. 92.
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a woman defended thf^ Rr~T4--;oKa a e B itish Empire by saying that "it is
next to the Kingdom of God.-^^
^^^^ ^^^^^ ^^^^^
^^^^
treatment of the West Indian during slavery did not deter
his reverence for the Crown. West Indians honor the Queen
on her birthday, and sing praises to her on Commonwealth
Day (which used to be Empire Day).
How does one account for this intense love of the
master? It seems to be in appreciation of the protection
afforded by the Crown during the period following emanci-
pation (1832-1838). in 1832, slavery ended but the ex-
slaves were still attached to the plantations. They did
not know what it was to be free, and from all reports
the planters were not about to cushion this trying period
for this unfortunate people. The British stepped in to
help but that help did not last too long as the Negroes
showed signs of asserting themselves by entering politics.
The British were to return again to help the Negro cope
with the harsh realities of living in an extremely poor
environment. In retrospect, this second return proved
a stumbling block to West Indian nationhood. Since
B.Lc St. John Hamilton, Problems of Administration
in an Emergent Nation : A Case Study of Jamaica (New York:
Frederick A, Praeger, 1964), p. 12.
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Changes came to each island in isolation, it has produced
a bitter rivalry among the islands. Further, changes
were made in institutions rather than within the people
of each island, who were not taught to work together
on a regional basis.
Colonialism robbed the West Indian of his individuality
and, in the process, his self-respect. His personality was
impoverished while his pride suffered and his creative
power was dulled. The colonized was made to feel that he
had no culture, no history; he was not even part of human-
ity. Consequently, an inferiority complex crept in; he
hated himself. He had nothing; but he wanted something.
The only alternative was to mimic his master. The West
Indian now has the reputation as the great mimic man. The
VJest Indian was totally emasculated as an individual.
This sense of v/orthlessnes s and dependence was further
rivetted into him because everything came to be done for
him. He could not help himself. For example, after a
Commission of Inquiry had exposed the benign neglect of
the West Indies, Paul Blanshard reports that "a comptroller
for Development and Welfare for the West Indies fwas
appointed] but he did not need West Indian help, he came
with a "staff of economic and educational experts," 23
23Blanshard, Democracy and Empire
, p. 323.
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With thei. expertise, they
.issed the importance of train-
xng West Indians themselves.
The hatred of West Indianism was inevitable. For
example, a conscious effort was made to remove creole-
patois in Dominican society because it was generally
believed that it had the adverse effect of hampering one's
ability to speak English well. To speak English well was
to be superior. This is clearly demonstrated by the
opinion of a member of the Dominica House of Assembly
who raised serious objections to giving additional funds
for Radio Dominica since the announcers pronounced English
words incorrectly.^^
Philip Mason is not too far from the mark when he
writes that "the deepest wrong that has been done to the
Caribbean people is that they have been brought up in a
society in which traditionally everyone wishes he was
someone else. -'2^ Various methods of attempting to induce
physical changes were even attempted; attempts ranging
from marrying
-light" to the use of cosmetic preparations.,
The quintessence of this rejection of the Black self
came from the mother who happened to have a light skinned
child when she reminded the child that he had to be
24This exchange took place in the presence of this
writer during debate on a motion by the Government to increase
funds for the Radio Station, August 17, 1972.
25Macon, Patterns o_f Dom i.nanc e
,
p. 288 (my emphasis).
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care.ul in w.at
.e .oes to prevent Xettin, aown Ms coXo.The so-soci.Xi.ea
.Ml.
...
associating
"
Mac. With di.t, idleness, un.eiiaMlity
. ana even
stupidity.
The colonial condition heightened the importance
Of s.in color. Increasingly, whites in the colony refused
to associate with the darker people, and anvone of the
colony Who could "pass for white" tried to be wMte. still
to a great extent, one's r^ir^r-
,
s color is a very important variable
for advancement in society. The two major banks in
Dominica only began Mring people of darker complexion
in 1965. but they came from the upper classes. Originally,
Dominicans were kept away from the banks by the ridicu-
lously high qualifications that they demanded, qualifica-
tions which were in no way connected with banking. 26
By 1965, Dominicans still did not have those qualifica-
tions; therefore, either banking got easier or Dominicans
got smarter. Besides the banks, the religious bodies
took part in this form of discrimination by favoring
lighter skinned people over the darker ones in their
hiring practices.
2 6
,
,
.
Originally they were required to have at leastthe equivalent of tv/o years of school after Grade 12 ortwo Higher School passes, but by 1965 some people whodid not even have a High School Certificate were being
employed. ^
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The other side of the coin has been the class
question. As in many other places clac,. .H-J-ciues, C ass is acquired
through a family name„ The family name plays an important
role and takes precedence over color. Certainly, this
class distinction was acquired from British rule. The
Dominican knew his place, but did not always struggle as ,
Marx suggested because he wanted to be like the first
classes and be accepted by them.
Class distinction is especially noticeable in
Dominica where the language one speaks may indicate one's
class. There are two languages: one "superior," one "in-
ferior"; English and Creole-patois respectively. The
upper classes may insist, through various means, that they
do not understand the inferior one; though members of the
family may speak it at home. Furthermore, anyone who has
spent some time abroad inadvertently "forgets" his creole-
patois. If he has not forgotten it, and speaks it on his
return, his admiring and often surprised peers are flaber-
gasted and may even lose respect for him.
On the other hand, if one were to approach a person
from the rural districts, where creole-patois is the
language and make an attempt to initiate a conversation
in patois, the one approached might feel offended, even
though his mastery of the English language is not good, of
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cour.o, some people will not ,n..ry ini.o such a fa.ily
because i. is too low. his ,o.ces Lhe f ..iXy
a black Sheep who gives up family prestige to
.'uplift"
a darker skinned family.
The class syndrome was so deep in the West
Indian that
-when the "first-class" Kngri.h rejected his
company, the West Tndian smoothed his hurt feelings by
surmising that thin breed of Englishman is not the real
thing, and that somehow the better tJnglishman resides in
nritain^'7 though this breed rarely reached the Caribbean.
The resulting complications of race, color, and clans in
the Caribb.-an are well documontod by C.T.Jv'. James. There
were clubs which simply did not admit iUacks. One good
example was tho Dominica Club, whose, show piece w<u; the
Covernor; it was rechris toned the White People's Club (no
derogation intended). There were instances where heated
discussions were carried on as to the possible effects of
lowering the tone of an Institution by including a Black
man. m 1933, Cyril bionel Robinson James writes that
"the surest sign of a West Indian h,.ving arrived is tliat
he kec^ps company with people lighter in complexion or
Raymond T. .Smith, "Social Stratification, Cultural
Pluralism, and Integration in We.<-.t Indian Societies,"
Caribbean Integra h ion ; Papers on Social
, Political and
Kconomi c Integra [:ion
, ed, by Sybil Lewis and Thomas G.
Mathews (Hio iMedras, P.R.: Institute of Caribbean Studies,
1967), p. 237.
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bigger in ns.e.^^^ The reverse of that is also t.ue; that
the light-Skinned or Mg-na.ed is doing the darker-skinned
or small-named a favor by being in his company. But it
must be emphasized that in Dominica the family name is
taking precedence, though color is still very important.
However, the color question revolves around the major cities
unless the light-skinned from the rural district also has an
important name. a light-skinned person from the rural
area is usually poor like other villagers. He is often
ridiculed for being that color. He is usually called one
or all of these names: backra, vieux blanc, or shaben,
°^ povr e (poor white).
During and after slavery, the slave was often
rebuked for his "slovenliness." it never occurred to
the master that this could have been the result of ex-
haustion precipitated by undernourishment and a lack of
incentive. The same attitude of expecting maximum output
of the present-day worker has persisted with little or no
change. It is reflected in the answers given this writer
by the business elites of Dominica who felt that Domini-
cans should be working harder to better the country.
28C.LoRo James, The Case for West Indian Self
Government (London: Hogarth, 1933), pp. 8-9.
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The following question was asked of twenty business
elites:
-A^e Dominicans contributing enough toward the
economic development of the island?.. au twenty said no
The follow-up question posed was:
..In what ways could they
(Dominican people) contribute
.ore," This was not an open-
ended question though the interviewees were invited to
add comments to the following options: by (a) working '
harder; (b) using more local products; (c) saving n,ore;
(d) investing more at home; (e) making less demands for'
wage increases and, (f) any other way. All twenty res-
pondents chose option
..(a)., and declined to give additional
29comments
.
Apparently it has not sturck the interviewees' '
fancy that poverty and low wages engender apathy and lack
of enthusiasm for productive effort. Indeed people resort
to a kind of foot-dragging slow-down strike to resist
This writer is satisfied that the twenty were
representative of the Dominican business elite. He
even feels that his sample was too large since an asso-
ciation, the Dominica Manufacturers* Association, re-presents the views of the elites. in interviews withpeople very intimately connected with the Association,
the author was able to discern a yearning to have moreproduction from the average worker.
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that excessive exploitation. They woDc at half-speed;
just enough to get by and this is the "laziness- that'
they are often reproached for. These assessments are
Often misleading, intolerable, and malicious. West
Indians working abroad have proven themselves to be hard
and productive workers. West Indians still live in
Panama after having worked hard to build the Canal which
bears the name of their new country; and, of course,
innumerable West Indians migrated to the United States,
Canada, and the United Kingdom to work in the lowest jobs.
They now own their homes and many businesses. But, instead
of trying to find out the cause of this "laziness" of
Dominicans, Peter Simple of the Dominica business elites
quotes Gunnar Myrdal approvingly when simple lists charac-
teristic traits and attitudes that hamper development -
in Dominica, the people are the main stumbling block.
The traits listed by Myrdal and quoted by Simple are;
1. Low levels of work discipline, punctuality, and
orderliness
;
2. Superstitious beliefs;
3. Irrational outlook;
4. Lack of alertness - young boys stay av;ay from
sports
;
5. Lack of adaptability, ambition, and readiness
for change and experiment;
Ill
8- Chronic dishonesty, bobh large and s.all scale.
But Simple chose the part of Myrdal's work which
suited his purposes, his own biases, and his lack of
understanding of Dominican society and people in general.
He should have continued a little further and he would
have read that Myrdal writes that "a stagnant society does
not come Into existence except as a result of State
policy, "31 he could have added, business policy too.
It is underemployment and unemployment which induce
people to stretch jobs. These are obviously compounded
by the no-name nobody who is forced to be unambitious.
He cannot take a loan to begin a business; he does not
know how to run one and does not receive any help either.
30
^'eter Simple, "Of Men and Mice," The Dominica
Chronicle, May 25, 1968, p, 4. Peter Simpl'iTook those
Ideas from Gunnar Myrdal, Beyond the Welfare State : Econo-
mic Planning j_n the Welfare State and International Tmplica -(London: Oxford University Press, 1960), pp. 90=^^2;
31 Myrdal, Beyond the Welfare State
, p. 99.
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AS these islands get more industrialized, no effort is
made to cushion the transition for the worker whose
working habits have been patterned on his former condition
Of seasonal work. As one expert has so ably put it,
the transition from "agraria to industria" is hard.32
In agraria, life was leisurely. People worked their
"tass" (certain amount of work in one day). They worked
when they wanted money. m industria, it is different;
production is the name of the game„ The biggest piece
of decoration in the fachory is not the human being,
but the clock which is always punctual. It takes time
to get adjusted to this new life style. The pressure
on the individual is so unbearable that there are
high rates of turnover, absenteeism, tardiness, which
in turn discourage investors, which lead to further
unemployment. But in spite of this gloomy situation,
the West Indian can make it in the West Indies if he is
sufficiently motivated. He does not have to leave his
home to prove himself. If the average peasant could
receive the needed advice, he would stop looking at the
land as a place to scrape up a bare existence until
Fred Riggs, "Agraria and Industria," Toward the
Comparative Study of Public Administration
,
ed, by William
J~. Sif f in Toioomingdale : Indiana University Press, 1957),
passim .
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something better com^s ^ir^r^r^ u. along. He will change the attitude
that land is just to be had for the keeping and that
efficient methods could make production profitable.
The peasant could not see production on a large
scale because the trained agriculturist in the islands
was not interested in passing on that information. The lat-
ter was more interested in setting up a horticultural
experiment station to show the Royal Family or its repre-
sentative on their annual tours. Furthermore, these
agriculturists did not reside in the areas where the
productive land existed; they remained in the cities to
enjoy the fruits of the city. The new brand of agricul-
turists have not done much better either.^^ They now have
elaborate offices in the city while the rural areas are
manned by the beginners. Of course, there are exceptions,
and serious work has been done in certain selected areaso
But considering the fact that many of these countries
have agricultural economies, more could have been done.
•^his writer was reliably informed of deals which
could not be accounted for when the new Director of
Agriculture, Dr. J. Bernard Yankey, took over in
Dominica in 1966.
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The Colonial Irnpach on Educr.tion
An area which has rccoivod liLLle serious attention
because of the sensitive nature of the subject is the irr,-
pnct of colonialism on Caribbean education. The British
system of education was transplanted wholesale to the
Caribbean with little or no modification, and with it
came the attitude that education was for a select few.
One observer, William J. Foltz, writes that the educational
structures of the newest states reinforced polarization
between elites and masses. '^'^ Schools concentrate on ele-
mentary subjects; high schools are few (four and a half
in Uominici.) and these are run by religious sects, except
for the one and a half which is run by the Government
.
A university was
--ibsent, until one was established in 1948
in Jamaica. Subjects such as international relations, which
could have given the West Indian nn idea of the non-role his
country was playing :i n the world, were almost always avoided.
Of course, subjects dealing with the West Indian's heritage
were unheard of and the authorities did not have to
explain their exclusion, Raymond Kennedy writes tliat
William J. Foltz, "Buildincj the newest Nations:
Short-run Strategies and Long-run Problems," Nation-Building
,
ed. by Deutsch et £l
. ,
p. 110.
3 5 This writer refers i.o the newly built school at
Portsmouth as a half school since it' goes up to Grade 9 only,
though the GovernmenI reefers to it as a complot'^ high school.
these "subjects were deliberately avoided to hide fror.
the native students their lowly status in comparison
with free people and thus keep them from inevitable dis-
content and rebelliousness. This last statement
does not hold completely true for the Caribbean, because
by all indications had the VJest Indian been told about
his past, chances are that he would have opted to dis-
card it. He would have acquired British ways since the
latter had been so deeply inculcated into him, or if not
fully inculcated, dangled in front of him long enough to
make him want it over his own.
To complicate matters, secondary education has never
been free, though now it is less expensive than it used
to be. The masr;es received primary education only, A
select few from the masses made it socially, but that did
not do the poor elements any good, since that meant the
"better" part of them was bought off at an early stage,
British examination was, and still is, more highly valued;
thus, the reason for the long connection between the only
University of the West Indies and that of London was to
keep the former institution both honest and acceptable.
3 6Raymong Kennedy, "The Colonial Crisis and the
Future," quoted in Blanshard, Democracy and Empire
,
p. 17.
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The West Indian University has been so proud of that'
connection that it can still boast that a second class
honours degree in the West Indies r.ay command first cl
honours at London. As a result,
.American degrees are
considered second rate regardless of place of graduation.
Ironically, the people making the comparison between
systems base their judgments on feelings since they have
never been exposed to either educational system. This
indifference towards American degrees is shown by an
account of attempts to recruit teachers for Jamaica.
The informant writes that no efforts were made to contact
Jamaicans in the United States, although many Jamaican
agencies could have obtained more than the reguired amount,
The writer surmises that the deliberate oversight may
have been made as a warning to those Jamaicans "buying"
degrees in the United States. He based his conclusion
on the following statement by the Jamaica Board of
Education:
Students to American Universities and Colleges
v;ho intend to teach in secondary schools might
find it well worth their while when they are
deciding on the nature and content of their
study courses never to lose sight of the British
background and tradition against which they will
work,-^
'
37
G.Io Durrant, "American University Degree," The
Torch (July 1958), quoted in St, John Hamilton, Problems
of Administration
, p, 34,
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colonialism gave a certain direction to education
by encouraging certain professions. in the colonies,
education was for a limited purpose, to benefit the ad-
ministration. No attention was given to vocational train-
ing; there was no need for such since no factories of any
significance were maintained. All "unnecessary" skills
were discouraged. Education was associated with the
present needs and Opportunities afforded by colonial rule
which emphasized law and white-collar jobs in the civil
service bureaucracy. This general lack of interest in
education for its own sake (which a country like Dominica
may not be able to afford) is reflected in the lack of a
plan for education in Dominica.
In summation, the catastrophic effects of colonial
education are these: there is an overproduction of
unemployable semi-educated people, with primary or secon-
dary specialization. The lopsided distribution of
specialization has the infuriating effects of inviting
expatriates to take technical jobs such as in the
communication and teacher training fields. These have
to be heavily subsidized, as Ivor Jennings warns, to
lure them out of their secure jobs at home to the tenuous
positions in the Caribbean, which entails a tremendous
amount of sacrifice.
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Associating a highly educated person with a white-
collar job has produced an inefficiency in hu.^an resources
which a new nation, lilce Dominica, can ill-afford. Conse-
quently, the Government has a monopoly on talents which it
cannot transfer to the private sector. But why the attrac-
tion to the public service?
Historically, working for the Government has meant
job security and an inefficiency which has become unbearable.
The private sector has not provided that security; hiring
and firing were carried out on a very informal basis. m
addition. Government has encouraged the talented people
to leave the more productive private sector to join the
non-productive service sector after colonialism in its
crudest form has all but disappeared. For example, at one
time, the privately owned Bulletin Office was the biggest
printing concern in Dominica, but now it is on the verge
of closing dov;n because Government has inadvertently lured
the better Bulletin Office personnel into its printing
concern. This move was wrong on several counts; " a loan
to the Bulletin Office to expand its facilities would
have been much better, in that this concern was helping to
expand the economy v/hile the Government printery is main-
taining yet another bureaucracy which offers more security
but does not help expand the economy. Government may have
been reluctant to subsidize The Chronicle since it is owned
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by the Church, Which is foreign. Another printing
concern, The Herald, could have been substituted.
The unavailability of talented people in the private
sector gets translated into the attitude of the local
business people toward expanding their enterprise. They
have been taught to be satisfied with what they have.
They have learnt not to be too avaricious, leaving the
outsider the chance to risk his fortunes.
Because of the psychological content of Caribbean
education which taught the recipient not to be too uppity
or dynamic, it is faulty to assert that Western education
hastened the demise of colonial rule.^^ m fact, it
reinforced the rule. The British never overtly taught
British ways to West Indians or even to Africans; or the
importance of proper English as emphasized by two
educators in Dominica. It was the local master, the West
Indian himself, who took it upon himself to transmit
3 8The biggest business concern in Dominica is owned
by Astaphans, a one-time foreigner. Astaphans has made enough
money by now, and has since sold out the business to
the people of Dominica.
39James Coleman, ed., "Introduction: Education and
Political D'^velopment
,
" Education and Political Develop-
^Q'^t (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
1965), p. 1.
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formally what he had acquired from the British. The
local headmaster took it upon himself to teach about the
grandeur of the Empire and the tremendous deeds people
like Sir Winston Churchill et al
.
, had accomplished to
save that empire. The general knowledge class was devoted
to drilling the students to memorize the meanings of
KCMG (Knight Commander of St. Michael and St. George),
Qe or KoC. (Queen, or King's, Council), MBE (Member of
the British Empire), and QBE (Order of the British Empire)
„
The unassuming headmaster saw to it that all stood at
attention on singing "God Save the Queen." The child had
to abandon class for some two weeks to practice his drills
to give a presentation that befits the celebration of the
Queen's Birthday. Of course, songs such as "There will
always be an England," and "Rule Britannia' became standard
renditions and every school day began with the salute to
the Union Jack. Having accomplished this, the Headmaster
feels his job has been well done and he may even receive
one of the citations from the Queen for his efforts.
Another myth which needs to be set straight is the
general belief that education hastened independence or
whatever variant the countries have of it. It is correct
to say that those who pushed for independence v/ere
educated in K'orth America or Britain, but they would have
been educated there anyv;ay. They were already independent
121
since they were able to leave their countries at will to
study abroad„ m fact, .any of the educated returnees
had beco.e American citizens. Further,
.ost educated West
Indians were not concerned with the uneven political and
economic development among the islands. The British had
instilled pride of being better than the next, while a
well-controlled communication system kept the less de-
veloped islands satisfied. No well educated West Indian
rose to the occasion to correct these disparities; a
hasty attempt was made in 1959 to correct the uneven
political development to bring about federation (see
Chapter VI) but this was done by Britain, not by any
educated West Indian. The educated West Indian, for
the most part, is afraid of independence because this
might spell trouble' for him in his attempts to keep
the masses in their places. As to the do-gooder who has
been educated abroad, one finds that he is a product of
the colonial situation regardless of how one may think
he detests the metropolitan master.
The Political Impact of Colonialism
The present political situation in the British
Caribbean is a direct result of the colonial condition.
During colonial rule there were two important components
which affected the political situation. They were the
bureaucracy and the aspiring politician who had either
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refused a Job in the bureaucracy or had been hurt by see
policy which had adverse effects on his business. With
the end of colonialism, one sees the struggle for sup-
remacy between the two forces Tf ^ exu . It IS, of course, only the
people who suffer the consequences of this fight.
For these reasons, this section is divided into
three parts. The first deals with the general political
atmosphere under which colonial rule has operated. The
second part deals with the bureaucracy, with an examination
of the role of the Governor during colonial times, together
with the British attitude toward incorporating local men
in the bureaucracy. it includes an assessment of the
emerging bureaucracy, as politicians acquire the power of
appointment from the colonial master. a strange situation
has developed since independence in many of these Caribbean
countries, as all the old bureaucrats are faced with
getting orders from politicians they once could ignore.
As vacancies occur, they are increasingly filled with men
who are more likely to be supportive of the ruling
Government's policies. The old hands have nothing to lose,
but still feel threatened both by the new hands and by the
politicians. The third part deals exclusively with the
type of politician produced in the colonial situation.
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Crown colony Government^^ was introduced to the
West indies in 1878; it came to Dominica in 1898. it is
important to note that it did not malce its
-appearance in
all the colonies at the same time. This promoted insular-
ity and hampered Caribbean political integration (Chapter VI)
Crown Colony Government was introduced in Jamaica
first because the whites were afraid that the newly en-
franchised Negroes would dominate them because of their
numerical superiority. Earlier, the whites could rule
in all the colonies since slaves were not allowed to
partake in politics. But now the slaves were freed
and the operating system was open to anyone. Rather than
work with the Negroes, the whites preferred added pro-
tection from the Crown. There was no guarantee that the
new situation would give them either more protection or
prestige. The whites knew fully well that they had been
cruel to their slaves. By inviting the Crown to take
direct control could also mean added protection for the
ex-slaves; but that was the chance they had to take.
There were tv;o types of Crown Colony Government.
The "mild" form meant that a certain proportion of members
of the national legislature was elected, but the majority
was nominated by the Governor, The second type, the pure
form which Dominica experienced, meant that all members
of the legislature were hand-picked by the Governor, the
lawful representative of the Crown. In both cases, the
Governor was able to rule the territory single-handedly.
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Britain may have waited for this invitation. it
had refused to take the initiative and its talcing over
was timely. But in retrospect, the British blundered
very badly in their handling of the islands. After
so many years of British political coaching, the level of
politics in the islands is still extremely low by any
standards. The British may have missed a golden oppor-
tunity to train responsible local leadership in the unit
legislatures.
One basic feature of this type of government was
its strict constitutionalist nature, which made the West
Indians great law abiders and stymied any form of initiative
on the part of West Indians. They may fight the British
system, but never want to destroy their inherited system.
They only want to replace the Englishmen who hold key
positions
.
The system also brought with it the situation where
few people made decisions; this still persists today, and
has led the present leaders to remark that responsible
government does not exist in the Caribbean. Responsible
government signifies that the "Cabinet is responsible to
the Parliament." This is a mockery since the statement
implies that Parliament is larger than the Cabinet and can,
in fact, overrule the latter. In the small islands, the
reverse is the case; the Cabinet, or even an individual,
makes a decision and Parliament cannot muster enough votes
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to defeat it. Oo.inica any dynamic leade. can have his
way in the present situation. When one loo.s
.ac. at the
past history of Dominican politics, one sees that a
Governor performed a similar role, though his
.ethod of
operation might have been harsher.
During recent times, Dominicans either went to the
streets, or were forced on the streets, when they did not
get favorable legislation. They did not always win since
the crown had a monopoly on power and sometimes used it
to contain resentment. The system had a way of pushing pro-
grams on the people with or without their consent. The same
pattern is repeated today, which leads to frequent break-
downs which fall short of a major challenge to the system.
The system failed to promote local government,
probably because local government machinery was not con-
sidered necessary for an efficient colonial administration.
The national government, if it could be called that since
it was never national in character, could and did stifle
local attempts to provide services to the grass roots.
The loc-1 man who developed a reputation may rival and
even challenge the legitimacy of British rule; for this
reason he was thwarted. And even after independence, lip
service has been paid in Dominica to the development of local
governments. The situation has often been aggravated if the
party or people in power in the local body is not in the
party of the national government. Any action the local
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body .ay ta.e wMch is seen as inimical to the ruling pa.ty
can precipitate a crisis.
The British had thought that the best way to deal
With rancourous critics in thei. colonies was to throw the.
in prisons to bring the. bac. to their senses. In fact .any
national leaders were taken from jail and brought to the
Prime Minister's palace to lead their countries to indepen-
dence/1 The same practice persists in the Caribbean. A
state of emergency lasted for six months in Trinidad while
many people were held without trial during that period. m
Dominica, two days before the Government planned to dis-
solve the local government, it banned public meetings to
prevent local government members from presenting their
cases to the people.
In commenting on the inherited political systems in
the Caribbean, Charles C. Moskos, Jr. and Wendell Bell chose
Jamaica to show that democracy and the general working of the
system were most apparent there. It is their opinion that the
long experience Jamaicans had with the system they now have is
responsible for their success. in the first place they
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In the Caribbean, Bustamante fits that description,
though he was not removed from prison to lead his country to
independence. In addition, Uriah Butler was jailed in 1939
for this trade union activities in Trinidad, while a Jamaican
writer was interned in 1945 because he criticized the British
system during the war of 1940.
42Charles C. Moskos, Jr., and Wendell Bell, "Attitudes
Toward Democracy," Democratic Revolution in the VJest Indies
ed, by Wendell Bell (Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman, 1967)
,
p. 74,
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Chose the «.ong example; If they a.e concerned with longevity
Of a political system in the Caribbean, Barbados is the best
example. To show the superiority of aa^aica, they used the
following criteria:
TABLE Political Types By Territory
Percentage of West Indian Leaders
PLACE
who were:
Demo-
crats
Authori- Cynical Authori- Notarian Parlia- tarians ofIdealists mentarians Cases
JAMAICA 39% 9% 26% 26% 23
TRINIDAD 18% 14% 27% 41% 22
BR. GUIANA 8% 8% 38% 46% 13
BARBADOS
DOMINICA
GRENADA
19% 2% 26% 5 3% 53
Source: Wendell Bell, ed.
, Democratic Revolution
Hi West Indies (Cambridge, Mass.;
Schenkman, 1967), p. 70.
This table does not explain the high incidence of
authoritarianism in Trinidad and British Guiana (Guyana).
Perhaps the race question has forced the leaders to be
authoritarian and thus want to settle "this problem" once
and for all. Their combining Barbados, Dominica and Grenada
does not help this analysis since it prevents a comparison
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between Jamaica and Barbados, which has had greater ex-
perience With self-rule. Barbados never had Crown Colony
Government.
Bell may have fallen in the frustration-aggression
syndrome when he says that aggression is the result of
frustration.^3
^^^^ necessarily follow that the
incidents of dissatisfaction in the smaller islands are
the result of frustrations engendered when they were faced
with working with an "advanced" political system. The
system in the smaller islands is not delivering services
which it can deliver; thus the people are not satisfied.
The ills of the small islands cannot be hidden as easily
as in the larger ones. Wages in Jainaica or Trinidad may
not increase in relation to rising prices but that fact
is hidden by the fact that wages do increase annually.
Increasingly people can work two jobs and keep themselves
busy. An individual in Jamaica or Trinidad can move with
relative ease from one job to another. He has countless
ways to release pent-up energy while the small islander
is not as fortunate as his other brothers; and, besides,
the low level of resistance in Jamaica before 1970 was no
indication of the acceptance of the system.
It would be well to take note of Peter Lupsha who
writes that "Political violence is not the result of the
frustration-aggression syndrome. When frustrated, an
43Ibid., p. 76.
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.ndividual may forget his goal and beco.e aoathetic
Aggression can
.esult without frustration. The events In
all the Islands, big and small, demonstrate that there Is
something wrong with BelLs analysis. If the system was
so very much accpeted how does one explain the revolution
the Caribbean, beginning in Jamaica - not Montserrat,
the most backward and last colony to receive a little
self-rule7 But developments in the system cannot be fully
understood unless one gets a clear understanding of the
role of the Governor and bureaucracy, and how they worked
to run the system with the exclusion of the colonial
politician.
The Governor and The Bureaucracy
Crown Colony Government in its crudest form meant
direct rule from Britain. its ultimate purpose was to
prepare the West Indian to rule himself. The one who was
designated to perform that task was none other than the
Governor, the cog of the system. He was the "man on the
spot" who listened to public opinion; in him all social
and political legality of the system came to a head. He
had to be close to the natives, yet keep his distance. He
had the power to appoint people to the legislature to en-
sure maximum representation. But the word "minimum" was
substituted for the original "maximum" as one interest
44Peter A. Lupsha, "Explanation of Political Violence
Some Psychological Th?ories Versus Indignation," Politics
and Society (Fall, 1971), p. 96.
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was represented, and that was that of the Governor. His
interest was to make himself look good in the eyes of the
Colonial Office to ensure his promotion. To ensure that,
he appointed people who would go along with his measures
for the colony.
The result of such appointments created a great
deal of irresponsibility and cynicism on the part of some
people who read the motives of the Governor. The idea
of having to support Governments' legislation had the
effect of defeating the whole purpose of direct British
rule. Further, the principled few refused appointments
because that meant giving up one's individuality.
The Governor continued to maintain the class
structure by keeping company with a few and shunning the
majority. He recommended a few cronies to the Queen for
citations while more deserving people refused them or
v;ere disregarded. This practice continues and those
recommended and receiving are usually friends of the
Government. Elite selection is nothing short of decapi-
tation of a native society by removing the native leaders
45from the people.
Paul Blanshard, op. cit., p. 83. But the biggest
joke of itaall was when an M.B.E. was bestowed on a Carib
Chief in Dominica. This can be likened to Harvard's bestow-
ing an honorary doctorate to the first Indian it picked up
from the Reservation,
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The Governor and his lady, the island's temporary
Queen, stood at the head of everything. His presence
was always punctuated by the rendition of the first bars
Of "God Save the Queen," while those present stood at
attention, if he were to appear at a function where a
crowd was expected, the people had to be at their posts
minutes before his grand entrance; when he entered the
people would stand at attention, face him and remain'
standing until he had taken his seat. But people should
not have been deterred at the coldness and aloofness of
the Governor, wrote Sir Ivor Jennings, since this was no
indication of his attitude toward the natives. Ke was
so because he was English; if he were an Irishman, he
would have known how to act.'^^
The result of sending incompetent people to teach
something they did not know or understand was disastrous.
Its effects are now being felt throughout the Caribbean.
In England, the Governor may have been a nobody, but,
on becoming a Governor, he was suddenly catapulted into the
ruling class. In England, he may have heard of the Empire
probably did not care too much about it, but now he formed
an importaunt part of this one time nebulous society. He
convinced himself of his ovrn importance. But when he took
up his post in the Criribbean, he realized that the natives
^^Sir Ivor Jennings, The Approach to Selr-Government ,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963), p, 131.
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were not as stunid sc: v^c^ u ^ou pxu as ne had once hf^^ir-H^in- nea d„ He was even im-
pressed with the natives' ^^^1.-+-, 4-ability to speak English and dressjust as well as himself Ho -k^n se.Lt. e began to compare himself with
the natives to find out why it was necessary to keep them
in bondage. At one point, he even relaxed and tried to be
part of the people, but he suddenly became uneasy in their
company and withdrew. He rationalized his position with the
thought that he had a job to do and it was not his business
to worry over the people. He convinced himself that the
present condition was a necessary phase in the scheme of
things; the time would come when they would be able to stand
on their ov;n.
Yet the Governor was uneasy; he knew that he owed
his raison d'etre to the system and for that reason could
not show his lack of respect and ungratefulness by chal-
lenging ito He also knew that by being ungrateful to the
system, he would be acting in the interests of the natives
whom he had already begun to respect. But love of Britain
took precedence over everything else. He even eagerly
awaited such events as the Queen's Birthday or Empire Day
to pay his respects to the head of his country. On such
occasions, he would spout out some platitudes to a gathering
of hungry and underfed children who had gathered under the
lashing rays of a tropical sun while he himself, dressed in
full uniform, stood shaded at the head of the gathering.
In the midst of such pageantry, the Governor forgot
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that the people he was addressing were not Englishmen, they
would never be, even though s o.e would, in the future, try
hard to be. They were brought up where they were and ^he
great majority would die where they were. In the final analy
sis. the Governor developed a morbid desire for the respect
and homage of those over whom he ruled. One unadmiring
critic puts it this way: "Uneasily conscious of the moral
insecurity of his position, he was further handicapped by
finding himself an aristocrat without having been trained
47
as one." Little wonder that many a Governor became
neurotic. The intense contradiction within one person had
to surface somehow,^®
Harold Laslci was very unhappy with the narrow base
from which Governors were selected. He writes that the
quality was such that the one so appointed rarely questioned
the system or attempted innovations.'^^ On the same point,
Paul Blanshard writes that most Governors had no first hand
knowledge of dealing with the "institutions of responsible
democracy." They were not recruited among those who would
most likely criticize the system. "They had to conform to
47CoL.Ro James, V/e s t Indian Government
, p. 11.
'^^Gordon Lewis makes mention of two governors, one
in Antigua and one in British Guiana, who were sick. The
Groyyth of the Modern West Indies (London; MacGibbon and Kee
Ltd., 1968), p. 22.
Harold J. Laski, "The Colonial Civil Service,"
The Political Quarterly , Vol. 9 (1938), p. 546.
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w.n B^itisn app.oval.
. ...a « ,.ey we.e not a con.o^ist
the beginning, they usually attained that status long
befo.e the end of thel. career," or even current tour, one
gets the impression that it was beneath their dignity to
sub.it to the approval of the people with who™ they were
supposed to work.^*^
The intent here is not to condemn all governors,
because there were some good ones. But they were so rare
that one has to search hard to find them. However, there
is no question that generally the ones on the Caribbean
circuit were not the best. The one so appointed in the
Caribbean arrived without any detailed knowledge of his
post and within days he would be commanding people who had
lived in that very area all their lives. This situation
was that way only because he carried the title of Governor
and, of course, he was a European. Of those appointed
to the Caribbean, Thomas E, Simey writes of their qualifica-
tions: that their social backgrounds did not qualify them
to handle administrative planning; that they were engaged in
5 2miseducating the people. And, interestingly enough, of
the Governors working in Dominica, this writer was unable
^^Blanshard, Democracy and Empire
, p. 14.
^"""Morley Ayearst, The British West Indies : The Search
for Self-Government (London: Allen and Unwin, 1960), p. 150.
5 2Thomas E. Simey, V/elf are and Planning in the West
Indies (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1946), pp. VI-VIII.
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to find out their Qualifications. Their arrival usually
made the papers and their inauguration made the headlines,
but usually the only qualification published was the M.B.E.
(Member of the Order of the British Empire) they may have
acquired and their having worked in Africa.
53
^^^^^^^1^^ account of the quality of men appointedto the Governship during the war years is contained inKenneth E. Robinson, The Dilemmas of Trusteeship : Aspectsof British Colonial Policy Between the Wars (Londo~Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 46-47.
^
As of 195 7, Governors who made the Caribbean tour andtheir previous experiences are:
JAMAICA:
GUYANA:
BARBADOS
WINDWARDS
LEEWARDS
:
Sir Hugh Foot; Palestine, Trans Jordan,
Cyrenacia Cyprus, Nigeria.
Sir K. Blackbone; Nigeria, Palestine, Gambia.
Sir Patrick Renison; Ceylon, India, Trini-
dad and British Honduras.
Sir Roberb Arundell; Tanganyika, Uganda.
Sir Coleville Deverell; Kenya, Jamaica.
A, To Williams; Northern Rhodesia - for both
the Leewards and Windwards there were white
administrators on each island and almost all
had served in Africa previously.
BELIZE (British C.H. Thornley; Tanganyika, Kenya and
Honduras) Uganda.
TRINIDAD Sir Edward Betham Beetham; Kenya, Swazi-
AND TOBAGO* land, Bechuanaland and Windwards.
136
in summation, it can be said that .any incompetent
people were placed in critical positions which adversely
affected the desired progression of the political syste..
The Governor's role was to teach a people how to be
politically sophisticated by maintaining an air of com-
promise and strong leadership without dictatorial measures
His role was to develop a complex and structually differen
tiated system which could bring a better life for
the people. These ideals were never approxi-
mated; it became increasingly necessary for the Governor
to demand conformity which negated compromise and respon-
sible government. The Governor became a pattern to be
emulated in the system by the aspiring politician.
The Colonial Bureaucracy and the Governor
In the first section of this chapter, the idea of
introducing the bureaucracy as- a way to explain political
development/change was criticized, but no attempt was made
to portray it as an unimportant variable in the political
system. In fact, a country which has experienced the
colonial bureaucracy and in the process inherited a cer-
tain structure during independence, can be understood a
little better through an understanding of what that
bureaucratic system entails.
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Paradoxically, the colonial bureaucracy was above
politics, but yet continually in the midst of politics.
The Governor, already portrayed as the king-pin of the
political system, was at the apex of the bureaucracy; he
made all appointments. Because his judgment was superior,
there was no need for close supervision by the British
Governments In any case, the top personnel were white
and knew how to administer. Although the white bureaucrat
was paid twice as much as the local West Indian, the best
did not make the Caribbean tour since both Africa and the
Far East were more exciting. The Caribbean was kept at
the bottom of the ladder and even there, there were levels
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of better areas; an Englishman would opt to work in
Jamaica over Dominica. But Jennings has offered an
explanation for paying the English more: that was to get
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the best to come.
The main feature of the colonial bureaucracy, whose
members will be referred to here as the old hands, was
that entrance to it was open. But when the Colonial
Office stopped staffing it with their own kind, only
certain people made it to the top. It had a class bias
Blanshard, Democracy and Empire
, d. 15. Also in
Ayearst, The West Indies
, pp. 150 ff.
^^,Sir Ivor Jennings, The Approach to Self Government,
. 129.
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and its own form of stratification. This sub-system
guarded against encroachment from all sides, from poli-
ticians, from the people, though encroachment was very
unlikely to occur; lines of command were clearly marked
internally. it was powerful but not innovative and was
was ambivalent toward any progressive movement or person.
The crown gave it adequate protection', thus worrying about
its legitimacy was not the rule. From the interviews
which this writer conducted, the impression was given that
the Dominican bureaucracy was always manned by locals.
This was not the case, and even those who have since taken
over from the British still do not show any noticeable
break with the system they once served as junior clerks.
They are still the carbon copy of their past seniors and
sometimes even more rigid in their actions.
The colonial bureaucracy was intimately connected
with the Government which was for all intents and purposes
the Governor, the leader of the country. The old hand
was not part of nation-building; he was an advisor or
something less in this writer's view, but in the bureau-
crat's view he was an administrator.^^
56
G,A. Campbell, The Civil Service in Britain (Nevv;
York: Penguin Books, 1955), p. 308,
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The old hand, steeped in his colonial ways, today is
not that efficient. Procedure becomes more important
simply because that is. how he has known and done it over
the years. But there were a series of changes in the
colonial situation which did have tremendous effects on
the old hand. As Government and Civil Service became
separated as a result of the imposition of "advanced"
constitutions, an intense battle between the colonial
politician and the conservative colonial bureaucrat
developed
•
V.'ith the introduction of the ministerial system
where politicians, elected representatives of the people,
acquired power from the Governor and from the old hands,
the latter began to feel threatened. Some made their
departure very quietly, though at times he became a
politician. But the old hand was still in command; he
was the one teaching the politician the ropes of the new
system. He seemed to have done a good job of it. But
suddenly something had gone wrong because in many inter-
views, the sentiment expressed v;as such that the old days
were better, the days when the elected representatives
did not have too much power.
It was not the good old days that were being
idealized for their own sake but a disappearance of
140
power was being bemoaned. This w./^'^a riter must sympathize with
some Civil servants
.ho have had to put up with many in-
competent politicians with the coming of the new system
Although the politician was gradually being made the leader
Of government, the Governor was still the unguestioned
head in 1956. The Governor could accept the erosion of
power because, as soon as his major powers were removed,
he left the territory, and returned home. But the old
hand saw the erosion of his powers and could not leave
the system, especially if he was not of retirement age.
He has commanded respect; knew his job, and was never
pushed around. in short, he had grown to appreciate
his "well deserved importance,- though his salary remained
the same and increased even at faster rates. m spite of
what he may say, he had to make tremendous adjustments
when the clean break was made in 1967, when the Premier
of Dominica acquired the powers of the European Governor.
Eighty per cent of top civil servants interviewedby this writer indicated that they had to make little ad-justments when this break occurred. On the other side of
the coin, about sixty per cent indicated that the politi-
cians were doing their jobs well. Expectedly, about fifteen
per cent did not answer that question' which tells this
writer that they have negative opinions about the competence
of politicians. Twenty-five per cent admitted that the
politicians were incompetent. This question of competency
of politicians could have been more accurately stated -
the respondents could have been asked to name competent
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ha.pe.ea Oo^inica^s aevelop„ent. He ^ay Have prevent..
ayna.ic
..n.ste.s
..o. initiating new p.o,.a.3. sincere
himself can be ve.y
.esitatnt to try new things.^B The
the iea.e..s action, as being forced on bi™ because of
votes to be obtained by certain programs.
independence did bring a change of attitude for the
old bureaucrat. The new politics has made him switch
roles with the politician; he now answers
.to the latter.
He finds himself subordinate to the very people he once
snubbed and ignored at will. But there is one other
Important feature of the new system he finds hard to
accept, although he once practiced it himself in his
own way. Politics in Dominica today is the game of re-
warding friends and punishing the enemies; in many
instances, he himself is the number one enemy. Decisions
are crudely made on the basis of how many votes such and
and incompetent politicians-ministers. But the writerknows too well that no answers would have been given. Thecivil servant is afriad of reprisal if he expresses a nega-tive opinion of the politician.
58The same point is made by La Palombara, Buroau-
c^acy and Political Development
. p. 18.
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such a policy will bring in the next election, though a
certain policy may in the long run have adverse effects
on the government. Thus, the old hand gives the impression
that he is spellbound. He balks at the relative ease with
Which the common people can approach their elected represen-
tative. He sees that as a breakdown of discipline.
This so-called breakdown in discipline is very
revealing. it throws some light on the attitude of those
bureaucrats toward the masses and the social relations that
exist in Dominican society. Under the colonial system,
the ultimate head of government was the Governor. Because
of the amount of paper shuffling and decisions the Governor
had to attend to, the civil servants intercpeted the few
citizens who dared to go to Government House to lodge a com-
plaint. The civil servant did a good job in screening the
"unnecessary" visitors and allowed the few chosen friends
to see the Governor, but with the coming of the present
government in Dominica (1961), an open invitation was ex-
tended to Dominicans to visit government at will. To be
sure, many unnecessary complaints will be made, and have
been made, but because of the past history of the old hand's
turning the people away, the present government has seen
fit to pass on that invitation to the people. Taking
away this important responsibility from the old hand has
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precipitated a major crisis because everywhere, everyone
is talking about breakdown in discipline at all levels of
society. The old hand sees the removal of. this responsibi-
lity as yet another way the politician has decided to get
votes, but he seems to forget that he was the greatest poli-
tician in his heyday when he kept the more "disturbing"
elements away from the Governor.
The old civil servant cannot see any good in an open
door policy of government. He does not realize that if
people are sufficiently moved to visit government that
this is a good sign of government's ability to penetrate
the society and make the polity feel part of the system.
The old hand must see politics in such a move because he
is the product of his environment. He is very shortsighted
and also small-minded, which is not unusual in any small
society where the one who makes it to the top has had to
struggle very hard and will do anything to gain respecta-
bility and admiration to keep his position which he con-
ceives as very tenuous.
The old bureaucrat in Dominica has been so hurt by
being pushed around by local politicians that he deliberately
shirks a responsibility and function for which he is the only
one qualified to perform by the mere fact that he is more
familiar v/ith the governmental machinery than the "new"
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politician. He has refused to get warring politicians
together because he so.ehow enjoys the open conflict a.ong
some ill-informed and ill-prepared politicians. m
addition, he has failed to prepare the system for any
meaningful change. He performs his duties callously and •
very mechanically. For example, the Deputy Premier of
Dominica told this writer in an interview that for two
years his government has requested a comprehensive plan
for the Department of Housing and it was not received up
until then. This lack of interest is further precipitated
by the fact that the old hand's opinion is seldom requested
unless he has shown a sympathy for the government or has
shown himself to be decisively apolitical. The politician
criticizes him openly, something he was not used to and,
whenever the opportunity arises, he is replaced by a new
set of people, called here "fresh blood." But these, by
all indicators, can be equally bad, if not worse, than
their former senior counterparts. The new bureaucrats
are now directly under the control of the politician;
this fact could lead to better results if used properly
but, at the moment, that does not seem to be the case.
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The New Bureaucrai-.
The Old bureaucrat owed his legitimacy to the Crown;
he could, and did, ignore locally elected representative!.
But the new bureaucrat owes his Job to the politicians of
the day, though the r.yth is still perpetuated that the
civil servant is apolitical. This is the case if apolitical
means one cannot be objective, or if one has to side with
a party, the ruling party takes precedence. This myth
about the apolitical nature of the civil servant is further
expressed in the attitude of the leading politicians of
Dominica and even among the top civil servants themselves.
All of the top civil servants interviewed indicated that
the service should be apolitical, but they refused to
indicate whether in fact it was.^^ The facb is that the
service was never apolitical. Promotions were almost always
based on political juggling and in the process good people
who never were able to prove their worth were snuffed off
at the bud. Politics went so deep into the service
that it entered the awarding of college scholarships. It
was not uncommon for a deserving student to be denied a
"schol," as it is called, because his family was not known,
They may have been afraid that the author ivould have
tried to find out why it is not apolitical. And it is not
apolitical in this writer's opinion, because of no great
fault of either the politicians or even the new civil servant
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or hostile to the government, or for an unH..» u£ r deserving civil
servant to grap a schol for him^^Pi^l n self and go on to fail
the course (degree).
But the comments made to this writer in interviews
concerning the desired apolitical bureaucrat are very in-
teresting and revealing. just a few will be reproduced
here: the Dominican civil servant is "to be li.e the British
Civil servant,., which means he must be just as apolitical
in disposition. Another respondent put it this way,-"in
the first place, no civil servant should align himself, with
any party
- if he had and his party failed 'to form the
government, then he should play it cool." Quite interest-
ingly, some civil servants were willing to concede that it
was hard to remain apolitical but were always ready to put
the interest of the State before the Party. This in itself
is superfluous since they are civil servants precisely
because they are expected to put the State's interests
first. One suspects that their concession for party affilia-
tion is a means to accommodate their partisan inclinations.
The politicians are overwhelmingly in favor of an
apolitical bureaucracy. But one cannot discern clearly
what they mean by that. If the present practice is an
indication of what apolitical means, this writer will have
to conclude that apolitical has a special meaning in
Dominica because clearly the top civil servants are not
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allowed to make any decisions which will not benefit the
ruling party. Perhaps that is the way it was meant to be,
but the politicians do not seer, to realize that a short
term hurt may well turn out to be a long term gain. In
support of this argument this writer can document several
decisions which would have had bad short term effects but
long term benefits to the government. As was anticipated,
these policies went by the wayside along with the experts
who had initially recommended them.
The positive aspect of the new bureaucrat is the fact
that he can he molded but cannot be removed at will by
a new government. One individual may be transferred from
one department to the next, but he may still remain as a
thorn. Besides, there are just so many departments in a
s 11 country like Dominica. With every change of Government,
a top man cannot be asked to resign because the treasury
can support only so many pensioners, while gainful employ-
ment is not easy to find. In days gone by, the so-removed
bureaucrat could pack up and head for the mother country
to begin a new life.
When all is said and done, the new bureaucracy in all
the former small colonies disproves the Riggs ' hypothesis
that the bureaucracy can be a key variable in political
development. The nev/ bureaucracy has shovm itself able to
adapt very easily to its environment, and become a
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football. TO put the pieces of the colonial conaition
together, one wlU have to review the type of politician
produced and his view of the whole colonial syste..
The Politicianimmediately Before and After Independence
Colonialism had installed a Governor as a virtual
dictator; he could veto any legislation. The bureaucrat
accepted this fact blindly since he was effectively co-
opted into the system. But the politician remained a most
"horrible" element who was always irresponsible in the
eyes of the British. The politician had been refused a
say m the running of his country, even when he was an
elected representative. He often saw himself as the
savior of the masses as opposed to the Governor and
bureaucracy, whom he often criticized as the greatest enemy
of the people. But because of his inability to make
policy to benefit members of his constituency, he read
that as a carte blanche to make the wildest of promises
during election time. When elected and quite expectedly
did not make good his promises, he was not honest enough
to show the impractical ity of his promises. Instead, he
lashed out at the system for not allowing him to implement
his programs. The sad part of it was the fact that the
very people, the masses, whom both politicians and British
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tried to protect, suffered at the end. The British were
not tactful enough to pull the rug from under the dema-
gogues by putting into effect
.ore adequate programs,
instead they were out to teach these "irresponsible"
politicians a lesson by bringing change when they thought
it was right. What they failed to realize is that no
matter how long they waited to bring these changes, the
politician would always accept and receive the credit for
the changes. And when he accepts the credit, he expects
the people to receive him as their Messiah.
In his drive to get changes, the politician was able
to appeal to most mischievous passions of the people who
rarely knew why they were so emotionally moved to partake
in the satisfaction of one man's ego.
On the achievement of independence, the leader has
to find a scapegoat to vent his frustrations. Before it
was the British, but now it becomes anyone who happens to
have a different idea of how the country should be run.
The legal situation of the State changes but the leader
with his cohorts remain the same. Eric Williams of
Trinidad is an excellent example of the mind produced by
British colonialism. He feels very happy about every
detailed gain he has made over the British. He is always
revengeful and bitter. He can write that all British
historians spoke ill of the West Indies (very much untrue)
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but can
.e.use Sto.ely Car.,chael entrance to T.ini.ad
because he was p.eacMn, a raaicaX
.o™ o.
.Xac. o.iae
the ve.y iaea Wlnia.s himself „.ote about as early 33'
1939. The colonial politician carries with hi„ to
independence a hatred he once reserved for the British,
but now his disposition demands he passes it on to his'
own people and the bureaucrats.
The politician usually presents a political party
as a front to hide his own authoritarian personality. He
speaks Of all kinds of reform, but refuses to allow all
others to partake in this enterprise since he, like his
masters before him, has a monopoly on expert knowledge of
reform. Thus, one sees'a system which has a leader who
jealously guards his position against all encroachments.
The "new" politician may strike a responsive chord by
echoing the need to build roads, but by and large, placing
o£ roads might be restricted to areas where the politician
has garnered many votes and other rewards. The colonial
politician becomes, after independence, aggressive, vin-
dictive, and of course afraid.
Eric Williaras, Capitalism and Slavery (London-George Allen and Unwin, I'jjy), passinu
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Conclusion
It has been argued in these pages that the colonial
Situation is something special. it, is not a .e.e appendag
Of the .other country. Further, it was stated that the
present pattern of politics in the British Caribbean is a
reflection of the "training', received during colonial rule
But the colonial situation, on the surface, looked har-
monious, though realistically it was riddled with contra-
dictions. For one thing, the Governor owed his legitimacy
to an outside power, the Queen. But increasingly, the
local politician was getting the people to back him during
his frequent attacks on the political system. The politi-
cian saw himself as getting his power from the people.
For this reason, he felt he should enjoy more power than
the Governor, who was an outsider. This rivalry did not
lead to many open confrontations because the politician
knew quite well that the Governor was stronger than him
because he was white. Secondly, the politician had seen
the British use force to quell disturbances elsewhere.
Under these circumstances, the politician waited for his
chance to assert himself when the British left.
When colonialism ended, the politicians were quick
to institutionalize the machinery which could give them
back both legitimacy and respect. They created the army
and with British help, built more police stations. Lavish
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constitutions, outlining people.s rights and duties, wece
also introduced. The politicians were only copying what
the British had done before the.. The strictures indica-
ted that the wielders of power were anticipating the sa.e
confrontations which did not guite materialise during the
colonial period. The politicians were correct in antici-
pating trouble. But in their desire and drive to be like
the British, they forgot that time was against them, and
that all groups in the political system were just waiting
patiently for the superior power, the British, to leave
in order to assert themselves. Thus, the confrontations
in these former colonies have become more frequent and
more serious. The results are described in the rest of
this study.
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CHAPTER IV
THE PARTY IN THE POLITICAL SYSTEM IN DOMINICA
Introduction
The two previous chapters dealt specifically with
the effects of colonialism on the Dominican political
system. it was concluded that both the colonial constitu-
tion and other aspects of colonialism did influence and
sometimes determined the shape of the component parts of
the Dominican political system. Thus this analysis was
deemed necessary to set the stage to review the actions
of the present actors of the system. The political party
is presently considered, while a later chapter is devoted
to other actors of the system.
The purpose of this chapter is to identify the
functions of the Dominican political parties. It is
taken as a given that there is a structure called party.
The structure acts and is acted upon in an environment.
This writer is aware of the hazards of trying to identify
the functions of any single structure vis-a-vis several
structures in any given system. Thus measuring the func-
tions of the party alongside other groups and individuals
in those non-developed countries where, according to
Gabriel Almond and Bingham Powell, structures are not
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sufficiently differentiated and individuals take on multiple
roles, can be problematic. The party may effect changes
on .any objects. indeed, in the "non-U'estern" world, the
role of the party is often blurred and will be that way
for a long time to come. Let us now review a few defini-
tions Of the structure called party to extrapolate a working
definition for this study.
Defining the Party
The experts do not agree as to what constitutes a
political party, when they are dealing with the non-advanced
world. The tendency has been to use the structures which
exist in the "advanced" world as a yardstick to measure
those in the "less" developed world. The following defini-
tions, though they were not devised expressly for the de-
veloping world, are sometimes used when dealing with it.
Andrew Milnor writes that the party is the sine qua non of
liberal democracy; it is an organization of people with a
mission to provide alternative programs. Thus it exists
2to seek power. The exact number of people in this
Gabriel Almond and Bingham Powell, Comparative
Politics : A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little, Brown
and Company, 19fcb), p. 29.
2
Andrew J. Milnor, ed., Comparative Political
Parties (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1959), p. 1.
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a
in-
organization does not see™ to be important; it does not
have to be open to all. The fact that it exhibits the
tendency to have its own place and wants power ^akes it
party. Milnor's definition is sufficiently broad to
elude all groups regardless of their chances of winning at
the polls.
Joseph La Palombara defines a party as a continuous
living organization which is always prepared to assume
3power. It IS an open body with dispensable individuals
and permanent local units and it must be constantly organiz-
ing. Its leaders must make a conscious effort to seek
national power to wield power with the backing of the
people. This definition is extremely tight and rigid. The
Dominican parties under review v;ould disqualify under it.
They both depend heavily on their leaders. Local cadres
are virtually non-existent, and are certainly not autonomous,
as La Palombara's definition demands. Finally, the dynamism
which was so often attributed to African political parties
during the early 1960 's is nowhere to be found in Dominican
parties since they crumble as soon as elections are over;
the winning party becomes the government, while the defeated
one loses its touch, its elites get disenchanted and resign.
3Joseph LaPalombara and M. Weiner eds., Political
Parties and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1966), p. 6.
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The losing party Is usually taken over by a new set of
elites who proceed to change its na.e. if that does not
happen, they become dormant to be resurrected once, annually,
at What they call a convention, where lavish praise is given
to the leaders.
Joseph LaPalombara's definition is not useful for
this study, although ironically, though not surprising, he
was writing on the developing areas when he used that de-
finition. Of course, LaPalor^bara is not alone in devising
unrealistic definitions to be applied to developing areas.
Samuel Elderveld's definition that the party is an open
organization with autonomous wards, ^ is even more rigid.
It is cited here only to demonstrate that at times parties
in the non-advanced world can approximate in many ways the
roles attributed to parties found in the advanced world.
Roberto Michels sees the party as a. clique dominating
the masses but this clique will prostitute itself to garner
support to continue its domination.^ Both Eldersveld and
Michels emphasize the open party to. a certain extent, and
this openness can be found in the non-developed areas,
including Dominica, but it is the nature of this openness
which needs closer assessment. It is one thing to encourage
4Samuel J. Eldersveld, Political Parties ; A Behavior -
al Analysis (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964), p. 3.
^Roberto i-lichcls, "Organization and Discipline,"
Comparative Politics
,
ed. by Roy C. Macridis and Bernard
Brov/n (Homewood, 111,: The Dorsey Press, Inc., 1961) p. 233.
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same
..ass participation, but it is another thing to have the
people devise and carry out policies. One quickly realizes
'
that mass participation is not necessarily the best way to
satisfy the needs of the people. At the same time, elites
should not be blamed for a lack of mass participation. m
all fairness to the elites, it must be said that generally
the people do not know how to participate; consequently they
give up and allow things to be done for them.
This study could go further with definitions of party
and the implications for the non-developed world, but that
is not necessary. The only crucial point now is to state
clearly a workable definition for the chapter. For this
reason the writer has chosen the Epstein definition stated
succinctly: "a party is any group, however loosely organized,
seeking to elect people in government under a given label. ""^
The definition is sufficiently broad to include all the
groups in Dominica which have paraded under the banner of
party. This researcher's job is made easier because he
does not have to be too concerned with the "imposters,"
since they have usually been unmasked very quickly. And
quite frankly, if a more rigid definition were adopted,
what exist in Dominica would not pass as parties.
Leon D, Epstein, Political Parti es in Western
Democracies (New York: Frederick Pracger, 1967), p. 3,
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The important thing about the group is that it seeks
to win elections regardless of its chances at the polls.
The label is even unimportant as both party members and
supporters show little understanding of it. But before we
discuss Dominican parties, let us discuss party systems and
functions
.
Party Systems
The number of parties found in separate political
systems have often been neatly labelled under different
categories, with little knowledge of their strengths and
attitudes. This has been done to make for easy analysis of
parties in environments with which they are constantly
interacting.
What is a party system? Maurice Duverger defines
it as the number of parties found in the political system.*^
In undertaking a count, Duverger cautions against care-
lessness since parties come and go very rapidly. But this
writer does not have to exercise this caution since he
accepts any group which seeks to win elections as a party,
Duverger divides the party system into three major
categories, and under each he has sub-categories. The first
is the two-party system which does not preclude the existence
of minor parties. In that system, there are two major
"^Maurice Duverger, Political Parties : Their Organiza-
tion and Activity in the Modern State (New York: John Wiley
and Sons, 1963), p. 282.
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parties of al.ost equal strength. Then he categorizes the
niultiple party system as the system with three or more
major parties of equal strength, and finally, the single
party system where one major organization exists, but not
necessarily excluding minor parties.
Joseph LaPalombara^ writes that competition is the
key to party systems and more so in the non-developed world
The important thing to be considered in dealing with these
structures is whether competition is open to all. His
typology reverts around the acquisition of power and how
it is preserved. He detects two major systems; one Hege-
monic, where a party or its philosophy dominates over an
extended period, and two, the turnover system, where as is
implied, governments change hands very often. The amount
of time required to consider a system Hegemonic does not
seem to be too important and yet it is not arbitrary.
LaPalombara has come up with four heuristic models
There is the ideological-pragmatic model where a party is
interested in staying in power first, so it will yield to
some interests to achieve that end. Second, the Hegemonic-
ideological system, in which the party has kept its ideolo-
gical purity and wins elections or has had its philosophy
perpetuated even in defeat. Third, the Hegemonic-pragmatic
where the party has v;on elections because it has been
Joseph LaPalombara and M, Weiner, eds.. Political
Parties, p. 33.
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-on
as
:an
sensitive to both changing ti.es and people. Finally
there is the turnover-prag.atic syste.. Party cornpetiti.
is intense as the people respond to the parties on the
basis of past performance. Using LaPalombar a
• s model
a guide, the Dominican political party system would fall
under the Hegemonic-pragmatic continuum, as the Dominic
Labour Party has dominated the system since 1957 and
officially since 1961. if it were to be defeated at the
polls, and this is very unlikely, its programs would be
continued by the opposition.
In dealing with the so-called one party states,
LaPalombara- specifies three varieties.^ First, there is
the authoritarian type which is non-totalitarian, mono-
lithic, and ideologically unclear. This is so as invariably
the chain of command in the party is unclear as one man
directs the operation. The leader almost never states
clearly the policy to be pursued. Almost everything is
improvised, which has disastrous results, as subordinate
leaders are often reluctant to take the initiative lest they
make a mistake and earn the scorn of their superior. In
this system, opposition is not tolerated; it is seen as a
conspiracy to detract the people. The major setback in that
system is that the party, because of a lack of coordination
of policies, proves itself unable to carry on nation-building,
Ibid
. , pp. 34-40.
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second, t.e.e is the one party p,...,,3tic type
.Here
competition is allowed and somehow the
.est leaders do
e.erge to conduct the nation-s a..airs. Third, the totali-
tar.an party type which becomes the state. But the A..ican
countries which have da.hled with socialism put it differently
and Dominica may one day put it that same way. T.ey argue
that with independence there is only one interest, and
Since parties emerge to protect interests, there is no need
for more than one party.^O
^^^^^^^ ^^^^^ ^^^^
coin is that there is also a need for one leader who has a
monopoly on solutions to the nation's problems.
The one party totalitarian type has a very rigid
ideological bent which gets the nation built, but at tremen-
dous cost, especially when the nation in question is simply
underdeveloped and' not undeveloped. The party usually ends
up squeezing water out of stones, which precipitates fre-
quent national crises.
Party Functions
The political party plays a function in the system,
although it is problematic to descern what these functions
are. It works not in a vacuum, but with other actors. This
gives it a status in relation to these actors, which pre-
sumably gives rights and duties to it.
a. ^ •Quoted m Rupert Emerson, Political Koderni zation ;The Smale Pnrty Syst em (Denver: University of Denver Press.
1963), p. 24. '
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The party has been seen as a modernizer, which
-ans that it is charged with bringing the traditional to
'
the modern age with its structural complexities. But
Epstein disagrees stating that it is not an agent of change.^^
Others see it as a mediator of social conflict since it
establishes allegiances cutting across social divisions.
The party, as it were, establishes a link between the people
and the institutions of government which makes it mandatory,
writes Hilnor, for the party to include as many people as
possible in its ranks and to make the issues clear to the
14people. Quite obviously a party does not have to include
the people in its fold to make them relate to institutions.
The people can even relate and respect existing institutions
without understanding anything about government.
The party, it is said, articulates and aggregates
the wishes of the people. As a go-between, the people let
the party know what they want and the party in turn lets the
government know the people's wishes. But what about situa-
tions, like the Dominican one, where the parties disintegrate
after elections.
The party is supposed to socialize people into
accepting the political system. In the process, it has the
'^Leon Epstein, Political Parties
,
p. 9.
12
A. Lifphart, The Politics of Accommodation ;
Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands (Berkley: Uni-
versity of California Press, 1968), Chapter 1.
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role Of recruiting the potentially best to rule. Thus, the "
party is expected to ta,ce an active part in the educational
process to create better citizens for a stronger nation.
Obviously, the party in every systo. does not perform all
these functions; they .ay not even perform well the few they
attempt. But because they have tremendous responsibilities,
people Often forget that the party is an artifact and, like^
everything man has made, has its shortcomings and failures.
Of course these warnings are even more conspicuous
in Dominica where the parties have "a limited life span"
and are limited in scope and imagination. Other agencies
and individuals have continued to perform the role of the
parties perhaps because they were hurriedly started in
Dominica to support a democratic system - which has not
enhanced their position. It has required the presence of
the "strong man" to keep parties from bursting apart since
the delaying tactics of democratic party politics continually
threaten an erstwhile dictatorial system.
Worrying over the functions of parties has not
reached Dominica yet as more pressing problems such as
Black Power and full political and economic independence
attract more than their share of attention. But there is
one problem related to parties which continues to cause
alarm in countries like Dominica; that is, how to achieve
unity v;ithout having to use dictatorial measures to maintain
it.
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Laclc Of unity
.ay lead to sterility and .ay cause
considerable turnover in
.overn.ent as slim majorities are
overturned by the defection of one or two
.e.bers of a
ruling party. The leaders of Do.inica do not see. to realize
that a certain amount of internal disunity is healthy. This
r.ay make the party .ore responsive to whatever ele.ent which
causes this disunity. if unanimity always prevails, it .ay
drive the party into complacency or into demise.
Electoral Politics in Dominica
The "No-Party" Era
Before discussing the era of organized party politics
in Dominica, it is important to review the Dominican people's
involvement in politics. The people had the franchise
since 1951 (discussed in Chapter II). And judging from the
results of the election returns between 1951 and 1957, when
parties were formed, one sees a degree of sophistication in
voting behavior which approximates any developed country.
The Dominican voted for the individual who made good his
promises. The figure below illustrates the voting pattern
between 1951 and 1957.
There is no question that the people did very v/ell
when they exercised their British given right to vote for
the people of their choice; only 1309 ballots were rejected.
They had no previous training in the art of voting and there
are reasons to believe that the Dominican elites never even
in
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bothered to explain it to the.. Secondly, the chart shows
that by 1954 apathy ta.es hold of the people, as only 70%
bothered to vote. The people had been disappointed with
the performance of those they chose in the previous elec-
tion and those who bothered to vote told them about it, too,
By 1957 voting percentage went up although there
was an actual drop in voters from 23,835 (1954) to 23,348
(1957). The reason for this drop is not clear. It might
be that the trek to England was responsible because it was
during the mid-1950. s that the largest number of Dominicans
emmigrated to Britain in search of a better life. Be that
as it may, enthusiasm, reflected in the turnout at the
polls, was due to a number of reasons. The idea of West
Indian unity was in the air and all the talk was to get
Dominicans involved in sending a solid team to negotiate
with Britain to get a Federation' from which Dominica could
benefit. Secondly, a group of young individuals were able
to foster this enthusiasm by making better promises to the
electorate. More importantly, the people were fielding for
the first time their own candidate or candidates who looked
like them. The 1957 elections marked the beginning of the
Dominican Labour Party which was largely made up of the
masses of the trade union movement. This last fact was
enough to get spirits to run high.
Let us discuss the people's response to specific
candidates. In Roseau North the chart shows that candidate
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Winston,
.a':pro.inent estate owner, handily defeated his
opponent in 1951 but lost out in 1954; the reason is si.ple.
He was one of those no^ocion roseau (big shots) who felt he
could win elections by sir^ply presenting himself to the
electorate. He won in 1951 because it was believed that
he could use his influence to provide more jobs for the
unemployed. He did not live up to expectations and was de-
feated by Eoyd in 1954, not because the latter had better
plans for the people, but because the former had failed the
people. Boyd suffered the same fate as Winston in 1957
because he was too crude and rude, getting into frequent
slanderous fights for which he was once convicted. His
attacking the Church in a predominantly Catholic country
proved a fatal mistake.
In Roseau South, the winner is not the one to be
assessed but the loser. When adult suffrage caine in 1951,
James was the editor of the newspaper which constantly
criticized the British for allowing adult suffrage at that
particular time. For his arrogance he was repaid by a sound
defeat by Harris.
In the Eastern district, from the start, the people
were not too impressed with any of their candidates until
1957. In 1951, they allowed the winner only 28 percent of
the votes and v;ent on to turn him out of office in the
following election. Then another candidate, Didier,
continued to dominate the scene because he was close to
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the people, having lived with them as a headn,aster for
some fifteen years.
The story in the Western district is similar to
the Roseau North district. No one cadidate won twice in a
row. Jeffers was favored over Charles because he was more
trustworthy. Charles had shown himself to be very stingy
and hard with the masses, hoarding his wealth to make
around the world tours while people remained unemployed
in the island. But by 1954, the people gave him the chance
to mend his ways. He did not and suffered a defeat. And
of course, his meddling with the Church did not help his
cause either.
In both the Southern and Northern districts, the
candidates had a perfect record. They were re-elected
every time they presented themselves at the polls. St.
Luce, a carpenter in the South, was always close to the
people in contrast to his opponent, Pemberton, the owner
of large estates. Although Pemberton had such a great
fortune, by Dominican standards, he did not put it to good
use to benefit the people. Thus,' he was never given a
chance.
In the Northern district, Laville had provided work
on his plantation to those who needed the jobs, but his big
jump from 39.8 percent of the votes in 1951 to 85.4 per-
cent in 1954 must not be interpreted as a greater vote of
confidence. This last figure was inflated because only
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one rival candidate contested the election in 1954; the
same was the case in 1957, although by then his margin
was considerably lov;er. It is also significant that a
certain Armour ran in 1951 and got only 200 votes (10.3%).
The people were not to be fooled; he never ran in another
election. He was one of those foreigners who had acquired
large estates in the district in which he was running. He
had always tried hard to displace the "squatters" from 'his
property and because of this lack of empathy for the people,
he did not stand a chance of winning an election.
There are many interesting things about the Ports-
mouth district; it was dominated by R„B. Douglas and his
cronies. Douglas had Portsmouth wrapped up because he had
his roots in every facet of its life. He was the manager of
the biggest industry (bananas) in the district. He also
had the biggest business at sea, where he controlled a steam-
boat line, which plied betv;een Portsmouth and Roseau, the
only means of connection between those two towns during
that time. It had to take a man like Edward Oliver LeBlanc
to unseat Douglas, and it was by a very slight margin as
the figures show; Ironically, the very theme which had
precipated the downfall of two previous condidates in
other districts v;as the one to unseat Douglas. LeBlanc
carried a compaign which emphasized the dictatorial measures
of Douglas, such as putting cronies in key positions in the
Portsmouth district, and the role of the Roman Catholic
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Church as the blood sucker of the people. In 1957 the
people from Portsmouth were responsive and sent LeBlanc
to the legislature over their long time favorite, R.B. Doug-
las. It is true that the attack on the Church may not have
helped to unseat Douglas, but the people were intelligent
enough to see that Douglas was not doing enough for them.
Finally, one sees in the Northwest district that
Shillingford was r-turned consistently. Shillingford , an
estate owner, was a staunch supporter of the Church and
provided employment for the many people in his district
Everyone in his district had some kind of connection with
him. He was a friend to his people.
With little help, the Dominican voter has rewarded
his friends and punished his enemies. He did return to
office the individuals he perceived to have performed well.
The others he turned away. The same pattern seems to be
repeating itself in the era of party politics in Dominica.
The Organized Party Era
Accepting Epstein's definition of the political
party, there are two in Dominica. One, the Dominica Labour
Party, has retained power from 1960 to the present. The
other, known as the Dominica United People ' s Party has re-
grouped only during election time. The latter is very com-
petitive, but h?^s been unable to make a meaningful dent in
the lead of the Dominican Labour Party. Before discussing
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the roles of these parties in the political syste., a brief
history of each is in order.
TheJDorninica Labour_Party
. The Dominica Labour
Party was an externally^^ created party. m 1955, Mrs.
Phyllis Shand Allfrey formed it while in England. At the
inaugural meeting, /arnold Active, then in England, was
elected secretary (now nominated member of the House).
Mrs. Allfrey was president, with her husband Robert, trea-
surer. The party was heavily influenced by the British
Labour Party with its brand of Fabian socialism. When one
takes a look at the first constitution of the party, it is
almost an identical replica of the British Labour Party
Constitution with its desire to support the laborer. It
was because of its socialistic stance which many members
and leaders did not understand that the party was always
in a running battle with the Roman Catholic Church over the
ownership of property.
By 1957, the party had convinced the workers, the
poor elements, that this was their
-party in spite of or
because of the fact that its president was white, an emblem
of British colonialism. Thus, by 1958, the party got almost
all Dominicans, especially the lower class elements, keyed
13The idea of an externally created party is con-
tained in Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner, Political
Parties
, pp. 10-12. An externally created party is one which
comes about to challenge a group or party in a system. An
internally created party is one formed after elected repre-
sentatives have taken office and decide to form a party.
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up on the word of "labour." The party would get labor-
work-for the people, was the theme of the tin>e. The
results Of the 1958 federal elections are shown in the
figure below,
^^^^"^ Election Returns in Federal Elections 1958
TOTALVOTES CAST FOR: PARTY
Allfrey, Phyllis Labor 9 345Bellot, A. Labor 1*836
LeBlanc, E.O. Labor 8*968
Lestrade Independent 1,101Lockhart Opoosition t /iqo
Royer Opposition""-^""^ 975
Source: Dominica, Report on Vae Federal Elections
,1958 (Castries, Voice Press, 1958), p. 5.
It will be noticed that Allfrey came out on top
this time, although she was defeated in the Western consti-
tuency in 1957. It is also significant to note that only
57.6% of the registered voters bothered to go to the polls.
This would lead one to believe that although the masses
were not sufficiently moved to go out to vote, the upper
class candidates were un-ible to carry the election. The
election marked the coming to power of the party. By then
Christopher Loblack, a trade union man, together with other
subordinates had effectively sealed the working man to the
party. He made the party a mass party. Between 1957 and
1964, Loblack was behind the party helping its leaders to
make it big. He used to open all public meetings of the
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party by singing
--We Shall Overcome" and closing the. with
a heated indictment of the power structure. Loblack,
.ore
than anyone else, was responsible for the penetration,
communication, and integration which the party had achieved
by 1966.
The elections of 1961 effectively destroyed the
other party, as the Labour Party asserted itself under the
able leadership of Edward Oliver LeBlanc. He has since led
the party to victory in every election the party has par-
ticipated in, save one: the Roseau municipal elections of
1971. While the 1951 election marked the entrenchment of
the party, by 1967 it began to lose power.
Between 1961 and 1966, the party continued to
stretch its lead over the opponent as it opened up the
bureaucracy to the people and delivered goods and services
to them. In the meantime, a power struggle developed be-
tween LeBlanc and Allfrey over the party's leadership,
Allfrey lost out and was expelled because she had not
established herself well, enough v;ith the sub-elites of
the party. She overestimated her influence and openly
challenged LeBlanc for the leadership. For that, she
was dismissed from the Party. Subsequently Loblack was
expelled. The exact reason for this action has not been
made clear, but it can be assumed that Loblack 's lack of
tact may have been responsible for his dismissal.
Loblack has shown himself to be man who likes to
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"expose., everything. it is only i.onical, though certainly
not surprising, that LoblaC, although a loyal party
.ember,
would be expelled because he frequently took independent
positions which went against the party norm. The norm
reads "A member shall not make any public statement orally
or in writing which tends to discredit the Party."^^
Loblack is like any average Dominican politician; he is not
tactful enough. He was never schooled in the art of cir-
cumlocution and will say anything without first reflecting
on it. Dominican politicians do not understand that dis-
agreement can sometimes be shown by remaining silent. The
average Caribbean politician is too crude; C.L.Robinson
James' description of him is surely applicable to those in
Dominica: "^-/est Indian politicians only help those who
praise them and can be savage and vicious as snakes to those
who are not helping them win the next election. ""^^
The Labour Party has served the people, and it was
repaid with a landslide victory 'in 1966 with a margin of
10-1. The turn of events since 1967 has had disastrous
consequences for the party and the people. The party began
to be infiltrated with elements of the upper class who now
realized that this party was there to stay. Unfortunately,
this last assertion cannot be supported with figures since
14Dominica Labour Partv, Constitution and Rules
(Roseau: Bulletin Office, 1963), p. 31.
^^C.L.R. James, Party Politics in the West Indies
( Port-of-Spain : People's National Movement Press, 1960), p. 85
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the parties hardly keep a count on their me.bership; and
besides, the upper class elements do not have to be regis-
tered members to reap the benefits of the party. They
benefit through tar. incentives on their businesses. These
take the form of pioneer status for new industries, which
means that a company is not required to pay taxes over a
period of time, sometimes as long as five years.
In addition to the businessmen, the character of the
party was changed as more lawyers and doctors became part
of it; one observer has termed this transformation as the
"enbourgeoisification" of the party. The same people who
indicted Dominicans for not working hard enough suddenly
took control of the people's party. Some ten years ago,
these elements would not be seen in the company of laborers
like Loblack, who has since been referred to as "LowBlack."
At that point, the party preached socialism', although no
meaningful move was made in this direction; but just the
talk of it was sufficient to drive the elites away to
preserve their property.
The last major upheaval which the Party had to
handle successfully if it was to stay alive was the crisis
of 1970. At that time, three Ministers were dismissed
because it was alleged that they conspired to overthrow
the leader, Edward LeBlanc. This caused the party to
split in tv/o to contest the 1970 elections. One faction
was led by LeBlanc and the other Nicholson Cucreay. Thus
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the 1970 election was a three way contest with the Freedom
Party as the third challenger. LeBlanc was up to the
occasion and beat his opponents, winning no less than eight
seats.
The Opposition Party of Dominica
. The opposition
party has changed its name so frequently that it defies
more precise identification. The succeeding body always
tries to disassociate itself from the past body whenever it
suits its purpose to show that it has a new image. But
on other occasions, it will show that the new is only a
continuation of the old.-*-^
Adult suffrage did not bring with it political
parties, but the "advanced" constitution of 1959 required
that disciplined parties in the legislature be in operation
to complete the political system.
As the constitution said, a Chief Minister had to
be appointed; that is, a minister who seemed to command
the respect of a majority of the legislature. Originally
the governor relied on his own judgment to pick a leader
but the members of the legislature realized that the best
v;ay to lend legitimacy to that leader was to create a group
This writer raised that issue with a prominent
member of the P'reedom Party. The member said that the link
of the Freedom Party with past opposition parties of Dominica
was a conspiracy to detract from the originality of the
party. But the leading theorist of the Freedom Party wrote
in the Star on October 10, 1970, that his party could be
considered a direct continuation of the dead Dominica
United People's Party.
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of which he can become head, thus making the Government's
job easier.
As a result, an "internally'-^^ created party, the
Dominica United People's Party (DUPP), emerged which formed
the first government under the 1959 constitution. But this
coalition of individuals was very tenuous since it was made
up of elites who had either been expelled from the Labour
Party (Didier, 1957) or those who joined the coalition 'to
get a prominent place in the prospective government. While
the leader of the DUPP was already designated as the first
head of government, it had no roots and had no island-wide
support as a party. its base of support was the major city,
while those elected in the rural areas won on their own
(Shillingford, Didier, Pemberton, Laville). The breaking
up of the party was in the making from the start; a new
election was forced in 1960 when four members of the party
resigned from the Government (Didier and Laville). In that
election, the heaviest blow was struck when that party's
leader was defeated. This signalled the end of the DUPP.
The island v/as left without any meaningful opposition during
1961-1966 though this party tried a comeback in the elections
of 1966. But Labour's lead was too much.
1
7
See footnote no. 13, p. 172,
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Between 1966 and 1968 there was only one party in
Dominica, the Labour Party, which continued to enjoy the
confidence of the rural elites while the urban lot tried
to be vindictive through the newspapers. This caused the
Government to overreact and give the bourgeois element a
reason to regroup to save their interests. But increasingly,
both the Labour and Opposition parties were showing similar
interests in maintaining the status quo.
In any case, the government's attempt to silence
its critics through muzzling the press created an interest
group, the Freedom Fighters, composed predominantly of the
urban elite, including the hierarchy of the religious bodies
in the island. The group was relatively successful in
getting the government to rescind the harsh and repressive
piece of legislation. Subsequently, many fighters left
the group since their job was done. But one faction had a
taste of power and went on to organize a party.
The Freedom Party . This organization has tried to
involve itself in the problems of Dominica by organizing
every community into units of the party. At present member-
ship (paying) stands at about two thousand out of a possible
twenty-six thousand eligible voters (1970), The party
suffers from lack of unity. As one prominent editor has
1
8
1968 Seditious Act wds withdrawn by Government
on the instigation of the Freedom Fighters.
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put it, he is afraid of the competence of the Freedom Party;
there are too many leaders and not enough followers.
Besides, the party has been unable to convince the rural
elements that it is not a party of the urban elite. it is
dominated by the very elements of the more conservative
Dominica United People's Party. By 1972, after four years
of existence, it has shown signs of deterioration. Key
members have since left the party, after they were stymied
by another Labour Party landslide in the election of 1970.
The figure reproduced below shows the success of the Labour
Party in the past three general elections.
The figure shows the number of votes the Dominica
Labour Party received relative to the strongest rival in
the elections of 1961, 1956 and 1970.
After the 1961 elections, the Labour Party secured
eight seats and formed the Government. The people of Domin-
ica must have been satisfied with its performance between
1961 and 1966, because they returned the party to office
in 1966, and gave it an additional two seats. In the pro-
cess, the Dominica United People's Party was destroyed.
Dominica was without an organized opposition party between
1966 and 1968.
The 1970 election was contested under strange con-
ditions. Two weeks before the election, the Labour Party
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1961
Party
Numb eg-
of Votes
Per
Cent
J. • X.* cxUU XT
Opponent
807
321
60.5
24.0
2
Opponent
912
843
39.0
36.1
•J • Labor
Opponent
743
872
34.5
40:4
4 Labor
Opponent
179
564
13.3
42.7
5- T ^ T^#^^
Opponent
492
512
30.9
32.1
Opponent
329
485
24.9
36.
6
7.* • Ck i-^ \J
Opponent
1149
453
64.2
25.3
8. Labor
Opponent
941
214
77.8
17.7
9. Labor
Opponent
707
422
56.9
34.0
10. Labor
Opponent
759
588
51.0
39.1
11. Labor
Opponent
330
636
47.0
36.0
1966
number irer
of Votes Cent
1067 60.0
461 26.0
1374 53 3
1075 41.7
1199 4Q S
1036 42.8
969 DO
. O
418 28.8
728 4<i 3
918 55.9
705 55.0
542 42.3
1397 72.3
425 22.3
976 75,8
248 19.9
1193 84.5
153 10.8
1190 76.5
86 5.5
937 45.8
693 33.9
1970
Number Per
of Votes Cent
1255
755
1417
1254
924
923
977
353
528
1144
729
539
616
758
851
472
942
267
1030
423
607
1214
57.8
34.7
48.5
43.0
35.0
35.0
63.6
23.0
29.0
62.8
52.7
39.1
23.2
34.8
62.4
34.6
65.0
18.4
65,8
27.2
29.1
58.1
er-al v',f:^i3f^S'
Doininica
,
Report on the Legislative Council Gen-
\ L f X ^"'"^ ^-i^jj^^^L-A^ (Dorninica: The Government Printery)
.
p2ni?SL^p2,-l//^^ ^-S'^. Opposition Party w^s the Dominica UnitedX-eopie's Party, and xn 1970 it was the Freedom Party.
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suffered a spllt.^O Three of the Party-s elected represen-
tatives were dismissed. They were accused by the Party of
planning to overthrow the Party's leader. The three dis-
missed individuals formed a party to contest the elections,
While the leader of the Labour Party chose his own candl-
,'
dates, and went on to win the elections. The split in the
Labour Party resulted in its losing two seats in the Asse™-
bly to the Opposition.
But apparently the leader of the Labour Party was
able to show the majority of Dominicans that his faction
of the Party was the one responsible for the "better times"
they were now enjoying. Be that as it may, the issue at
hand is not to determine what Dominicans have been led to
believe. That is important; but the issue is to decipher
to what extent the promised policies of the Labour Party
have been realized. This is done with a view to assessing
the impact of these policies in the state building process.
20This split centered around an alleged conspiracy
by three top officials to unseat the Leader of the Party.
But on further investigation this writer was able to find
out that ^ the split was concerned more with disagreements on
land policy. One faction of the Party opposed selling land
to aliens; while the other was in favor of it.
21 State-building refers to the structural difficul-
ties of establishing control over an area and devising
policies to develop a bureaucracy, judiciary and party
system. Nation-building is making a people feel a part of
some entity they call their own. Nation-building seems to
be getting harder than state-building.
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The conve rsion process
. in Chapter I, it
stated that the systems theory would be utilized to investi-
gate the Dominican political system. This approach seems
comprehensive and can be made dynamic. Its essence seems
to hinge on what is termed the conversion process,
-.which
means how inputs are translated into outputs. The programs
of the Government of Dominica are seen as inputs. And the
effects (success or failure) of these inputs are seen ks
outputs. In short, the role of the party, translated into
such things as interest articulation, interest aggregation,
rule making, rule application, rule adjudication and com-
munication is reviewed here.
Even though it has been argued elsewhere that the
party in Dominica loses its mass character once the elec-
tion is over, what remains of it seems to perform all or
most of the above functions. But it must be made clear that
most of what follows applies only to the Labour Party. In
addition, it must be stated that the distinction between the
Party and the Government is often blurred. The two are re-
ferred to interchangeably in discussing the conversion pro-
cess.
The Labour Party and the conversion process . The
Dominica Labour Party has not tried to impose unity in
Dominica in the form of creating one political party. But
it has pledged to create "social justice for every citizen
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regardless of race or status, whether poor or prosperous. "22
Apparently the party was aware from the start that this
assertion could be meaningless unless it was translated
into reality. To achieve this, the party began a number
of projects.
Social Development, In the area of social develop-
ment, the party has sought to improve the water supply.
The United Nations has been approached to provide technical
advice. The party also pledged to create more community
centers, equipped with libraries to improve the reading
habits of the people. There were- plans to have island-wide
electricity and telephone services to improve the communi-
cation system. The party had plans to initiate a housing
loan program and "a stage by stage promotion of better
housing and sanitation facilities for the people." Low
income housing projects at Canefield, Calibishie, Trafal-
gar vyere to be implemented, with additional plans for new
schemes at P. Michel, Plat-e Ma Pierre, Soufriere and Bath
Estate, Finally, a comprehensive social security plan was
to be implemented to provide for workers ' compensation in
the event of sickness or incapacity. The National Provident
Fund, as the program came to be called, had to "provide a
These programs of the Labour Party are not con-
tained in any one document of the Party, These pronounce
ments have been extrapolated from several sources such as
the Party's Manifesto for 1961, 1966 and 1970 elections.
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pension for incapacity or old age."
Agriculture and lands. Dominica is dominated by
agriculture, with the mainstay of the economy being bananas
The party which can implement more schemes will command the
people's confidence. The Labour Party devised plans to
push agrarian reform by acquiring land to redistribute to
the people in addition to the Crown lands that were already
available. Plans were in the making to improve production
by getting. scientific methods to the people. Soil surveys
were to be started and an Agricultural and Industrial De-
velopment Bank was to provide the necessary credit to under-
write the new undertakings. Both an oil and fruit canning
factory was to be built. With the increase in production,
hopefully the economy would begin to expand which would be
conducive to governments' plans to assist Dominicans in
their efforts to make it.
Large scale development planning and financial
backing for Tourist Centers in areas of special attraction
such as Prince Rupert and Douglas Bay areas, and the Fresh
Water and Boiling Lake areas were to be created.
Education
. The party had plans for a massive
increase in the number of primary schools to absorb the
growing number of children of school age. A technical
college at Storkfarm was to be constructed to cater for
students in Agriculture, Technology, Commerce and crafts.
Adult education programs were to be increased and an
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industrial School at Mount St. Mary was to be built to
accommodate the country's delinquents who would hopefully
develop Skills in the construction and industrial fields.
The University center was to be fully financed
. by the
Government to allow it to make maximum use of facilities.
The party's document reads that there was to be a "much
greater emphasis on technical education" to increase the
capacity of Dominica to industrialize and make basic
technical education "a feature of all Primary schools."
International communications
. it has always been
the plans of the party to build a deep water harbor to
facilitate large ocean-going vessels. First, this would
bring more tourist vessels into the State, thus giving a
lift to the economy. Second, it would improve the banana
trade since the long trek from shore to the large boats,
which carry this fruit to England, would be eliminated.
The fruit v;ould be less likely to be damaged if transported
in boats which would anchor right next to the jetty.
Finally, an international jet airstrip has been planned to
"increase the growth of the export potential and any sub-
stantial tourist development schemes."
Sport and culture . These two items were originally
not included in the Party's program. But over the years, it
has seen fit to lay heavy emphasis on both. The Party
planned to as3ist the island's only sport association, v;hich
operates in the urban sector. It indicated that it would
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provide '.proper coaches and inproved playing fields all
over the island." Culturally, the Party said that it would
encourage the cultural potential of the people.
Health. Because of the poor quality of health
facilities in the island, the party prepared a very im-
pressive and comprehensive program. There were to be no
less than thirty health centers and five small hospitals
in "strategic" areas. The best treatment was to be avail-
able to the mentally ill. mi schools were to be inspected
at least twice yearly by medical doctors. Ee-ch district
was to have a trained midwife.
The output side
. The output side of the conversion
process is the policies of the Government. Evidently, the
Party seems to have successfully implemented its policies
since the people have returned it to power in three con-
secutive elections, 1961-70. But this writer refuses to
accept this simple analysis of equating success at the polls
with successfully implementing policies. Thus each policy
discussed above will be assessed individually.
The road-building program which cuts across every
facet of Dominican life has been very impressive. Speaking
with the rural elements, one cannot but be impressed with
their satisfaction wi th this program. Presently, every
village in Dominica is served with a motorable road. It
is because the people never had it so good that they are
prepared to overlook the state of disrepair that these
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roads are presently in. Quality does not latter, as long
as the peasant can ride the jeep to his home without having
to walk part of the way. It is this misapprehension on the
part of the opposition of why the peasant is thankful that
the former tries to tell the latter that the badly damaged
roads are a deliberate move on the part of the Government
to frustrate non-supporters. This might be the case. But
the people have common sense which tells them that the roads
are bad because the rain destroys them. The peasants
reason that the Government cannot prevent rain. The ex-
tent of the road building program of the Labour Government
appears on p. 189.
The Government has reorganized the Water Authority,
but it continues to serve the urban area. The rural areas
are left unattended. To date, only twelve villages out of
thirty receive tap water in the homes. Quite recently,
four more villages had water facilities installed at a cost
of $73,249.00 (BWI) to the Government . Though the topo-
graphy of the island does not lend itself to easy penetra-
tion with water carrying facilities, its record could have
been much better when one considers that there are no less
than 365 rivers in the area. Government could have used
more effectively technical advice from outside agencies
such as the United Nations. But of course, the political
^^"Four Villages now get Pipe Water," The Dominica
Chronicle, July 15, 1972, p. 4.
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gain to be had through a gradual increase in water facili-
ties should not be underplayed.
AS reported in an earlier chapter, the Government
has not completed its plan for a comprehensive housing
scheme. The schemes mentioned in its place have increasing-
ly benefitted the upper class elements while it has become
more difficult for the lower class people to own their own
homes. The lower class elements cannot afford the loans,
and are forced to live in slums. But the government has
spent about a million dollars to construct government
offices and some two million dollars on a new police sta-
tion in Roseau, the main city. It is true that the funds
for the police station were earmarked in England to make
Dominica able to protect itself against an emergency, but
Britain did not send its construction firm to build the
building. The Government could have constructed a police
station, and did not have to destroy an already existing
sturdy building, with some of the funds and use the rest
for some other meaningful project." Instead, it followed
the letter of the law and put every cent in building this
which may cause the younger elements in the urban area
to be further alienated.
Both cooperative and local government agencies are
not functioning v;ell. In an interview v;ith a prominent
member of the cooperative division, the writer was led to
believe that Government has not shown enough interest in
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this agency. it has not allowed enough funds to recruit
the field staff to educate the people in the working of
cooperatives beginning at the priniary school level. Thus,
although registered cooperatives have increased over the
years, there seems to be little incentive given the members
to keep the movements alive. On the other hand, this
writer discovered that certain cooperatives like the
poultry cooperative, have used its special privileges
granted by government to create a shortage of the commo-
dity it is involved in to make the Government look bad.
For example, a restriction on poultry imports could put
the poultry cooperative in a good position to foster this
situation.
The Local Government departments do not seem to
be playing their intended roles. They were instituted to
stymie the growing power of the national government, but
instead they have been used as a means to sustain the
national government. The reports indicate that local govern
ments do not enjoy autonomy and the more autonomy they enjoy
the less benefits they receive from the national government.
This hypothesis is supported by the accusation by a top
government official that this agency was receiving too
much attention over other more meaningful agencies which
have affected Dominica in a more positive way. Finally,
the national government has put itself in the ironical,
but not surprising situation of wanting to promote local
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government island-wide, but at the same time wanting to
disband the foremost local government body, the Roseau
Town Council, because that council tried to exercise its
autonomy by renaming streets with names which better "suited
Dominica.
In the area of agriculture, some attempts have
been made to present better programs to Dominica but the
results are yet to be seen, as the main stay of the economy,
bananas, dissipate precipitously. The problem has been
aggravated by the departure of top personnel from the
island. Some have obtained better jobs, while others have
gone to further their studies, may be never to return.
An agricultural bank has been set up to sustain many schemes
but the sad report for 1972 reads: ''So far requests for
assistance have been registered but few projects have been
approved and disbursement of funds have not commenced.
"
The report continues that lands designated to continue the
agrarian reform have been v/ithheld.
Further, in an effort to preserve the best lands of
Dominica for Dominicans, the Government has prohibited their
sale to aliens. This seems to have been done too late. One
can even question the sincerity of this policy since sub-
sequently aliens, probably seeing the writing on the wall,
Dr. J. Bernard Yankey, "A General Review of Ag-
ricultural Developments in Dominica for Period 1969-1972,"
Dies Dominica (November, 1972), pp. 18-20.
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have Offered to sell their holdings. People have approached
the Government with very comprehensive plans which could
facilitate the transfer of ownership of these foreign-held
lands, but the Government has categorically refused to
accept them.^^
The Government's record in dealing with education
is not a good one, as cited earlier. The Government has
not made public a comprehensive plan which was intended to
include all facets of education. It continually allowed
the missionaries to take on the responsibility of educating
the people. Many school buildings were erected but they
continued to be staffed with predominantly untrained ele-
mentary school graduates and high school dropouts. No
attention was given to technical, agricultural or adult
education, until very recently. In 1972 a technical
college was opened but its fees ($90.00 a semester) are
prohibitive. The Government has failed to provide the
much needed training school for the children labelled de-
linquents while a poor attempt was made to start a youth
camp which is terribly understaffed. No particular atten-
tion was paid to secondary schools as the government per-
sonnel dealing with educ?!tion were oriented toward primary
25
In July 1972 a group of farmers approached the
"Socialist" Labour Government of Dominica to have it sanc-
tion the purchase of farms in the Castle Bruce area. The
Government refu5;ed to help on the grounds that the project
was motivated by Communism. The details of this affair are
contained in Movement for a New Dominica, "V/orking Class
Struiqle in the Caribbean: The Cose of Castle Bruce,
Dominica." Unpublished paper.
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education. The Govern.ent has not even provided a secon-
dary school for girls yet, although one exists for boys.
There is no teacher training college. Indeed, in 1972,
DoiDinica had the distinction of being the only island in
the British Caribbean without such facilities of its own.
The most that has been done as of 1972 is that the Govern-
ment now pays the salaries of all the teachers of the four
secondary schools of the island, and this was at the request
of an outside force (see Chapter V).
The jet air strip and deep-water harbor have not
materialized though as of 1972 they were seriously being
considered. The Government had already initiated plans
to study the suitability of a particular site to locate
the airport. In the meantime, extension facilities were
being considered for the present inadequate facility at
Melville Hall Airport. The deep v;ater harbour was coming
close to reality by the passage of the Port Authority Act.
This legislation was passed in anticipation of the heavy
traffic that this port would handle. It is not too im-
portant at this stage, but the location of this port may
prove costly. The Government has decided to locate it on
an open roadstead in Roseau, while better natural facilities
at Portsmouth, the second town, are passed over.
The state of sports and culture in Dominica is very
low. Coaches and available fields are virtually non-exis-
tent. There a^e no full time organizers for sports and
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the little org,^nizing which exists is primarily directed
to the major city. m this respect, the government had
failed to encourage island-wide participation in sports.
Thus, to be recognized in sports one has to travel to the
major city.
The state of culture, simply defined as exhibiting
what is typically Dominican, is in an even sadder situation
The more "cultured" elements group themselves into cliques
to sing Dominican songs of old. They use much of the tax-
payers money to travel abroad to cut records and to wear
Dominican "national" dress. These groups are made up of
the same elements who a few years ago would never think of
singing a local tune because it belonged to the lower
classes. But since government has shown an interest in
reviving these, the elites jump on the bandwagon to deprive
the masses of what is their own.
Like all non-developed countries, the health prob-
lem is such that one oft-^n wonders why epidemics are not
more common. There is one major hospital and two half-way
houses, all with inadequate facilities. The better trained
doctors remain in the city v;hile the recently graduated man
the rural posts with even less facilities. There has been
no noticeable improvement in the treatment of the mentally
ill as they are still kept in the same compound as prisoner
The only mental institution is badly staffed and the
personnel are poorly trained. The availability of free
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inedical care to the school children is simply non-existent.
An attempt was made by a politician of the opposing party
to initiate a free program of eye testing in the schools,
but it was discontinued as the authorities became unco-
operative. To be sure, this move of free testing could
have been politically motivated. But the point is, it was
a free service which was beginning to show results as the
doctor began to detect, at an early age, eye defects which
v;ould later affect the productive ability of these same
youngsters, who might later become leaders of the country.
In the final analysis, the Dominica Labour Party
has not delivered all the promised services. Therefore,
its successes at the polls must be the result of a success-
ful political socialization process, v/hich makes the people
satisfied with what they have received.
The Organized Parties in the Political Socialization Process
The parties of Dominica are also confronted with
21
the problem of nation-building. This refers to the psy-
chological dimension of cre'ting a country as opposed to
the structural dimension. It is an attempt to form a homoge-
nous, national political culture. This "political culture
. .
.consists of attitudes, beliefs, values and skills
which are current in the entire population, as well as
those special propensities and patterns which may be found
26
within separate parts of that population (subcultures)."
^^Almond and Powell, Developmental Approach, p. 23.
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Political socialization is a process whereby political
attitudes and values are inculcated as children become
adults and as adults are recruited into roles. Political
culture is continually molded by various agents in the
environment by the process of socialization. This section
deals with the Dominica Labour Party and the Dominica
Freedom Party, and their role in political socialization.
The concept of secularization is used in discussing
the evolution of a political culture. Secularization is
comparable to complexity in structure and is defined as
".
.
.the process whereby men become increasingly rational,
analytical, and empirical in their political action. "^^
This section is divided into three parts. The
first deals with the ideology of the Labour Party, the
second assesses the pattern it has adopted to push this
ideology, and the third deals with the results of attempts
to inculcate that ideology. The last two are juxtaposed
against the attempts of the Freedom Party to carry on a
similar process, with a view of indicating why the latter
has been unsuccessful thus far.
The ideological orientation of the Parties . The
parties in Dominica are very hard to follow since they
have changed their positions so many times on issues which
^'^Ibid., p. 24.
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are diametrically opposed to each other. Thus to label
this or that party socialistic or capitalistic on the
basis of party actions and pronouncements can become very
hazardous. But on the basis of the constitutions of the
two parties one can discern the orientation the parties
would like to undertake, but have been unable to follow
because of the environment in which they operate.
The original constitution of the Dominica Labour
Party pledged its commitment to "democratic socialism",
a concept which was introduced by Mrs. Allfrey when she
returned from England in 1955. As reported elsewhere,
she was heavily influenced by the British Labour Party's
brand of socialism which envisaged the participation of
the State in many areas where private concerns had in-
volved themselves. But with the expulsion of Mrs. Allfrey
from the party, the party did not change its orientation,
although it has done nothing which approximates socialism.
It continues to speak about securing for the workers by
hand or by brain the fruits of their industry "and generally
it seeks to promote the political, social and economic
29
emancipation of the people." It does not say explicitly
in its constitution that it is only for the lower class
elements, but by implication it does, since it is determined
29Labour Partv Constitution, pp. 1-2.
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to work on behalf of those who have been exploited. Surely
that does not include the elites of the country.
In spite Of these platitudes, it is safe to say that
this party has no ideology, if ideology is defined
commitment to a principle. This does not imply that
ideologically oriented party cannot waiver a little to
secure its domination of a political system. One thing
certain is that the upper class element of the party either
does not understand the meaning of socialism or they are
using socialism to disguise their non-ideology, which the
Deputy Premeir told this writer is pragmatism. For example,
when this writer asked of the elites what their party stood
for in relation to the op-position, they all said that their
party was socialist and that it was for the small man. On
the other hand, they saw the opposition as capitalist,
meaning that the opposition stood for its own class interests,
and not for Dominica.
Like the Labour Party, the Dominica Freedom Party
does not have a clear-cut ideology. Its leaders with few
exceptions accuse the Dominica Labour Party of being for
themselves while they are for Dominica. This party speaks
of the four freedoms as an ideological stance and emphasizes
the importance of putting people before politics. But the
Freedom Party seems a little more confused than the Labour
Party. On the basis of interviews, the following came out
of the top leadership in response to the question: What does
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your party stand for? Ansv;er A:
-The party stands for four
freedoms, people before party"; Answer B: "practical educa-
tion for the country"; Answer C: "Development and bring in
foreign capital"; Answer D: "largely socialistic, taking
the best from the Communists and Socialists." This last
response is interesting since the party has constantly
accused the Labour Party of being a communist party, a very
far-fetched statement, to say the least.
How the parties inculcate their ideas
. In the
section dealing with the conversion process, it was diffi-
cult to show a distinction between the Labour Party and the
government in the process of State building. The difficulty
is even greater in dealing with the role of the party in
the socialization process as distinguished from the role
of the Government, because essentially it is the Government
which does every thing v;hile efforts are always made to show
that the party helps in this important role. The Government
is the party and the rest of the party withers away tem-
porarily. Almost to the last man, party officials are
involved in the planning and execution of government policy.
Increasingly, even people in the bureaucracy, in top posi-
tions, including police and army, are sympathizers of the
party.
The Dominica Labour Party has changed in composition
over the years. When the party began it used the already
established Dominica Trade Union as a base to bring the
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lower class elements into itq -FoIh o^ur I s fold. The union had already
established itself in airr,/^c-+-r it m almost every section of the island,
making it easier for the party to gain members once the
^
union had accepted that relationship. m fact, today there
are two former union leaders in the Government, Patrick
John, who was once secretary to a Waterfront Workers Union,
and Earle Leslie, who organized unions at Portsmouth be-
ginning in 1945. The Union which John led was at one time
hostile to the Government when the latter tried to pass
restrictions on strikes, but John was quickly won over and
the law was passed. But the Government had to contend with
the fact that the President of the union was affiliated to
the opposition. The president was quickly "forced out" of
active politics because in his words: "people saw him as
a politician and not as a humble man negotiating for his
workers. ""^^
The Labour Party has since ignored the unions as a
means to lure members into its fold. It has taken on the
agencies of local government and cooperatives to accomplish
that end. The two agencies are not used to bring an
ideology to the people, but instead are used to bring re-
calcitrants into line. They are used, though not overtly,
to sustain the rural support that the Government has enjoyed,
Letter of resignation from Louis Benoit to Miss
Eugenia Charles, President of the Freedom Party.
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5 6 as
The agencies will be used even
.ore for this puroo.
the Roseau constituencies (urban) have turned down every
member of the Labor Government who sought election to the
Roseau Local Government Board in 1971. Of course, there
are other agencies which can be used more effectively to
ensure a victory for Labor and that is the Constituency
Commission, discussed in Chapter III.
The party continues to give the image that it is
open and that it belongs to the common man, but the ulti-
mate leader of the party has openly said that his best
friend is Astaphans, the richest man in Dominica, because
he pays the most taxes. Indeed, at one time 1958-1956,
the party was open, even though the masses might have be-
longed to the party to be entertained. it is no secret
that the party has always been dominated by a few, who at
one point were as poor as the ordinary Dominican, Increas-
ingly, one man asserted himself to the point where he can
now choose his own successor. The party has had "open"
conventions. But these have been for the purpose of pro-
posing new plans and that of praising Mr. Edward LeBlanc
and his cohorts. He has entrenched himself so deeply that
now only a special conference can unseat him,"^^ and not a
31 Based on interview with Edward LeBlanc, Summer
1972.
32LeBlanc Labor. Party, "Constitution," Dominica,
1970, p. 3. (Mimeographed.)
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QQrinal„vote at a convent- i r^r^ mvention. To show its openness and
youthfumess, the party has attracted so.e young and educated
people. It does not see the entrance of these individuals
as a minus factor. These individuals may have Joined the
party because it shows no signs of failing at the polls,
and as a way of ensuring their dominance of the political
system. m effect, the party rules against itself by
accepting these elites into its fold, thus against the
people whom it always wanted to protect. The changing
nature of the party has not sapped its strength, because
it has been able to make the people feel part of the Govern-
ment. The Government officials and Ministers live in their
districts and if they do not, they have a "home" there,
where they can be seen with "their" people.
The Opposition Party tries to give the image that
it is open to all, but it is yet to get this message across.
It is not manned with people who can relate to the masses.
The elites of the party are mostly old politicians who tried
many times at the polls and were turned back by the people.
Presently, like the L.-bor Party, the Opposition is ruled
by a chosen few who are not sufficiently united to effect
any meaningful chance within it. This lack of cohesion has
manifested itself in many ways both openly and secretly.
One former top executive of the Party has openly disasso-
ciated himself with it. To him, party politics is a waste
of time in Dominica. Further, according to him, the parties
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have not been responsive to the peopIe^s clesires.33
,,,,,
'"''^
'"'^ ^^^^ a-stan.in, ovation at
His party.s convention in 1972 when he reported that he was
a Professor of Blac. studies at an A.eric.n university.
This only demonstrates that leaders like hi. are interested
xn '.open- parties to satisfy their own inner selves.
The Do.inica Labor Party has introduced an emphasis
on Dominican culture by encouraging groups which study
Dominica's past. It celebrates the country^s semi-indepen-
dence day with a carnival jump-up, which many Dominicans
enjoy. On Dominica's last national day, the Party published
articles which praised the land with its heroes. The Party
also invited outside dignitaries to heighten the importance
of the occasion. But all these nationalistic drives run
counter to the keen desire to bind Dominica in a Caribbean
Federation, without looking closely at the implication of
that union. it might well be that the leaders themselves
have not formulated for themselves a Dominican nationalism.
One observer has written that Dominica is one of the Carib-
bean islands which would be the first to give up its sover-
eignty to join into a bigger union. "^"^ This nationalistic
33Lecture delivered by Edward Scobie to Dominicans
in Support of Progress (Summer, 1972).
3'^Carleen O'Loughlin, Political and Economic Develop-
ment of the Leeward and Windward Islands'
^
TlMew Haven: Yale
University Press, 19f8), p. 44.
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IS
outbu.st du.ing its .est recent national day celebration
even .ore surprising when one considers that the Government
through its newspaper, saw the need to explain to Do.inica
about the superiority of the Dominican Constitution,
-which
is on imperial Order issued by Her Majesty, The Queen at
Buckingham Palace on 22nd day of February 1967. The
Government must have seen the need for this explanation
since the editorial stated it was being done to clear the
confusion, so that the people will know. This must have
done to lend credence to the Constitution, which would in
turn attribute added legitimacy to the Government. For
this reason, the Government could not emphasize that Domini-
ca's leaders did participate in devising the Constitution.
The fact that it came from the Queen was more important.
One would expect that the Government would use the
educational system to effect changes in the political system,
since the most overt attempt to control political socializa-
tion has been through education. The leader of the party
has criticized the Church in its relation to the people and
would probably like to replace the Church with the school
to create a new Dominica. But he does not know how to
achieve that end. The Government emphasizes the number of
schools built but rarely take into accounL the quality of
p. 2.
35Editorial, The Educator
,
September 1, 1971,
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the people who sta« the. o. the
.uality o. the p.oauct
tu.nea out.
.his wUX
^^^^ ^^^^^ ^^^^^leaders have
.ostly heen self-™ade ™en, which forces the™
to Play down the importance of formal education. They still
believe that high standards are the .ey to success, disre-
garding the type of courses attempted to achieve the high
standards. m any event, the amount spent on education is
totally inadequate (Si. 5 million or 13.7% of the budget
during 1969),^^
The Results of These Efforts
Dominica is still very much affected by an elite
dominating the lower class elements. The latter has re-
fused to accept that fact when it is told so by the more
"radical" elements of the society, the Black Power men
(see Chapter V). m other words, the Labor Party has shown
itself to be for the lower class, though on occasion the
Labor Party has tried to compete with the lower class to
suppress its aspirations.^"^ The Freedom Party is also for
the poor man though somehow the poor cannot see the benefit.
The youth are left out by both parties because they do not
know what they want yet, the parties believe.
3 6Dominica, The V/e s t Indies , Annual Report, Educa-
tion Division
,
1969
, p, 3.
37
A good example is the Castle Bruce Affair re-
counted in footnote no. 25.
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Evidently, the Labor P^r^^.~>^=.c^arty has seen no need to
foster a national identity since if . uIt IS so intent on joining
any federation in the Carihho;,n t+-L-aridbea . it waivers in its pro-
nouncements on BlarV PrM-ov- ^b ck ower, and on creating a new Dominica.
But that same party can condemn the Black Power movement
When the latter criticizes the Government for wasting valuable
resources on national day celebrations (1972 cost about
nOO,000). State-building is virtually at a stand-still
as the leader of the Party is determined to keep Dominica
a "colony" as long as it is "Iqritishly" possible, to gain
as much aid from the British treasury. This is done in
retaliation for thbse "horrible" years when Britain ruled
with an iron hand, maintains Mr. LeBlanc.
If state-building has been consciously stopped by
refusing to have political independence, one would expect
that nation-building would proceed at an accelerated pace.
This would be to ensure a better acceptance of independence,
regardless of whether Dominica would be independent on its own
or be in a federation with the other islands of the Carib-
bean. But instead, the Labor Party continues to allow
itself to be drawn into useless debates with the Opposition.
It has allowed the renaming of a street to cause so much
controversy, to the point that it cost the country $16,000"^^
to investigate the resulting damages from the ensuing
This figure was arrived at by this writer from a
response given in the House of Assembly by the Minister of
Finance—the amount he quoted was $5,270.19 (BWI), but he
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the rur., elements and see u.ban people
.eel a p.Me in '
Dcinica. Hany others have very
.ew. good things to say
about the country and both parties can accept the credit
for that. The alienation of the youth is reflected in
their indictment of the Government for not allowing the-
opposition time on the radio station. On the other hand,
those Who feel part of Dominica were not necessarily moti-^
vated by the policies of the Labor Government, though the
influence of that party must never be underplayed.
One should not get the impression that a participant
society is about to dawn in Dominica. Before 1967 there
were glimpses of such a society, because ^t that time the
British .still had a tight control of the island, with much
executive power in the Governorship. Then, the Labour Party
was in the same boat with the people: both were powerless.
But since 1957, the Leader of the Party has acquired all the
power of the Governor. The Party has somewhat left the
people behind, making Dominica a partially integrated society.
The elites a'e integrated in the sense that they have many
common interests to preserve. Those who dominate both par-
ties have agreed to disagree on minor issues such as who
pointed out that this was in addition to the "extensive
repairs to the House of Assembly." The cost was further
increased by the necessity to import an overseas magistrate
to prosecute the wrong-doers.
39
"Role of Mass Media Discussed," Dominica Herald
,
December 2, 1972, p. 1.
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own. a puMlc
.a..et. On t.e
.o.e i„po.tant issues o.
.e-di3t.i..tio„ o. ,nco,„e ena provision o.
.ette. nousin,, the
elites ag.ee not to talk In ordo. not to undc™ine thel.
own positions.
.Hey woula have to give up one o. the th.ee
or four houses they own Individually,
Even though the L.bor Party started to wield power
socialization process. The Party has ^ade some rural ele-
rnents feel part of the nation, but feeling is not enough.
The party has failed to recruit the better qualified people
to execute policies which can benefit the island. It has
placed ministers and other cabinet officials in jobs which
they cannot handle. It is ^-Fr-^iH hr-. .-^^x-c IS af aid to recruit men with new
ideas, with imagination to undertake the task of nation-
building. Every recruitment has followed two patterns;
either the recruit is of such "low" quality (education-
common sense) that he can win an election, but once he has
won., he cannot handle his assignment well. Or second, the
recruit is of such "high" quality that he joins the Barty
to gain something for himself or for his business. Of
course, the latter understands that he is to behave himself
and not try to be too uppity, for if he gets out of hand
he will be dismissed.
Credit must be given to the Leader of the Labor
Party, Mr. E.O. LeBlanc. At times, he has done some strange
things but he has kept the party together. He has kept one
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He has allowed so.e incompetent Ministers to have their way
Of the people.
^ His democratic orientation has detracted
fro. his established able and honest leadership. He has
been slow to recognize a crisis and has refused to ta.e
command of a situation even though it does not come directly
under his ministry.^! He is somewhat arrogant and has not
involved the Opposition Party sufficiently in the major
issues Which confront Dominica. But this mentality is a
direct result of the training he and others had under
colonial rule. The colonial Governor almost never involved
the local politician (at that time the opposition) in any
major issues confronting the country. The Governor had a
job to do and he did it without any help. Mr. LeBlanc has
followed this tradition and has been quoted as saying that
he cannot involve the Opposition because in the British
tradition, which Dominica follows, Edward Heath does not
send Harold Wilson to negotiate issues which Heath's Govern-
ment is involved in.
The Labor Party has not produced a political cul-
ture. The people have not been made to accept the legitimacy
40
The Premier must have been aware of the practice
of a certain Minister who used to spend months in Barbados
on his private business while in the pay of the people.
41
A good example v/as the St. Mary's Academy crisis.
The Premier refused to take over the Ministry of Education
to handle the affair even after the School was closed down.
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Of institutions and elected officials. They have beco.e
cynical Of elected officials, referring to the. as stooges
and stand-ins for a leader who is directed by law to have
a certain amount of elected officials to maintain the
leadership of the country. Increasingly, politics in
Dominica has revolved around confrontations where both the
Labor and the Freedom Parties propagandize the masses.
The Freedom Party does not have enough members in the legis-
lature to overturn Government legislation, thus it takes
its disagreements to the streets. It has legitimized
violence whenever it is the one using it to achieve its
objective. And of course, in an effort to show who is the
head of the country, the Lsbor Party quickly takes on the
challenge since it knows it has the machinery of both police
and army at its disposal to beat off the Opposition.
Fortunately and very surprisingly, bloodshed has not re-
sulted from the constant confrontation as both parties try
to either their dominance or capture power.
One might expect that the lack of clear-cut ideology
would lead to a pragmatism in politics, which would force
the parties to maintain a good record to retain power.
This has not been the case. The Government has had its
way in virtually all major issues such as massive police
brutality against Black Power elements. It has been ably
supported by the Opposition Party, the Dominica Freedom
Party, whose basic principles supposedly, are to uphold
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freedom of e:>cnr^c- o
-;
^e-. a.o..g other
3ay.n, tHat the
.our.eois element.
.o„,nate the poor classIt has to be so because the Preedo. Party condoneO the
policy of Govprnment-
-t-^ c+--rnment to stop free expression. Little
v/onder that of -t-i^o +-, ^ i.the twenty members of the political elite
xnterviewed, no less than eighteen said that the two party
system in Dominica was working and that system was there to
stay. But as far as this writer is concerned, the system
could be better. There could be more meaningful communica-
tion and cooperation in a positive way to change the society
to make the people a little better off. since the parties
'
have Shirked that responsibility, the Blac. Power Movement
has come on the scene to perform that task. The role it
has played in the political system and its relationship
with other groups, institutions and people in the Dominican
society form the basis of the following chapter.
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CHAPTERv
THE BLACK POWER MCVEr4ENT IN DOMINICA
Introduction
Tbe previous chapter dealt with the failure of the
party to handle the processes of state and nation-building.
This was seen to be the case since the party has been un-
successful in outlining precisely in which direction Domini-
ca should be heading. Further, it has failed to draw on
the available talents to tackle the critical problem of
making Dominicans feel a part of Dominica.
Because the party has failed to carry on the task
of nation-building, the Black Power Movement has been forced,
according to its own prognosis, to undertake that task. The
activities of that group are reviewed here because the group
is the only one which has dared to challenge the Government.
It has not been too successful at that, but it has received
more than its share of attention. It has threatened the
very foundations of the present society. This threat,
whether real or imaginary, has caused those who "have a
stake" in the system, as the elites like to refer to them-
selves, to scamper for cover.
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The Concept of Black Power
Black Power is one of those concepts which has been
discussed for some time now. it has been defined both
literally and figuratively, and it takes on a new meaning
depending on the user's disposition. That is why there is
still a running debate in the Caribbean between the more
progressive elements which see its relevance, and others
who see it as irrelevant. Walter Rodney of Guyana, the
first exponent of the concept in its present form, has
shown its relevance."^
Walter Rodney understands Black Power to mean three
closely related things: "(i) the break with imperialism
which is historically white racist; (ii) the assumption of
power by the black masses in the islands; (iii) the cul-
tural reconstruction of the society in the image of the
Blacks." But who are the Blacks of the Caribbean? Rodney
writes in response:
I shall anticipate.
. .questions on who are the
blacks in the West Indies. I maintain that it is
the white world which has defined who are blacks -
if you are not white then you are black. However,
it is ^ obvious that the West Indian situation is
complicated by factors such as the variety of racial
types and racial mixtures and by the process of
class formation. We have, therefore, to note not
simply what the white world says but also how indivi-
duals perceive each other. Nevertheless, we can taik
of the mass of the West Indian population as being
No attempt is being made here to inquire into the
concept as it relates to the American context. This is not
to be taken to mean that the two situations are radically
different.
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black
- either African or Indian Th^r-oto have been some doubts on fhf i* I ^ ^^^"^^
ur tne contemporary scene.
2
Though somewhat of a militant definition of Black,
no doubt it was precipitated by the reality of the situa-^
tion in Jamaica where Rodney worked. m Jamaica, 76.8% of
the population is Black, but the 0.8% European element has
controlled every pary of Jamaica's life.^
The second part of the phrase, Power, is simply put
by Rodney: "The Caribbean is predominantly a Black nation,
and as such the Blacks have a right to power commensurate
with their own numbers. On first reading, his position
seems contradictory to his stance on "Black." But further
analysis reveals that he is willing to accept anyone. Black
or White, Who is willing to give a fair share to the people
who, by their hard work, keep the opportunists afloat. He
then cites the Cuban experience where a white man, Castro,
has brought more benefits to the Blacks than when Batista,
a Black man, was in power.
Walter Rodney, The Groundings with my Brothers(London: The Bogle-L • Ouverture Publications, 196$), p. 28,
3Ibid., p. 30. Of every 100 Jamaicans (1969), 76.8%
are visibly African, 0.8% European, 1.1% Indian, 0.6% Chinese
91% have African blood, 0.1% Syrian, 14.6 Afro-European and
5.4 other mixtures.
^Ibid.
,
p. 29
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"^"^
-—ic. nave accept.^
self to gene.ate Mac. p.iae a„a dignity.
..ey want the
Peop.e to cease tMn.in, in te™s o. the.seXves as a wic.ea
people, whose onlv ;:ihT i -i •y ability is to cause harm through Obeah
and Voodoo. They write:
hat^rdece?? lelL'usv"^'^" ^ ^-^^^ ^'"^^ of
as people full'ofoot^n4°r^"r" ourselves
land fSll Of po?en??ar?s"' as a
The Dominican movement has further clarified its
position in its journal Flambeau in the following way:
that all Dominicans must reali^o = u
At the beginning Black Power meant a rejection of
everything white. But now the Movement sees Black Power as
the uplifting of the lower class of Dominicans to
^
enjoy a decent standard of living, free from in!
i^literacr^'^f P"^-'*^. humiliation,Illiteracy, and shabby housing.^ *
Anyone, of any color, who can help in this undertaking is
welcomed to join the Movement. But in spite of the ideo-
logical bent of the Movement which approximates Tanzanian
^Hilroy Thomas, "A New Look" The Dominica Herald,August 1, 1970, p. 2. ' ' '
^Flambeau
, October, 1970, p. 11.
7
'Caribbean Rebellion and Social Change: Towards anUnderstanding of the Black Power Movement in the Caribbean,"
Toronto, 1972, p. 8. ( Mimecgr aohed
.
)
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sociaXis.. the Movement win not accept Whites in a leader-
ship position,
.here see.s to he a contradiction in this
position. X. the Movement is concerned purei, with ideology
the color of one • <? cv-Jr, ^.u -i ,^-L vjiic s sjcin should not- nrer-i • .h ; preclude acquiring a
leadership position.
The Movement in Dominica
The Black Power Movement in its present form was
begun in Jamaica and then transported to Trinidad. From
there, Dominican university students brought the idea to
Dominica. But like all groups which relied on "outside-
sustaining power, it was doomed to failure. In addition
to these university students, there was another, Roosevelt
Douglas,
S who occasionally gave life to the Movement during
his frequent visits to Dominica.
The Movement in Dominica was officially organized
during May, 1970. Previous to that, no attempts were made
to start a movement, though many discussions were carried
out in public places condemning the disparities in the
9
society. At the beginning, the Movement was very active
as it was something new. it began with one man at the head,
a man who had suffered directly because of the inequalities
QHe is one of the Dominican students who was tried inCanada in 1969 for taking part in an alledged smashing of
computers at Sir George Williams University. He was a one
time ideologue of the Movement.
9During the Summer of 1969, Dr. Bill Riviere held
numerous discussions about Black Power in Dominica.
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and contradictions of the existing society.
.o constitution
was developed; concrete and realizable projects were not
outlined. It had the sweeping mandate to change the human
relationship in the society. The group had failed to
realize that the present syster. was not created overnight
and that it could not be dismantled overnight. Changing it
required much more time and commitment than the group was
willing to allow. The situation was even compounded by the
fact that there was only one main organizer while the others
were pursuing more important things outside of Dominica.
The organization engaged in rhetoric and had affinity for
the dramatic. That in itself was good since attention was
concentrated on it for a time, but it did not do anything
good with that attention. it even alienated many of its
would-be supporters.
But it was during 1970 that the group made its
major contribution for which it is yet to receive the
credit. Then, the leader of the group, Hilroy Thomas, ap-
proached the National Government to have it support more
fully the three private secondary schools. Previously these
schools had been partially supported and this caused tuition
to be very high, in contrast to the sole school for boys
which the Government was running.
The Movement reasoned that these schools had a right
to receive more attention from the Government. Even though
they were being run by foreigners, the students were
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Dominican nationals. Besides, the Gove.n„ent was unaMe toprovide Places for those students who chose to attend
private schools.
For the above reasons and the fact that it was an
election year, the Government agreed to underwrite the
expenses of the three schools. Thus, as soon as the Heads
Of these schools returned to the island, Mr. LeBlanc took
the "initiative., and announced his Government's intention
to help the private schools. At first the schools were not
too happy about the affair. They were afraid that this
involvement was a back door route to take complete control
of their schools. Their fear was justified, considering
that LeBlanc had shown himself not a friend of the Roman
Catholic Church, the owner of two of the three schools.
Thus, in an effort to sabotage the move, the missionaries
at the Catholic schools demanded pay for themselves which
would greatly increase the cost of maintenance. This last
demand was very significant. In the first place, the mis-
sionaries were not interested in the money for themselves,
but only whether they had enough money to pay their lay
teachers a reasonable salary. Secondly, if the Government
was able to pay them, this meant that they were dispensable
since any qualified person could take command of the school.
But apparently the missionaries must have been misled by
members of the Opposition Party that the deal would fall
through if they demanded compensation for their services.
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Both the opposition and the missionaries we.e w.ong. The
overriding variable, the election year fever, was not
weighted enough. The Government was not going to let this
golden opportunity to slip away. it decided to pay the
salaries of every
.ember of the staff, in addition to a
sum for the upkeep of the schools. The Government made
the mistake, through its ineptitude, of not paying every
member of the staff individually, but gave the authorities
a grant to pay the staff. Thus, the Prinicpal of St. Mary's
Academy, one of the private schools, could say that the
Government did not pay the salaries of his teachers. He
was right and the accompanying letter with the grant read:
"I am directed to inform you that Government has decided to
make a Grant available to the secondary schools.
The Government subsequently acknowledged the efforts
of the Movement for initiating the move by sending a copy
of the very letter it directed to the Secondary Schools to
the Movement's leader. With this success, the Movement
began plans to organize a Secondary School Teachers Asso-
ciation. But two important events pre-empted that fact.
The first was a massive demonstration against a Canadian
official who had come to Dominica to see in what ways his
Government could help Dominica. The Movement did not take
Letter from the Office of The Premier to the
Principals of the four secondary schools of Dominica, dated
29th August, 1970, Ref. No. E and H-300/780/2.
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too kindly to this visit and carried placards at the de-
monstration Which told the mood of the people: "Investigate
the racist Canadians." "West Indians are catching hell in
Canada." "Give Black people a chance." This was an indi-
cation of things to come as the authorities were caught
unawares. The second major event was related to the first;
Hilroy Thomas, the main organizer of the Movement and him-
self a teacher at St. Mary's Academy, was dismissed from
his post. It was reported that his dismissal was based on
the grounds that he refused to wear a tie to work. But the
real reason seems to be to get back at him because he had
organized the protest march against the Canadian and because
his employers were Canadian, even though the Government paid
his salary.
The Movement tried desperately to gather momentum,
to make an issue of the Hilroy affair. It failed because
there was no one to generate support. The only one who
could have helped was the very person in the midst of the
controversy, Hilroy himself.
By 1971, the Movement had split up into no less
than five factions. They were without leadership as Hilroy
left the island to pursue further studies overseas. In the
meantime, the others were either employed away from Dominica
or were at school in Jamaica, Trinidad or Barbados. In 1972,
the Movement tried once again to regroup with the return of
two able leaders. It moved to change its name from Black
222
Power Movement to Movement for a New Dominica. This move
is to build a better image in Dominica. As this is being
written, there are several supportive groups in North
America and Canada who are helping the Dominican Movement
by way Of sending equipment and money to it. A discussion
of the Movement in relaf inn 4-^t o to other groups in the society
will form the subiect o-F -t-hci -f/^tt^ •o ^jecT: t the following sections.
The Movement and The Dominican Press '
Universally, the press has shown an affinity to
expose sensational news. in their efforts to capture the
largest reading public, the press must extrapolate the bad
which can command attention. This is understandable in an
advanced country where the practice has been in existence
for a long time and where it becomes hard to break away
from. Besides, in the developed countries, like the United
States, making money is the name of the game. This is not
to imply that the same drive for money is not to be found
in the developing countries, but when it comes to the press,
there is no need to report the bad to sell papers. For
example, the same "elites" buy all four newspapers in
Dominica regularly to see what slant each has taken on an
issue.
But in spite of the lack of great competition to
capture the reading public, which is small anyway, the
Dominican Press has gone out of its way to blacklist the
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Black Power Movement. Thus, the Dominican Chronicle could
give front page coverage to the fact that Roosevelt Douglas.
a Black Power leader "<-rMnw ^,,^4- ^^x a , could get five years following his
conviction in Canada in connection with the February 1969
Sir George William (University) Computer Centre Affair.
There was no analysis of the implications or reasons for
the conviction because the paper was already convinced that
Douglas was quilty.
The Star was happy to report on one occasion that
Black professors were against Black Studies since it did
not qualify the recipients of such an education to become
competitive educationally.
^^^^^ missed the point
as it conveniently left out the real reason why Black
Studies are so widely condemned among Blacks. The fact is
that too many Blacks have been put in high positions for
which they were never qualified. They are the ones who
make the programs so inferior and a waste of time. The
editor of the paper should have reported that it is the
Whites like herself who staff the programs with inferior
men and that the programs could be good. To show how
destructive this paper can be, it reported with "sadness"
the departure of the white Christian Brothers from the
island. According to it, the Black Power Movement was
^^Dorainica Chronicle
,
May 1, 1971, p. 2.
^^The Star, May 10, 1971, p. 4.
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responsible, but ironically, the editor of the paper was
the very person who chastised the white priests and white
nuns for owning too .uch property in the island. At th.t
tin,e the editor felt that they should leave the country or
give up some of the real estate they owned at the time,
in fact. She was against the white nuns' acquiring a piece
Of public property to provide greater recreational facili-
ties for the girls on the island. But now the editor of
the paper saw fit to defend the very people she once
detested.
The Beginning of the Dialogue
The first attempt to begin a dialogue in the press
on Black Power was in 1968. At that time Swinbourne
Lestrade was very disturbed by the fact that a little white
girl was a Carnival Princess of Dominica. He was of the
opinion that since Dominica is a black country, all its
representatives should be Black. "^^ Of course, this was a
poor analysis of Black Power, although at that point in
time the leaders were still groping to make their positions
clear on the meaning of the concept.
The second attempt was made in 1969 by Julian
14Johnson, His article contained essentially four points
13Dominica Herald
,
April 10, 1968, p. 6.
14Based on private conversation.
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which Walter Rodney had ^r^ir^y,-i 4. ^ .le n a articulated in Jamaica: a) the
blaclc community must aim to create an awareness of being
black; b; Black people must be mobilized to act in their
own interest; c) white cultural imperialism must be stopped
d) black rule must be established in black society, it
took him a long time to get this published since the topic
was then considered too explosive. But a year before that,
in 1968, the four papers were embroiled with the Government
over the issue of freedom of the press. ^^^^
paper, The Herald, accepted the article for publication but
instead published an article by Marie Davis Pierre "Has
Black Any Meaning in Dominica?"^^ In this article, Pierre
admonished the young to stop using the beaches as latrines
and urged Dominicans to stop being lackadaisical. She has
since continued to express her opinion freely on this
topic in just about every issue of the papers. "''^
In the Davis Pierre genre, Androcles of the Freedom
Party called on the police to stop the imported revolu-
tionaries. The peace of the community, he argued, could
not be allowed to be disturbed by persons "indoctrinated
in undesirable, or at best, irrelevant philosophy (Black
^^The 1968 Seditious and Undesirable Publications
Act was a move to prevent any and all anti-Government pub-
lications.
^^Dominica Herald, April 15, 1969, p. 2.
^"^It is ironic that such an ardent "exponent" of
Black Power, Davis Pierre, refused to fill out a question-
naire for this writer, which dealt with Black Power.
;re
.m
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18Power).
^. I. ,e .new anything about Black protest, he
would have known that Black Power is not an import to the
Caribbean. History has shown that West Indians have been
forced out of the West Indies to carry on their protest.
They have been forced out because the Caribbean is so small
and so poor that a true revolutionary cannot remain the:
and survive. The authorities can effectively starve hi,
literally by not giving him a job. And besides, he cannot
become anonymous because the place is too small. He is
forced out and returns periodically to let the authorities
know that he is still around to rouse them from their
complacency. It is this going and coming which drives the
reactionaries to believe that Caribbean revolutionaries
are imports. But notice Androcles' quick desire to have
the police enter the contest. This is the chief ideologue
of no less a party than the Freedom Party. The Government
seems to be right when it says that freedom has no meaning
19in Dominica.
In May, 1969, a columnist for the Dominican
Chronicle
, quite appropriately named Peter Simple, con-
demned Black Power since it was too radical and destructive,
It was his contention that the Movement started in the
18
The Star
,
July 7, 1972, p. 1.
19The Educator
,
July 28, 1971, p. 2.
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united States and it must be rejected in Dominica. In his
simplicity, he stated that most West Indians do not accept
Black Peer because "they know that Whites are more ad-
vanced than Blacks." But the main reason for rejecting
the Movement is:
l^tl "i^lt ^^^^^^2 ^ie^ its leaders with suspicion
T^f^^^v."^^?
staunch advocates seem to be people ii?hlittle background.
. .or of no well-developed sta-ture m society and thus have absolutely nothingto lose If there was any radical change in our pre-sent socio-economic structure. What those B.P.fanatics must realize is that many West Indian BlacksWhites, but mostly Browns have worked hard.
. .tocarve out a future for themselves and children.
This was a frightened man writing. He was deter-
mined to preserve the status quo. He was begging people
to come to his aid. But more importantly, Simple, himself
a member of the propertied class, saw no contradiction in
the society. He was not moved to give the lower class ele
ments a better chance in the system.
The 1970 election year-politics-press-Black Power
.
By 1970 the press was noticeably changing its attitude
toward the Movement. Both political parties were trying to
make some gains against each other by using the Movement.
This is somewhat strange as the Movement was not that power-
ful to hold the balance of power between the two parties.
In October, 1969, the Premier made a speech in his
district and attacked the Church for portraying all its
saints as being white, while the devil was black. The
Herald, the Opposition's paper, came out with a headline
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Which read:
'.LeBlanc Ma.es Blac. Power Speech.-^O
.^^^
this accusation did not produce the desired end, the
Freedom Party, headed by Edward Scobie, started to speak
Black Power. He began talking about his problems as a
black man in white Britain, and portraying his party as
sympathetic to the Movement. Once again, the Opposition
had been drawn into a controversy with the ruling party.
This demonstrates that Edward LeBlanc was able to condition
the Opposition, to take it on head-on and defeat it. But
as the 1970 elections approached, both parties tried to
include the Movement into their respective parties. The
Labor Party tried to co-opt it since it had criticized the
Freedomites for allowing two "outsiders" to contest the
general election. At the same time, the Freedomites
thought that the Movement was on its side since it was
using the same symbol as itself.
The post
-election period of 1970
. The elections
21
over; both parties returned to character and tried to
undo the Movement. But 1972 saw the publication of a
series of articles explaining the "real meaning" of the
Movement. Of course, the exponents were self-made experts
20Dominica Herald
,
April 26, 1969, p. 1.
21The Labor Party won seven seats, the Freedom
Party two and Independent numbered one.
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Who did not belong to the «ove.ent. The fi.st of the
articles ™ade its appearance in June 1972. and its author
ventured
.o give "an objective analysis of Black Power in
Dominica. To him, Black Power ™eant that the black
.an
had the potential to look after his own affairs. This is
confusing; either the black .an can .anage his affairs now
but has never been allowed to do that, or, the black
cannot manage his affairs now, but in time will be able to
do it. The writer contended that the concept had relevance
in Dominica since black Dominicans do not control their
economy now. He concluded, quite characteristically, that
violence is not the answer since alternative means can be
used to achieve power.
His analysis is not strong enough. It does not
touch on the vital issues of discriminating justice, the
widespread inequalities based solely on one's name and
place of origin. It fails to see that meaningful change
will come about only when the political elites can com-
municate with each other in the interests of the masses.
Things will change when the politicians can keep away from
devious means to stay in power. But to expect these
changes in Dominica is to expect tomorrow not to come.
There must be massive destruction of person, property, and
all the rest to achieve any meaningful change. The leaders
Dominica Chronicle
,
June 17, 1972, p. 3.
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are too secure and ably supported by the business elements
to give up their life styles to satisfy the "lazy" Domini-
can. Bur the lazy Dominican has nothing to lose but time,
and that he has a lot of. „o„ long can it lastj He might
just come in the morning:
Another one of those "objective" analyses came from
Rupert Sorhaindo, an important member of the Freedom Party.
He alerted the Movement to the big problem of "after the
revolution." He lamented the fact that revolutionaries
concentrated on breaking down existing systems too much.
They ignored in the process what they would do after power
was acquired. Sorhaindo then cited examples of past
instances where failure was inevitable since no thought
was given to this all important problem. He is very am-
bivalent. He is against the present system and on many
occasions has been highly critical of it, at the same time
he does not understand that nothing short of violence will
change the existing structure. In his naivete, he believes
that a simple change of personnel will bring the desired
change in the society. He fails to realize that Dominican
society had created the men who run it and they will do
anything to keep it as it is. Thus, the urgency of the
situation and the slim possibility of success negate any
precise planning about the future. The future is just too
far away in time to consider it. And besides, the future
will plan itself since the Movement has no blueprint as
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such to hand to the n*=>oni^n people. The people have first to
_
made aware and then they can partake in th. m •t^ciLt ice m e planning pro-
cess. History has shown that those who have succeeded at
a genuine revolution have always been able to muster their
own resources to lead. The fact remains, planning the
revolution and executing it become more urgent. Besides,
since Sorhaindo has raised that fundamental point and Js
shown a commitment to changing the personnel in the govern-
ment and not the system, it behooves him to worry about the
aftermath of the revolution. if he and others like him are
afraid of the revolution, they should quickly take over the
reins of Government to demonstrate to the Black Power Move-
ment that exchange is better than revolutionary change.
In the final analysis, all four papers at one time
or another have tried to show that the Movement is a fraud.
Ihs. Hecfll^ accused its leaders of intellectual dishonesty.
Then it showed that people in Dominica have never ignored
Black Power. They have tried to analyze it from the point
of view of black consciousness. The Chronicle has given
the Movement its share of criticism and although not using
those specific terms, accused it of being dishonest. The
paper demanded of its leaders that they reveal their true
intentions and present themselves to the electorate. Of
Dominica Herald
,
July 29, 1972, p. 5.
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Movement. At present, the Movement is not interested in
party politics. At a future da.e, it .ay have to present
itself to the people at the polls, but this ti™e is a long
way Off. Since the people do not sufficiently understand
the Movement now. When the people realize that what the
Movement has been talUnr, =k„,,4- iKing about. is true, the Movement will
be ready for the polls.
Finally, The Educator, the Governmenfs paper, has
Shown itself to be both irresponsible and ambivalent. On
one occasion it can carry a story depicting the achievements
of Blacks in all fields to taunt the "lazy" Black Power
24advocate, while on another occasion it reported in an
irresponsible way that a white man had kicked a black boy
at a racially tense school. Probably in an effort to
ingratiate itself with the Black Power elements, it saw
fit to make headlines with this incident. Since the Move-
ment was not properly organized at the time, rioting did
not bjteak out. Such has been the relationship between the
press and the Black Power Movement, though increasingly
the sole radio station in Dominica has begun to be receptive
to the Movement. This is because the Movement does not
carry the name of Black Power any more, is better organized,
24The Educator
,
August 11, 1971, p. 4.
^^Ibid.
,
May 3, 1972, p. 3.
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and has produced so.e ^eaning.ul results over the past yea.
The results are assessed in the conclusion o. the chapter.
'
The Movement and the Studf^nfc
in Dominica, it is very difficult to make a dis-
tinction between the Black Power Movement and the High
school students, especially those from St. Mary-s Academy,
the leading Catholic school. To be sure the students have
their own organization but they are very much part of the
overall movement. St. Mary's Academy students have highly
influenced their contemporaries at the Dominica Grammar
School (public High school) and the Convent High School
(Catholic girls school
- private), and have been at the
forefront of the Movement. But the great majority of
students in Dominica is not involved in the Movement.
There are various explanations for this: they are still
very young and are controlled by their parents. Moreover,
the school authorities together with the Government have
acted as an effective deterrent against their "revolutionary"
zeal. The few who are involved have to be reckoned with and
cannot be taken too lightly. The authorities realize that
and have had them under constant surveillance. But by and
large, the revolutionary drive of students is short-lived.
Once they are faced with the crude reality that they need
jobs to survive, the picture changes drastically. The
situation is even more critical and urgent for the Dominican
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High school graduate because jobs get fewer every day.
Protest at the High School level is not really new
in Dorpinica. Students before did have their own form of
protest but they were effectively dealt with. This new
group of students has only been a little more vocal and
has established greater contact with their seniors who have
travelled abroad. The students- now act as lieutenants to
these revolutionaries who, for one reason or other, are
unable to remain in Dominica. The students are a good
stand-in because at the time of service they are not con-
strained by the harsh reality of having to support them-
selves. Besides, they have enough time to devote to
"revolutionary" work. They can organize the young unem-
ployed and others to get ready for the rebellion.
By the late 1960 's and early 1970 's, Dominican High
School students were made aware of the blatant disparities
which existed in the society. And on a very simple level,
they even began to question their own ascribed status in
the society. In fact, five of them together with Hilroy
Thomas formed the first organized Black Power Movement in
26Dominica. This movement began emphasizing the cultural
aspect of the struggle by insisting on the wearing Afro-
hairdo and dashikis. Then the fashion spread to the student
Flambeau
,
October, 1970.
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population as others fro. the outside helped in bringing
in the style. The students began to be led and misled by
"outsiders... They began to use slogans, such as the
"domination by the bourgeosie," which they did not under-
stand. They were effectively propagandized and keyed-up
and then left alone to fight their own battles with their
superiors at the school and at home. But after spending
so much energy on useless encounters, the students could
not point to one significant achievement, though by then
they were feared.
Their actions were seen simply as rebellious
»
One erudite observer explained it this way: secondary
education was no longer the preserve of the upper class
and that had brought an integration of youth of different
backgrounds. He continued, "There is, in other words, a
unified mind among youth and a breakdown of the old class
barriers nurtured by a system handed down from the old
colonial masters and which most parents.
. .are loathe to
27break away from." Of course, his analysis of the situa-
tion is wrong, as the number of students involved in the
Movement is no more than twenty-five at the most out a
possible total of some nine hundred. Of the twenty-five
in the Movement, probably ten really understand and are
Pat Pierre, "Why is Youth Rebelling?" The Dominica
Chronicle
,
August 5, 1972, p. 7.
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comr^itted to the philosophy of Black Power, though at
present, understanding of the concept is spreading to all
elements of the society.
The Academy affair
- the moveiDent and the student^. .
The role of the High School students in the Movement can
best be explained through an analysis of the Academy affair.
St. Mary's Academy is a secondary school in the capital of
Dominica with an enrollment of some four hundred boys. In
its present form it was staffed by a group of missionaries
first from the United States and then from Canada. Under
the first set of missionaries, the school had grown in
number of students as it produced good results in the
final examinations which were graded in Britain. But over
the years, it had been poorly administered as the principal
was changed every three years. The important point to
remember was that discipline had deteriorated as recent
principals did not live up to the standards of the past.
But the last principal was determined to bring back the
school to normal again by tightening up on discipline.
He had become principal after having spent some time in the
school just as one within the ranks. But his drive to
shake up the school was ill-timed. It was then that the
Black Power Movement was taking a hold in Dominica, and
that the students began seeing everything white as anti-
black.
At the same school, the Black Power leader had been
dismissed and the students had not forgotten it. Pro.
this fateful day on. a handful of students began to ask
for a greater say in the running of the school. At the
sa^e time, they were having frequent meetings with
.embers
of the Movement on the outside. Had they not been sus-
tained by these outside leaders, they would have gotten
nowhere.
Still, the confrontation with the school authorit
could have been handled peacefully. The students would
have lost but the new principal, who had made it to the
top through devious means, was to be stern and inflexible.
He committed a great error by being drawn into the contro-
versy of the warring political parties. His allowing the
bourgeois elements to give advice as to the running of the
school was responsible for his downfall. He believed that
the Government was behind the students in the former's
attempts to end the Church supremacy in education.
In its characteristic erratic behavior, the Govern-
ment became involved. For example, when a group of stu-
dents were turned down by the Principal for a hearing, they
brought their complaint directly to the Head of State.
They were right to do this because it was intolerable to
have a secondary school in a small country like Dominica
with no supervision from the national Government. The
Principal of the Academy saw the reception afforded the
students as the Government's intention to interfere in the
les
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running of the school.
.o doubt the Government wanted to
get into the act because LeBlanc had always been anti-
Catholic, secondly, the Principal had already involved
the Opposition, by using its leader, Miss Charles, as
legal counsel to the school. Knowing the nature of poli-
tics in countries like Dominica, where every politician
wants to be recognized. Miss Charles was a poor choice.
But her selection as legal advisor was no surprise as the
Principal had always shown himself to be a great friend of
the elite. And when this writer questioned him on that
matter, he responded that his job was to take from the
rich to give to the poor. In this writer's opinion, his
shortcomings were just too many to be made principal at
that critical time but his superiors in the United States
appointed him. Even as an ordinary member of the staff,
he always had his few favorites with whom he communicated.
On becoming Principal, this same pattern was continued which
only lowered his own credibility. Had he been more tactful,
the events which precipitated the closure of the school
would have been averted.
The organized few
. The crisis at the Academy seemed
to have spurred a few Academy students to form a group they
called Student Movement Against Oppression. They put out
a two-page mimeo to explain their side of the story as
opposed to the authorities side* In short, they refuted
the charge that they were determined to destroy the school.
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That would be fool i cv. 4-uish, they argued, since that would mean
their own destruction. ^8 Subsequently, they produced two
periodicals. m both they have f.und it necessary to re^-
iterate their position; they say:
"Our basic aims are:
the"sta?e!..'''' '° ^"""^ ^^^^^
How will they educate the masses.
. .?
(a) the publication of a youth magazine(b) organize debates.
. .
(c) identifying ourselves with the masses(d) help the youth in education
On unifying youth they propose:
(a) infiltrate youth organizations.
. ,(b) substitute cooperation for hostile competition(c) be a moral example
(d) change values toward manual work
(e) agitate for educational reform29
Quite characteristically, the manifesto ends with a number
of quotations of Mao, Forbes Burnham, Prime Minister of
Guyana, probably for the effect of engendering commitment
and enthusiasm. But the group has not said how it plans
to identify with the masses and how it wanted to achieve
the rest. Not one of the programs outlined has been given
serious consideration. Besides, these are not only im-
practical but are full of deceit. This group has proven
itself unable to live up to expectations. It is very much
part of the ongoing order, wears Afros to be part of the
Student Speaks
,
August, 1972, p. 1#
Ibid.
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area, but looks down on the rural elements.
number of its students attending the University of the
West Indies. Thev ar^. i.-^^ ,r.n y e like the High School students in
their
'.co..it.ent^. to change. They were in the larger is-
lands When developments were taking place. When they
returned to Dominica, they took it upon themselves to pass
on the newly seen light to the masses. But they lacked
the commitment to immerse themselves into the people's
struggle because they had too much to lose. They are the
sons and daughters of the people who now run the establish-
ment. Thus, only a few among their number have been able
to "expose" the inequalities of Dominican society. And
even they are suspect.
The university students from Dominica do not have
an organized group. They have limited themselves to sign-
ing petitions which they do not hope to stand by. Their
June 1972 manifesto showed their stand with the masses.
Among the many things outlined in it, the individuals
"committed themselves to working only in areas where they
could benefit the masses." They were also committed to
fight the bourgeoisie and the Church.
30
"Our Stand with the Masses," The Star, June 30,
1972, p. 5.
241
They are still at the university; they must be
given a chance to prove themselves one way or the other.
But if their past actions are an indication of future be-
havior, they may as well settle down and accept their
position in life and forget the masses, m the past, they
have shown themselves to be very hypocritical and inept.
They may just provide the editor of The Herald with enough
examples of intellectual dishonesty. At the same time, it
cannot be expected that all students will become revolution-
aries. It is one thing to be very progressive while still
at school, but it is another when one is faced with the
reality of physically immersing oneself into the daily
struggle.
The Movement and the Polity
Attention will now be focussed on the relation of
the Movement with the masses, the bureaucrats and business
elements of the society. The strange relationship which
exists between these elements and the Movement is not sur-
prising. Black Power advocates are have-nots with nothing
to lose but to keep frightening the masses and the "haves."
In the process, the Movement has been hurt by many factors.
In the first place, it is not united and has not been able
to expose its ideas clearly. Such is not possible as
several factions have to be satisfied. Vaguely, the Move-
ment is for the betterment of all Dominicans. This has not
been carried across too well. The Movement is further
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Plagued by the fact that its leaders do not trust each
other completely. But these dangers and impediments can
be corrected.
The Movement and the bur..,,..,..
^he Dominican
bureaucracy is a strange mixture of people, its composition
and pecularities have been discussed in Chapters Two and
Three. The bureaucrats, although very dark in complexion,
are now even more frightened by the Movement. They are
afraid that a new idea will penetrate their heads and are
determined to keep the younger elements of the society in
their places. They will do everything to crush any per-
ceived enemy.
To test their reaction to the Movement, they were
asked by this writer, "What does Black Power stand for in
Dominica?" They were next asked,. "What are the contributions
of the Movement to the island? Responses to the above
questions were negative. They were convinced that the
Movement was hurting Dominica. Then without being asked,
many of them outlined what Black Power should mean. But on
31This leads back to the original definition of
Black Power in Dominica. The Movement does not consider the
elites of the bureaucracy as being Black, since the latter
have not shown their commitment to uplifting the poorer
elementc of the society. The Movement applies the concept
of "Black Skin White Mask" of Franz Fanon to the bureaucrats.
32This writer is convinced that the two bureaucrats
who gave "favorable" responses to the above questions were
not being honest. They had been members of the Movement,
but when they had learned enough about its activities, they
left it to inform members of the Government about the
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close examination, their "shoniH^.,
,
^n ulds" and what the Movement
stands for are almost identical. They
.oth spea. about
the uplifting Of the blac. man by providing more and better
services. On the h;::i<5icn basis of answers to the question, "What
does Black Power ™ean in Don,inica7" the following could be
discerned fro. the responses of the forty-five bureaucrats
:
Figure Vlli The Meaning of Black Power as Perceivedby forty-five bureaucrats.
^^^^er Percentage
Favorable 2
Violence 21
Ant i
-White lo
Take from White
for Black lo
No response 3 g^g
4.4
45.0
22.0
22.0
The response, though revealing, is not surprising.
This is an indication that the great majority of bureaucrats
do not like the Dominican brand of Black Power while only a
few were favorably disposed to it. Even this 4.5% favorable
response becomes suspect since the respondents were formerly
part of the Movement. They also knew that this writer was
aware of their previous affiliations, so for this reason,
they felt obligated to give a favorable response. There
were a few who chose not to answer the question on Black
Movement's activities and strategies. This explains why
why in the final analysis, their responses were considered
negative.
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Power since they were afraid to let their tr„. ^ , •x u n ue feelings be
^nown. This demonstrates that bureaucrats in developing
areas a.e often pressured on all sides. They are constantly
presented with a situation where their principles are
tested and many times they give in rather than fight.
Thejtovement and the mass... The assessment here
is very impressionistic, though the conclusions drawn are
fairly accurate. The people can be divided into two groups,
the urban and the rural. The rural elements seem to be
more politically conscious than the urban masses because
the former are more able to see contradictions in society.
The politically conscious in the rural area can see that
the politicians spend much of their time in the urban area.
But the rural few who are aware of these disparities are
not numerous enough to turn down the politicians at the
polls. In spite of their small number, they are larger
than the few urban people who see the same pressing problems.
The masses in Dominica are never asked for their
opinion. It is just assumed that they will accept programs
without questioning them, although the immediate urge in
the people is to become "better." And to be better in
Dominica means to be like the upper rich class and not to
disturb them. The masses have become convinced that the
rich had to work hard for what they have got. They do not
see this class as exploiters. These naive and simple
people have not felt the squeeze that the Black Power
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advocates are talking about. The world of the masses is
very narrow. if they want a good Job for their children
which they all do, they will seek a recommendation from a
member of the upper class. The person writing the recom-
mendation may not even know the candidate being referred,
but Dominica still talks about opportunity for all on the
basis of merit. The picture is fairly clear that the
masses of Dominica want to be like the upper class people
and will always support them.
The following encounter with a man of about forty-
five reveals how the people think. He was asked to explain
his position on Black Power. He was very critical of the
Movement and went on to talk about their many senseless
acts. He could not cite anything good about the Movement.
His position is quite understandable when one considers
his life story. He had worked all his life in a thirty-
dollar-a-week job. He once lived in a shack and was now
living in his own well-built home. He recounted his
troubles to this writer and concluded that during the time
of his problems no one ventured to assist him. He was
even opposed to the idea that it was the duty of the Govern-
ment to either provide decent jobs to earn enough to build
a home or provide such homes to people like him. He was
particularly critical of his neighbors because they did not
like him for having uplifted himself. But he seems to be
blaming the wrong people.
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His neighbors are no Black Power advocates. They
are all members of a small society which is always enmeshed
in petty jealousies and bickerings. The neighbors are
equally hostile to the Black Power Movement. Besides, the
Movement could not have helped that man because it did not
have the means. The Movement cannot even help itself, far
less help others.
By and large, the masses hate the Movement intensely
because they do not understand it. They cannot understand
that their miserable lives did not have to be the way they
are. They are simple people, with simple aspirations and
do not want any trouble. The masses have been placed in a
position of dependence vis-a-vis the wielders of power in
the society. They do not not want to upset the situation.
The Movement, the church and education , '^en the
Movement speaks about the Roman Catholic Church, it is
referring to the hierarchy. it does not include members
of the Church, estimated at 95% in Dominica. This is a
correct assessment since all decisions in the Church are
taken by the hierarchy, composed of the priests and one
bishop, with a few chosen laymen from the upper class. In
other words, the Church has lived up to its tradition by
leaving out the laity in decision-making processes.
The Church is closely related to education. While
the Government administered the colony, the Church ran the
schools. In fact, in 1836, it started the first secondary
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school and at one point owned every primary school building
Today, it runs the only secondary school for girls, one of
the two secondary schools for boys, the largest and best
primary school in the island, and two other primary schools
separate villages. It was the first to introduce tech-
nical and vocational training and still runs the only
placement service for school graduates, m addition, it
erected, with outside help, the first day care centers
and pre-school programs. All these achievements were made
with little or no help from the Government. m fact, there
have been instances where some primary school teachers have
had to be paid by the Church itself, although the Government
was committed to pay the salaries.
In the area of social services, the achievements
of the Church have been equally impressive. It has pro-
vided training for many in the health field. Doctors
sponsored by it have spent years in the public hospital.
Nurses from the United States have been brought down by it
to help alleviate the shortage in Dominica. It has under-
taken to distribute free food provided by outside agencies.
It has provided gainful employment to young girls by es-
tablishing an industrial school to produce rugs and local
shirts. Through its youth organizations, the Young
Christian Students and Workers, it was able to instill
a sense of responsibility in many young men and women.
These young people now staff the bureaucracy and other
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private organizations
. Also through these organizations
many individuals were ;.hi ^ ^ *able to receive scholarships to pur-sue leadership training courses in r ^y o m Canada and returned tc
Dominica to be of ^c^r-^r^r-^O se vice to the people. Above all, the
Church brought the Cooperative Credit Union to Oo.inica.
This union has been able to .eep Dominica's money in
Dominica. It has taught the Dominican that with a little
help, he is able to help himself and lead a better life.
Thus, to say that the Church has not done anything
is to be uncharitable and irresponsible. Even the politi-
cians agree that the Church has helped Dominica. But
everyone is disturbed, for different reasons of course,
about the overemphasis the Church has laid on damnation.
Edward LeBlanc, no friend of the Church, has seen this
emphasis as using the superstitious tradition in Dominican
society to force the people into submission. But why
should the Church want to force that submission. LeBlanc
and others like him were unable to give a satisfactory
answer. This writer agrees that the Church has always
wanted to force submission but he has been unable to
discern precisely why this is the case. One can only guess
that the Church wants submission to assert its superiority
33The list of those who got their first professionalpush" from the Catholic Young Christian Workers Movement isimpressive. The few named here are representative: Charles
Maynard, Havis Shi 1 1 ingford , M.C. Doctrove, Gifford Dorval,
Robert St. John, LeRoy Mitchell, Barnett Defoe, Henry John.
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and to get the job done very quickly.
Thus, in spite of the impressive record, the
Dominican Church has not beco.e a friend of the people.
It has kept its distance. This is reflected in the few
native Dominicans who have been accepted into its ranks,
though it keeps talking about the desire to have more native
priests. one can only sur.ise that the priests of Dominica
do not consider the native their egual. This also holds
true for the priests who man the rural districts and who
are from 'a different order than the ones in the urban area.
They look at the natives with contempt. To them, the
natives cannot measure up to the desired standard.
For these reasons, the Movement and the Church
have been at odds. The Movement is convinced that the
Church cannot act in any fashion other than in concert with
the elite to maintain the status qu^.. And it is also true
that the Church has always been a follower rather than an
initiator of meaningful change. Throughout its history,
it has hardly ever tampered with the society in which it
is found. It is only in rare cases where it stands to
gain that it has taken a controversial stand, and then often
only by the "defrocked" priest who does not represent the
viewpoint of the Church. Ironically, the Church is one of
those few organizations v/hich has the greatest chance to
forcefully speak out against injustice. In the first place,
its mission is to do ju-t that. Secondly, it does not
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ves
depend on any Government for its livelihood, its directi
co.e fro. Rome and whenever its priests are expelled, the
Holy Fatner is prepared to welcome them. Even the perse-
cuted native priests have on occasion taken advantage of
this warm abode. Thus, one might be inclined to agree with
the Movement that the Church has Joined the conspiracy to
stifle the aspirations of the powerless in Dominica. This
comes in an era when the Head of State, E.O. LeBlanc, has
consistently accused the Church of being the number one
enemy of the people. He has said on occasion that once the
Church keeps insisting that the "devil is black and St.
Michael White, it will be difficult for us (black Dominicans)
to make the sort of progress to show that we, too, have a
claim to heaven. And if that is any consolation, the
heir apparent to LeBlanc's job, Patrick John, has condemned
the Church for not providing more for the masses since it
35pays no taxes.
The Movement has taken the position that arguing
whether God exists or not becomes meaningless as long as
people are stil hungry and homeless. Further, the idea
that Dominica is 95% Catholic does not shed light on the
poor quality of life. If Christianity can bring about a
better life to the common man, then it becomes relevant.
34Dominica Herald, April 25, 1959, p. 1.
^^Interview with Ronald Green in Dominica, January
10, 1973.
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But in Dcinica the Church has shown itself to he so.ewhat
reactionary. And though on the surface the politician
and Church see. to be fighting each other, in reality the
two are working toward the sa.e end. They both do not want
trouble. instead of .aking earthly promises as the politi-
cians do, the Church speaks about the coming after life.
While on earth, the sinner must pray, the Dominican is told.
He must suffer now to be happy later. Does it follow that
the priests are having their good life now and will have
their hell later? This question must be raised since there
is no indication of suffering on the part of the priests.
They live in the best houses and are well fed. They have
no daily cares about sustenance since it is provided for.
Their cares on earth are minimal, at least on the surface.
The Church has done a lot for the people but very
little with them. it has preached about the unpredictable
after life but has refused to consider seriously the pre-
sent which has more than its share of tribulations. Its
company has been privileged class and in the process has
made that class feel superior to the lower class. With
its emphasis on pomp and pageantry, the Church has been
served by the people and has not served the people. By its
silence, it condoned the dehumanizing practices of the
upper class against the poor. It has acquired property
and on a few occasions has forcefully evicted Dominicans
from its premises when they were unable to pay rent. But
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more tragically, its shortcomings have heen brought out in
the open by the poor quality or personnel who manned its
posts, on many occasions, the priests were poor examples
to the people. Some too. to drinking, while other pursued
other activities which were not in keeping with their own
principles. But the greatest harm the Church committed was
to continue and reinforce the discrimination begun by
colonialism. it weakened the people, who were unable to
"lift themselves up by their bootstraps
. The people had
no other choice but to feel inferior, to feel that they
were nothing and will always remain nothing. This contempt
for the masses can be documented in many ways, but the
best was the attitude of those priests who during their
weekly confessional sessions openly chastized the natives.
The Movement on education- Every time the subject
of education has been brought up in this study, the story
has been the same. It is in a dismal state. Curriculum
development is non-existent. There is hardly a curriculum
for any course, the teacher is simply handed a text and
directed to teach. Education for the most part takes the
form of memorization and repetition in order to write an
examination, graded in Britain. The exact nature of the
system has been treated in Chapter Three. But it is
interesting to note that in spite of the overwhelming
failure of the system no effort has been made to change it.
Failure here is measured in terms of the number of people
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Who write examinations and the nu.he. who are successful.
The following chart shows the situation in select,
it needs no further explanation.
Figure IX
. Numbe
;ed subjects
r of Students who Wrote and PassedSelected Subjects. M
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971
ij^i re /'Wis
English
language 99 51 88 55 124 40 119 80 120 75 156 103
English
litera-
ture 53 29 50 27 81 64 67 58 52 22 94 60
Mathe-
matics 50 23 35 21 91 54 96 59 87 46 100 41
Physics* None 8 4 12 5 10 5 20 9 22 13
• All Males
Source: Dominica The Statistical Division, Department ofDevelopment, Annual Statistical Digest No, 4
197_2, Roseau, Dominica. Table 32.
Change cannot be initiated by Dominica alone since
the Dominica system is part of a broader system which in-
cludes the entire British Caribbean. If Dominica were to
change its system completely, there is no guarantee that
other islands would either change or even respect Dominica's
move. That is something the Movement which has talked about
change, has not fully understood yet. Change is easy to
talk about; the Movement can even speak about phasing out
secondary education to replace it with technical education.
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These are good ideas and even desirable but will hurt
Dominica. The change would call for a change on the
regional level. it would mean that Dominican students
would not be able to attend the University of the West
indies. in itself this would not be a bad idea since that
archaic institution does more harm than good to the Domini-
can graduates. it generally makes him feel superior to
other Dominicans. But severing relations with that uni-
versity would entail imposing a restriction on the indivi-
dual who may still want to attend it. To compound this
issue, Dominica cannot afford a university of its own. It
cannot even afford a good secondary school which could pro-
duce "desired" results. Clearly, should Dominica move to
change the system drastically it will be at a decisive
disadvantage vis-a-vis the other islands of the Caribbean.
This change the Movement speaks about must be regional.
On another level, the Movement's view on education
is not so radical. Many of the issues it talks about have
been raised by the politicians before, but they have have
done nothing about them for obvious reasons. The Movement
is dissatisfied with the expensive nature of education.
This precludes massive education with the rural areas
receiving the least attention. The peasants, by their
labor, are the ones who sustain education but are forced
to send their children to the main town to get a secondary
education. Because of the costly nature of this undertaking,
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the great
.ajo.lty of the peasants- children never finish
high school. The injustices of the situation can be de-
..onstrated by the following figures. They show the density
Of population in the .ain town vis-a-vis three districts.
Figure X. ^°st Populous Districts and Number ofSecondary Schools.
Location
Roseau
St, Andrew
St. David
St. Patrick
No. of citizens No. of secondary school:
20,114
11,998
6,709
10,085
4
None
None
None
The Movement has also shown concern over the con-
tent of education generally. It contends that it is too
white oriented and almost totally irrelevant, since the
purpose of education is to build and preserve a desired
society. Therefore, since Dominican society is an appen-
dage to white society, it stands to reason that the content
of education will be geared to maintaining and preserving
what was introduced. Further, since education is an import,
it will always reflect the biases of the designer of that
system.
The Movement seems to be too presumptuous on this
point. It is giving credit where it is clearly not due.
The British gave direction to education but never left a
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concrete plan. The present pX.n for education see.s to
be an oral one. Those who received fne plan, observation
for the .ost part, have endeavored to continue to stic. to
it as best as they can re.e.ber. But when all is said and
done, the Government does not see. to have any definite
Plans for the educational syste. other than their perennial
empty assertion that Government seeks by "an intensive
program.
.
.to provide free education. " ^6 Quantity is the
first priority and not quality, according to this one
sentence plan.
The desired new look in educ.tinn. The Movement
wants the people to be made aware of the usefulness of the
land and move away from unproductive work in the bureau-
cracy. It wants to draw a distinction between certification
and education. The certified students must be made aware
to stop looking down on the peasant. The new Dominican
must know the history of the struggle of his black brothers.^'
In dealing with examples to illustrate a point, efforts
must be made to use relevant examples. For example, instead
of having a problem in mathematics which deals with a train
leaving one point and arriving at another in Britain, it
should be stated, according to the Movement, thus:
36The Educator
,
September 29, 1971, p. 12.
37Caribbean Rebellion
,
Dominica, p. 24.
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thirty'^ii: ^rAlTna'Tt '° ^ ^-^-ce of
because the roads arl bad ^''^^
on account of landslides 'how T^^'.^ ^t°Pbus to reach Roseau. -38'' ^^""^ take that
This is a more meaningful example, asserts the
Movement. it makes the young Dominican question everything.
It will make him ask how is it that the road get blocked so
easily. it will change his attitude toward the Government
Which seems to be doing so much, while in fact only a few
programs have been successfully completed.
But the most distressing aspect of the educational
system, according to the Movement, is the rapid realization
that the British have effectively conditioned the Dominican
to feel that everything white is superior. The Movement
states its position succintly: "We are like dummies being
brainwashed for the ultimate benefit of the white boy and
preserving the upper class dominance in Dominica. " What
is being argued here is the fact that the British have in-
culcated such high standards which often are irrelevant in
the Dominican context that standards become an end. The
only way out of this situation, asserts the Movement, is
by completely destroying the whole system—but how?
Ibid., p. 25
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Conclusion
The Black Power Movement is not the strongest
interest group vis-a-vis the political n.r-^^parties in Dominica.
But it is the only group which has been able to openly
Challenge the power structure while all other groups work
together with the Government. The group is still very
weak since it does not have a sufficient supply of able
leaders. This is due to the fact that anyone who challenges
the existing system has been forced out of Dominica. Such
leaders cannot remain becauce they have to find some means
Of livelihood. The few who remain have not shown them-
selves "radical" enough to be forced out yet. Further,
the Movement has been plagued by the many splinter groups
which developed as leaders disagreed on tactics. Some
leaders believed in giving public lectures to educate the
people. Others felt the era for this was over. it was now
time for action. But the major stumbling block to the
Movement is its low membership, which might not be all bad.
Few members can be more easily controlled and directed.
At the end of 1972, the group had decided to make
a concerted effort to change its image and become more
unified and constructive. By then, three able leaders
were permanently residing in Dominica; they reorganized
the Movement and changed the name from Black Power to the
Movement for a New Dominica. Secondly, they have established
five task forces to tackle the problems of Dominica. The
une.plov.ent tas. fo.ce attempts to fina out who is unem-
ployed and to pxace the. in appropriate jobs. The politi-
cal education division tries to inculcate a sense of Domini-
can history in the people. The Co^unication Co^ittee
tries to bridge the gap between Roseau, the capital, and
the rural areas. Two task forces deal with publication
and fund raising.
This is a good beginning. if the dynainism of the
Movement continues
.any changes will result. The Movement
will increase its credibility with the r^asses. It will
demonstrate that it is not all talk but can do things with
the people. But its major problem seems to be its heavy
emphasis on Roseau where all task forces are situated.
If the Movement could physically move away from the major
town, it could obtain better and faster results. For one
thing, the Government could be caught more unawares. The
Movement would be working to undermine the Government
without causing any great stir. That is precisely why
Government response to these programs has been favorable.
The Government does not understand the implications of
political education. it has never tried and will probably
never try it on its own behalf.
The Movement seems to be on the right track. And
even though the Government is still amazed at the Movement's
commitment to destroy the present society, the Government
has allowed it to operate. The Government has allowed
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-
Ha.io station., to usea to e.p....
,,3,,,„„
the „ove.ent. But it „ust e.p.asi.e. again t.at t.e
Oove.n.ent is no
..iena o. the Movement an. aoes not
.eaXi,
un.e.stana the implications o. its actions, eve.ytnin,
.oes acco..in, to pXan. t.e Movement could produce tremen-
dous results at the expense o. .any other more powerful
interests in the Dominican political system.
in the final analysis, the Movement may be accused
Of proposing only incremental change. It would probably
answer that incremental changes are only feasible presently.
It .s only When the masses of Dominica have become conscious
that they will ,ise up and get all that they deserve. The
people are just not yet ready for immediate revolution.
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CHAPTER VI
FEDERATIONS IN THE BRITISH WEST INDIES
Introduction
This case study has treated Do.inica as a complete
political system, although it was emphasized that the system
was affected by other political systems. it is true that
Dominica should be treated as an entity on to itself. But
Since 1932 there has been a Caribbean regional feeling
Which has affected its political system. Thus the purpose
Of this chapter is to analyze the two major attempts at
federation in the West Indies.
The chapter begins with a brief discussion of the
meaning of federation, and why territories decide on form-
ing a federation. it leads to a discussion of the specific
situation in the British West Indies. Throughout, the
Dominican political system is treated as a subsystem of
a larger entity, the British West Indies.
Definition and Reasons for Federating
A definition and reasons for a federation pose
problems. It is generally accepted that a federalized state
is "one in which the several units and their respective
powers are constitutionally or otherwise legally united under
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the ultimate powers of a central 4- .^^^ state and government."^
secession for any one participating unit is virtually outOf the question. This is ensure, in some federations
the fact that the participating units retain some power!
Which they can apply to the same people regulated by the
federated state. At the beginning of such unions, it
could be problematic to draw with precision the sphere
Of influence of each unit vis-a-vis the union. But with
time, such demarcation could become clearer. The balance
between the central unit and the separate units usually
decides the success or failure of the union.
But the question is why do people join in federa-
tions? The answer is because they see more to be had from
that enterprise than remaining as separate units. William
Riker argues that federations are set up because they pro-
vide a wonderful opportunity to acquire territory without
the use of force. He states further that federations
occur to ready a government for some military-diplomatic
threat or opportunity.^
Frank Trager adds that the economic motive and the
cultural tradition of a number of states are driving forces
"'"Frank Trager,
''On Federalism," Wh^ Federations
Fail, ed. by Thomas Franck, (New York: New York University
Press, 1968), p. X
2William Riker, Federalism: Origin
,
Operation
,
Significance (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1964), p. 5,
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which may foster federation.^
surely, the above is an incomplete list of the
reasons for the creation of all federations, m fact
each federal attempt has its own inner dynamics. AccLdin,
to Wheare, modern federations have come about because there
has been
A sense of military insecuritv ^nH
need for common defence^ a desi?ffn K^ consequent
But motives are not enough to explain federalism,
according to Henry Teune.^ The perception of the means
and the seriousness of the actors to achieve it also
becomes important.
In relation to federation in the British West
Indies, the question arises whether these conditions were
present there. Keeping the above definition in mind, one
can ask whether the islands were ready for federation.
Frank Trager, "On Federalism," p. XIV.
4
K.C. Wheare, Federal Government (New York; OxfordUniversity Press, 1964)
, p. 54^
^Henry Teune, "The Future of Federalism: Federalism
and Political Integration," Federalism ; Infinite Variety
in Theory and Practice
, ed. by Valerie Earle (Itasca, 111.:
F.E. Peacock Publishers, Inc., 1968), p. 214.
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Federation
- a Caribbean Panacea^
The list Of suggestions, exhortations and attempts
at getting the British Caribbean islands into a union i
indeed impressive. Federation see.s to be second nature
to the Caribbean, but that is a very deceiving assumption.
AS early as 1705, the Leeward Islands (see map) were joined
in an association that did not last. Fifty-eight years
later, the islands (Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent) cap-
tured by Britain in the Seven Years War (1763) were formed
into the Government of Grenada. By 1830, Tobago, Barbados,
Grenada, St. Vincent and St. Lucia were under one Governor.
But each unit retained its. legislature.
The main feature of these pseudo-federations was
the all powerful Governor who controlled the units with
an iron fist. No "deviation" was allowed on the part of
the local politicians. Thus, the federal principle affected
only the judiciary, agriculture and education. It was a
federation of bureaucratic structures. The federation did
^The data dealing with the several attempts at Fed-eration m the British VJest Indies were collected from thefollowing sources: Bernard Marshall, "Attempts at Windward/Leeward Federation," unpublished paper. Honorable S.S.
Pamphal, West Indian Nationhood
.
Myth
,
Mirage or Mandate(Georgetown, Guyana: Ministry of External Affairs, 197l7.Cheddi Jagan, A West Indian State Pro-Imperialist or Anti-
Imperialist, (Leytown, Guyana: New Guyana Co. Ltd., 1972).CM. Maclnnes, "British Caribbean Federation," Develop-
ments Towards Self Government in the Caribbean (The
Hague: W. van Hoeve Ltd., 1955T7 pp. 151-175.
Figure XI. The "Little Eight" Islands
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not create a regional
.eeUng ana Britain was not concerned
With that, but instead, tried to create yet another federa-
tion wichin the Caribbean reaion thog . T e attempt involved '
uniting Barbados to St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Grenada and
Tobago. Barbados was the unwilling partner this time, it
Objected on the grounds that federation would mean a step
backwards. The islands with which it was to unite were
not as politically
.'advanced., as it was. Barbados had
always prided itself as little Britain since it never was
"graced" with Crown Colony Government, while the other
units were still Crown Colonies.^ Barbados never joined
the union but the remaining islands of Grenada, St. Vincent,
St. Lucia, and Tobago v/ere joined together to form one
administrative unit. Thus, in the British scheme of things,
there were two distinct federations, the Leeward and the
Windward,^ existing side by side with little or no contact
maintained between them. it never occurred to the British,
or even the islands themselves, that they could more effi-
ciently use their resources by coming together in a larger
union.
The federations were weak and artificial. They were
not spontaneous, but were imposed from the outside. One
cannot accept the statement made by Hubert Ranee, a former
7J.H. Parry and Phillip M. Sherlock, Short History
of the West Indies (London: McMilland and Co., 1960T~£a|slm.
QSee map on p. 267 for islands in each group.
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Governor of Trinidad, that "it has always been Britain's
policy^to
.ake the islands work together to be a stronger
unit."^ At times, they were forced to work together be-
cause it suited Britain's purposes. But from the very
beginning the islands have not looked at each other for
help, and instead have been taught to imitate the British.
Each island has learned over the years to agitate for
"advanced and better" conditions for itself in isolation
rather than fight for regional advancement. And Britain
did help this state of affairs since it always responded
to each island's demands in isolation rather than on a
Caribbean level. Consequently, all attempts at federation
have been seen by the more politically "advanced" islands
as a burden. Indeed it had to be a burden since the less
"advanced" islands were not ready in many instances to man
the mechanics of modern sophisticated government which gave
great responsibility to elected representatives.
Toward the end of the 19th century, the idea of
West Indian federation came to a standstill. Britain was
responding to the needs of the time. It was busy consoli-
dating the power of the Governors in the separate units.
By then, it was taken as a given that the Governor was
going to institute the machinery of representative
9Sir Hubert Elwin Ranee, "Towards a Federation of
the British West Indies," The Caribbean ; Contemporary
Trends
,
ed. by A. Curtis Wilgus (Gainesville : University
of Florida Press, 1953), p. 244.
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government. He would later turn over the administration
Of the units when the natives were ready.
During the first three decades of the 20th century,
the spirit Of federation was revitalized, but two major
Commissions of Inquiry^O ^^^^ Caribbean during that
time ruled out federation. They felt that the people were
not ready yet, though no plans were made to get them ready.
The Commissions were mistaken by blaming the wrong people
for the lack of enthusiasm for federation. They should
have said that the politicians did not want a federation
because they were happy to be rulers in their own domain.
But by 1945, with nationalism in the air, the separate
units of the Caribbean together with Britain embarked on
a venture which was destined to produce different results.
The British wanted a British West Indian Federation more
than the West Indians themselves, to get rid of the ever
increasing administrative cost of the colonies. On the
other hand, the larger islands of the Caribbean embarked
on a course to get their independence from Britain, not
in association with the smaller units. They only used
West Indian federation as a device to get their own
The Colonial Office, Report by the Honorable E .F.L
.
Wood on His Visit to the West Indies and British Guiana
,
Dec. 1921~Feb. 1922
,
Cmd. 1679"
^
(London: Her najesty's
Stationery Office, 1922 and West Indies Royal Commission
(1938-9) Report Cmd . 6607 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery
Office, 1945)
.
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independr*"'--lence.
The Modern Era of West Indian Federation
Different writers give different beginnings to the
modern drive for Caribbean regional unity. This writer
Chooses to
.arlc the starting point as 1932 because then the
first genuine move undertaken by West Indians to show their
desire for a political union in the region occurred. After
this ^ove, it will be shown that it was all .'downhilln as
the British undertook to fashion West Indian unity in its
own way. And every time the British tried, the Caribbean
was unable to provide the leadership to counteract unwanted
British influence. The leaders simply became followers
with little imagination or ingenuity.
Indies
""^^ serious Attempt at Federating the British Wp.^
The 1932 Dominica conference
. The 1932 conference
was called by Cecil A. Rawle of Dominica in response to a
British move in the same year to impose a federation on
4. 4- -.1
During this London Conference, Jamaica took timeto talk with Britain about its own constitutional advance-
ment. During the second attempt Barbados showed the same
ambivalence by pushing for West Indian unity and at the
same time was looking after its own constitutional advance-
ment. See Michael Hewitt, "The Tragedy of Sherbourne
,
Advocate, April 9, 1965, p. 3. Hewitt wrote: "I cannot
understand his (Barbados leader Errol Barrow) simultaneous
occupation with the federal efforts, his summit meetings
and his insistence on independence for Barbados."
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west Indians. The West Indian leaders viewed this move
with suspicion.^2
^^^^ ^^^^
^^^^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^^^^
wanted the credit for getting the islands federated,
secondly, the type of federation Britain wanted to impose
was a reactionary one since federation at that time would
not bring with it political independence. Britain wanted
only unity to save money. To the West Indian leaders,
this federation was a step backwards.
The conference was timely, but was not well planned
and was poorly run as a result. In the first place, the
delegates found it necessary to show their allegiance to
the Crown, thus dampening the "revolutionary" zeal of the
conferees. Secondly, not all the islands sent delegates.
Some were in Britain asking for more advanced constitutions
for their separate units. Lastly, the participants could
not agree on the type of federation they wanted. Some
wanted a federation even though it did not guarantee im-
mediate independence. The Trinidad delegate, Arthur
Cipriani, wanted a federation only if independence was
guaranteed immediately."'-'^ In rerrospect, it is easy to
see that this disagreement was unnecessary and puerile.
I 2F.A. Hoyos, The Road to Responsible Government
(Barbados: Letchworth Press Ltd., N.D.), p. 58.
13Roy Augier and Shirley Gordon, eds.. Sources of
West Indian History (London; Longmans, Green and Co. Ltd.,
TWel), p. 288.
14Hoyos, Responsible Government
,
p. 5 9.
Of course, this is because the delegates who attended were
not the best educated ones of the area. They could not see
that having a federation was far more important than
Whether it was politically dependent or independent. Had
they been able to achieve a partial unity first, then they
would have been able to press for independence. Their lack
Of leadership was reflected in the fact that the idea of
West Indian unity was dropped from that tir.e onwards. The
British revived the idea of West Indian unity in 1947,
although in 1945 they released a report which had ruled
out the readiness of the Caribbean for federation.
The 1947 Monteqo Bay conference . The British
generally regard this conference as the first serious at-
tempt to discuss West Indian unity. The seeds of this
conference were planted in 1947 when a dispatch was sent
out by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, urging
West Indian leaders to meet to discuss their future. "'^
Thus, in February 1947, the British Government invited
the West Indian leaders to Monteqo Bay
,
Jamaica, to dis-
cuss Caribbean regional unity. One would have expected
the West Indians to invite the British as observers. The
British did not only do the inviting, they even chaired the
15
Douglas A. Anglin, "The Political Development of
the West Indies," The West Indie s Federation
, ed. by David
Lowenthal (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), p. 40,
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an
..eeting. Reports circulated that some West Indians had
pushed to have the meeting take place in London rather th
the Caribbean because they all wanted the meeting held in
their islands.
The conference went very smoothly and passed se-
veral resolutions. The significant commissions, chaired
by Englishmen, were the Regional Economic Committee, to
estimate the economic needs of the separate units, and
the Standing Close Association Committee, appointed to
draw up a preliminary federal constitution."^^ Lloyd
Braithwaite described its meeting optimistically. He
wrote that "hopes ran high.
. .and so general was the
agreement that actual federation was imminent . "-^"^
The hopes were surely premature in spite of the
fact that a spirit of compromise, alien to West Indian
politicians, reigned at the meeting. Alexander Bustamante,
representing Jamaica, was the only one to indict the
British for lack of concern for the islands. '"^ But before
the meeting ended, Bustamante seconded a resolution for
creating a federation. He went on to remark that he was
aware of the many difficult days ahead, but there was no
Sir John Mordecai, The VJest Indies ; The Federal
Negotiations (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1968),
p. 37.
17Lloyd Braithwaite, "Progress Toward Federation,
1938-1956," Social and Economic Studies (1957), p. 146.
18Gordon K. Lewis, The Growth of the Modern West
Indies (London: MacGibbon and Kee, 1968T, p. 355.
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proble. Since they could be surmounted. The meeting had
indeed proceeded so well that Morley Ayearst could write in
I960 that it was a "valuable training ground for federal
politics.', one wonders about the sincerity of this state-
ment, but Ayearst continued: "it helped the island politi-
cians to become better acquainted and accustomed to the
problems" of the area. ^0 What was so magical about this
meeting? No substantial resolutions were drawn up. The
delegates simply agreed to meet again sometime in 1953 to
discuss a proposed federal constitution, which was hoped
would have been available by then.
The Hubert Ranee Report and the 195 3 London Con-
ference
.
The 1953 conference was convened to discuss the
federal scheme outlined by Commissioner Hubert Ranee, an
Englishman and the then Governor of Trinidad and Tobago.
His work on the federal scheme covered the years 1948-1950,
during which he travelled the entire British Caribbean
to gather people's feelings about a proposed federal con-
stitution. Many of the pro-federation leaders of the
Caribbean were part of the Ranee Commission, but not a
single member came from Jamaica, the largest of the units
of the future federation. Apparently, Norman Manley, the
Jamaican pro-federationist , could not have been included
19Proceedings of the Monteqo Bay Conference
,
Col .
No. 218 (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1960), p. 230.
20Morley Ayearst, The British West Indies : The Search
for Self-Government (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd.,
1560), p. 2 30.
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Since at that time he was a member of the Caribbean Or-
ganization. ^1 The same applied to Eric Williams, who had
not yet shown a desire to enter Trinidad electoral poli-
tics. But the predominance of the pro-feder ationists on
the Commission leads one to suspect that Britain wanted
to release the Caribbean islands at all cost. Further to
cut down on too much bickering which would probably have
hastened the destruction of the federal idea, all key per-
sonnel in the preparatory stage were British. This could
have had two results and in both instances, the British
would have reached the objective; to be relieved of the
burdens of the Caribbean administration. The predominance
of the British could have spurred the West Indians to a
nationalistic drive, making them break away from British
tutelage much faster. This did not happen because colon-
ialism in the British Caribbean has not made the leaders
develop a regional spirit to strengthen their positions.
The British have allowed each territorial unit, through its
leader, to be strong as an individual, precluding the need
to join forces to become powerful. The second effect, the
predominance of the British could have had, was to make
sure everything went right. Evidently the expected results
21This was an organization jointly established by
the British and the United States after the Second World
War to oversee their operations in the Caribbean. For an
account of its activities see: Herbert Corkran, Jr., Pat -
terns of International Cooperation in the Caribbean 1942-
1969 (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1970).
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were not realized. Britain was satisfied to get rid of
some of its Obligations: both Jamaica and Trinidad became
independent nations.
The more salient recommendations of the Ranee
Report^^ were the following^ a Federal Parliament would
consist of an elected Assembly and an appointed Senate.
The latter was to be very weak but could delay money bills
passed by the Assembly for three months. The Governor had
tremendous power. He would appoint a Council of State
consisting of six persons. In addition he would appoint
seven Ministers with the advice of the Prime Minister.
The Report also allowed each island of the federa-
tion to retain all its powers unless each one agreed to
give them up. The Committee prepared two areas; one, where
either the Federal Government or the units had exclusive
control, and one where the two bodies could share control.
The "concurrent" area, where both had power, but with the
Federal Government superseding in case of conflict, were
trade, commerce, development of industries, and movement
of persons.
This Committe made three major blunders. First,
it did not allow the islands to be represented in one of
the bodies of the federal legislature, on the basis of
population, as is done in all successful federations. The
22Report British Caribbean Standing Closer Asso-
ciation Committee , 1948-49 (Barbados; Advocate Company, Ltd.,
1949)
.
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committee, reflecting the British desire to prevent Jamaica
from dominating the federation, ruled against the "one man,
one vote" principle for at lea.^t the Assembly. Thus, on
the basis of some mathematical formula which was never ex-
plained, Jamaica was to receive 16 seats, though it would
pay 40% of the upkeep of the federal structure. Trinidad
was to have 9 seats, paying 38% of the federal budget,
Barbados 4, British Guiana 6. All the other units had two
seats with the exception of Montserrat which receive one.
The House was to be made up of 50 representatives.
The second major blunder was the Committee's nega-
tive reaction to dual membership in unit and federal legis-
latures. The Committee was not far-sighted enough to
realize that the uncertainty of federal politics would have
inevitably kept "able" men on the islands. Dual membership
could have forced the holder to relinquish one of the two
as the federation became stronger and the work became too
much. Lastly, the Committee, without being asked by the
island leaders, recommended that Trinidad be the federal
capital site. Subsequently, the Caribbean leaders asked
an Englishman to make that decision for them but, at that
point in time, this opinion was not sought. In West Indian
parlance, the committee was too "fast" (too uppity).
By and large, this report was reactionary. It
reflected the British view of what the Caribbean federation
should be. That was no tragedy. The lack of commitment
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the report showed for i..ediate independence should never
have been seen as a stumbling block to federation. m
fact, a golden opportunity was presenting itself to the
West Indian leaders to reject the report and write one for
themselves. They did not have to rely on the British for
a constitution by which they were to be ruled. On the
other hand, it can be hypothesized, the islands of Jamaica
and Trinidad used the federal negotiations as a way to buy
time. They did not reject totally the federal scheme but
at the same time did not accept it. They kept it floating
to achieve their own ends and in the process used the
smaller units like Dominica to hide their own selfish
motives, that of achieving their own independence.
The 195 3 London conference
. It was at the 1953
London conference that the Hubert Ranee Report was dis-
cussed. The Caribbean leaders must have been overjoyed
with the location of the meeting since they had always
preferred to discuss their future outside the Caribbean.
Lloyd Braithwaite wrote of the politicians attending the
meeting that they came not as statesmen to discuss sub-
23
stantive issues, to demand of Britain what type of
federation they wanted, but came shouting slogans. On
paper, the conferees "solved" many problems. They accepted
Lloyd Braithwaite, "Federation," p. 153.
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the holding of dual office in the unit and federal legis-
latures, in effect rejecting Ranee's suggestion to the
contrary. The federal govern.en'. was given the power tc-
raise revenue through taxes. It was decided that an,end-
™ents to the federal constitutions should not be made until
five years after the federation was established. Then a
constitutional convention was to be held to consider
revisions.
The report of the 1953 conference^^ was presented
to the unit legislatures. it did not cause much stir in
the area probably because the Caribbean was engaged in more
important matters. in the first place, the people were
busy celebrating the coronation of Queen Elizabeth II.
Secondly, the smaller units like Dominica were only getting
used to the idea of being able to vote in their representa-
tives. Thirdly, the economic situation in the small units
was difficult enough to devote attention to something the
leaders themselves did not even understand. For example,
it was more important to tend to the nascent banana in-
dustry which was going to become more important than to
waste time on federation, a nebulous idea, at best.
The 1953 meeting solved nothing. Like the 1947
conference resolutions were passed and more committees
24Plan for a British Federation of the West Indi es
Qnd. 8895 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 195377
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appointed to solve problems at a later date. One such
committee was to see into the feasibility of allowing
citizens of the federation to mo /e freely within the ter-
ritorial units.
Between 195 3 and 1956, no effort was made to get
the people better acquainted with the federal idea. The
partners to the federation still believed that small
meetings could solve all major problems, of course neglect
ing to take into account that the leaders had never shown
a desire to solve the immediate problems such as communi-
cating with each other.
Hearing a federation
- 1956 London conference
. At
the London conference of 1956, the Secretary of State for
the Colonies made two major statements at its opening. He
insisted that no one island would be allowed to become
independent in isolation. Secondly, aid would continue
after the federation was established. It was this last
factor which made the British insist on giving the British
born Governor final power in financial matters. The
Colonial Office wanted close supervision of the British
taxpayers' money. But there were major issues which were
never satisfactorily settled in the opinion of those who
raised them. Britain did not envisage immediate indepen-
dence because a grant-aided territory could not be an
independent territory. Jamaica saw the issue differently.
It insisted on immediate independence probably because
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Britain had given the instruction, for the first ti.e, of
not allowing any one unit to go it alone. Secondly, Ja-
maica b.lked at the idea of having an elected Senate but
did not want the Governor to have the power to appoint it.
Rather, Jamaica felt the Prime Minister should have the
power to appoint the Senate. Thirdly, Jamaica did not
like the power the federal government was to wiela in
dealing with customs. It felt that its own industries
would be hurt if its products were made available indis-
criminantly to the other islands. Of course, most of that
fear was based on intuitive feeling rather than facts. As
a consequence, a committee was appointed to study the cus-
toms issue. The 1956 meeting also rejected Trinidad as
the capital site; a committee, composed entirely of
British members, was appointed to suggest another site.
At the close of the 1956 meeting, it was decided to meet
the following year to make plans to launch the federation
in 1958.
The 1957 federal conference
. The 1957 meeting
was the last conference before the federation was launched.
Reportedly the West Indian leaders met under tension.
They had received the Site Committee report which had cited
Trinidad as an unlikely place for the capital because of
the unpredictable nature of its politics. The Site
25 Report of the British Caribbean Federal Capital
Commission
, Col . No . 328 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery
Office, 1956).
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committee felt that the racial troubles of Trinidad were
too intense to burden the political syste. with an addi-
tional superstructure, the machinery of federation.
Further, the British had already announced that a Briton
was going to be Chief Justice of the West Indian Supreme
Court. Braithwaite wrote later that it had been confi-
dently expected that a local would have been made the
Chief Justice.
This writer cannot agree with this statement since
from the very beginning the West Indian leaders had shown
a lack of trust in one another. Each unit guarded against
what it already had and refused to share with the less for-
tunate islands. Thus, the British appointment could have
been welcomed. The British Government was just not playing
favorites and under these conditions was right in appointing
an outsider. This writer is more than convinced that the
way these leaders were behaving indicated that even placing
the West Indian federal capital outside the West Indies
would have been more acceptable than having it in the
Caribbean. So why could they not do with a British Chief
Justice? They had always revered everything British. This
last act was merely in keeping with their own desires and
behavior patterns.
Braithwaite, "Federation," p. 162.
283
-ssues
Federation created. Although the major i:
Which were absolutely essential to .a.e a viable federation
were net yet resolved, the British Parliament made the -
west Indies Federation a reality in 1958. Perhaps the
British thought that the problems would somehow disappear
with the arrival of this
-long awaited day." One often
wonders, who was really waiting for this day, the British
or the West Indians, though the first Prime Minister,
Grantly Adams, was quoted as saying that "we cannot wait
any longer, we might not have another chance. "^"^ Be that
as it may, Princess Margaret declared the federal legis-
lature open in June 1958. To substitute for any real ex-
citement which could have generated a full commitment to
federation, the islands made large sums, which they could
ill-afford, available to send entertainers to Trinidad for
this opening of parliament.
The West Indies was not an independent state,
though. In reality, it was a joining of all the colonies
into one to make for more efficient administration. This
interim period before full independence was also meant to
solve the other pressing divisive problems of the union.
But as it turned out, between 1958 and 1962, when inde-
pendence was to be worked at, the leaders at the federal
level began to disagree openly with those at the unit level.
Quoted in Gordon Lewis, Modern West Indies, p. 384.
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They adopted what Arthur Lewis has called
.-open diplomacy,-.
Shouting at each other to show their strengths. Finally
Jamaica felt prepared to go it ^lone and Britain was not
about to stop it. in 1961, after it had singlehandedly
rewritten the federal constitution to reflect its desires,
it decided to withdraw from the Federation to become an
independent state. Trinidad followed in the footsteps of
Jamaica and became an independent state in August 1962.
l^L-!^bf Federating th. R.^'M sh IVest IndiP.
The First West Indian Federation ended when
Jamaica and Trinidad decided to leave the union. But like
everything else which went before, an act from Britain was
required to dissolve the federation. The leaders of the
remaining Little Eight were not dismayed and may even have
been overjoyed with the defections of the larger units.
They moved quickly to begin a new federation. Their en-
thusiasm for the federal idea was great, but this time
Britain was to stop them. In effect, Britain was warning
them that it was not going to allow another failure.
Apparently the leaders were not intimidated by
Britain's dealying tactics and at a meeting held in
Barbados, in 1961
,
they pressed the British to consider the
new federation as created on the very day the first one
ended. It was also at this meeting that the second attempt
at federation began to fail even before it came into being.
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The leaders learned that "considerable economic aid was
going to be needed... ^8 This meant immediate independence
was again out of the question. m fact, two things were
coming out in the open which went against the grain of the
desired unity to achieve statehood. The first was that
the British were unwilling to provide the necessary funds
to prevent overburdening the more prosperous islands with
financing the federation. The second was a denial of
immediate independence for the federation. Both became
unacceptable to the West Indian leaders.
Between February 26 and March 3, 1962, the leaders
of the Little Eight met with Sir Arthur Lewis to hammer
out plans for a new federation. After the meeting, spirits
ran high and it is interesting to note what Dominica's
chief of state, Edward LeBlanc, had to say on that occasion.
It was his opinion that the new federation "would preserve
democracy in the area." He insisted that there was no
reason why the present leaders could not formulate an
acceptable plan of which this generation would be proud.
Evidently, LeBlanc was not too impressed with the way
Jamaica had handled the other units during the first federal
attempt. He must have felt that the remaining units could
negotiate as equals to achieve their objective and not be
28The Federal Negotiations, 1962-1965 (Barbados:
The Government Printing Office, 1965), p. 5.
29Emile Lancelot, "Constitutional Developments Five
Years B'-fore and After Statehood," Dies Dominica (November
1972), p. 5.
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dominated by an unyielding chauvinist power.
The leaders met again in May 1962 to frame a new
constitution for themselves. Tho meeting used the Arthur
Lewis suggestions^^ submitted to them, and two other sug-
gestions dealing with specific issues of federation sent
out by the British Colonial Office. It was at this
meeting that the Eastern Caribbean leaders officially
adopted the motion that the new federation would come into
being the day the old one died. Up to that point, the
British Government had not been party to this new venture,
but the West Indian leaders found it necessary to include
it in order to receive added revenue to balance the pro-
posed federal budget. This invitation to London took the
shape of the leaders sending a report of their meetings
to Britain, asking the latter for its approval. Britain
was negative to the idea of a new federation. It further
suggested that the proposed federation be a stronger one.
But the greatest blow to this new drive at regional unity
was the message passed on to the unit leaders that "the
British Government. , .was unlikely to assist the West
Arthur Lewis, Proposals for an Eastern Caribbea n
Federarion Compromising the Territories of Antigua, Bar -
bados
,
Dominica
,
Grenada
, Montserrat , St. Kit rs -Nevis -
Anquilla
, St . Lucia and St. Vincent (Port of Spain:
Government of the West Indies^ 1962) . The specific sug-
gestions are contained in Appendix A.
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indies Little Eight on a greater scale than has so far
been envisaged." The British advised that aid would have
to be sought elsewhere.
Instead of allowing a new federation to take effect,
a White Paper32 ^^^^.^^ ^.^^
^^^^ ^^^^ fe<ier^^
tion was published by the British. It was intended to
make the people better acquainted with the idea of federa-
tion. This was ill-timed, to say the least, for the British
were merely delaying the new federation. The British used
the idea of educating the people on federation as an excuse
to postpone its commitment of a continuous subsidy for the
new federation. in the first place, the people were never
considered before. They had nothing to do with the col-
lapse of the first federation. And, most certainly, the
publication of this paper was not going to make any dif-
ference in conditioning their attitude to the federal idea.
What occurred in Dominica was fairly typical.
Only a few people were informed about federation, "^^ and as
late as 1965 when the federal idea was all but buried, the
"Dispatch from the Colonial Office of August 9,
1963 to Caribbean Leaders" Regional Council of Ministers,
Draft Federal Scheme, As Amended at Ninrh Meeting (October,
1964), p. 33.
32Report of the East Caribbean Federation Conference
,
1962 Cmd . 1946 (London; Her Majesty's Stationery Office,
1964).
33Letter in The Dominica Chronicle , November 3,
1963, p. 2.
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Barbados Advocate was still asv-inrr -i-v, i ^_ CIO jcmg the leaders to let the
public know about federation. And even a year before
that (1964) The Dominica Chronicle editorialized:
Although we have to rely entirely on news from
aareed'th'r'?'* '^'"^ ^^^^ generaUy
Sced!^ '""^ ^ Federation are well
The second paragraph read:
f^q^^ttabl e to have to rpn^.^ that our sourcesentirely unofficial 7^ t
nr^ r^,,Ki-!^
:!'^iiuxrj.ciai.
. .
As far as we are aware,o public and authoritative statement has been mad4or document published to acquaint the electorate
discussL^!?5''°"^ '^^^^
V/hat is being argued here is that, although it was
a good idea to inform the masses on federation, nothing of
the kind occurred. Had genuine consultation of the people
taken place, one of two things would have happened. Either
the people would have asked to be let out of this contro-
versy or they would have decided not to have the type of
federation that was envisaged. On a very impressionistic
level, this writer suspects that they would have opted for
the first. The people of the Caribbean have never been
consulted on the simplest things which impinge on their
lives, far less to be asked to decide on federation, some-
thing they barely understood. David Smithers supports
this theory for he wrote that dfter his travels through
34
"Federation: Open Debate in Public," Barbados
Advocate May 29, 1965, p. 4.
35
"Federation," The Dominica Chronicle , December 16,
1964, p. 3.
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the units in 1965, he found that the people generally
were apathetic to the idea of federation.
It must be noted that even prior to the British
n,ove to stop the federation, the leaders had surmounted
the major difficulty, each territory contributing to the
union according to its ability, which alledgedly destroyed
the first attempt. The leaders had already decided to have
a stronger government than the previously proposed one.
The new federal government would have had the power to tax
at all levels.. In short, the new federation was already
acquiring what the first did not have, an independent
constituency. On the surface at least, the leaders were
showing signs of desiring a federation. This commitment
must not have been too great ' because as soon as the British
refused to guarantee the recommended $215 million^*^ over a
five year period, the Federal idea began to wane. Arthur
Lewis did not quite see the situation in the same light.
He did not blame the leaders but chastized the British for
not allowing thr West Indian leaders to have what they
38
v;anted, a new federation.
36David Smithers, "Federation of the Seven is Dead,"
Barbados Advocate
,
April 1, 1965, p. 4.
37Carleen O'Loughlin, A Survey of Economic Po ben-
tial and Capital Neods of the Leeward and Windward Islands
and Barbados ( London : Her Majesty's Stationery Office,
1963), p. 136.
38 Arthur W. Lewis, The Agony of the Eight (Barbados:
The Advocate Press, 1965), pp. 24-25.
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was
a
The events of 1963 and IQf^d. The Little Eight
reduced to Little Seven in 1962 when Grenada showed
desire to join Trinidad as a unitary state. Several re--
gional meetings were held during 1963, and during each one
the politicians continued to destroy West Indian unity.
Their reliance on Britain had driven them to give up federa
ticn since they thought they could not afford federation
on their own.
But there were other events which led to the demise
of the yet to be established federation. A new government
came to power in St. Lucia in 1964 which meant that a new
leader was now at the federal level representing the island
This new leader, John Compton, found it necessary to
make new demands on the proposed federation. Thus, issues
such as the taxing power of the federal government, which
were thought to have been solved, were brought up again
for further discussion. In addition, Compton found it
necessary to initiate a rivalry between St. Lucia, Dominica
3 9and St. Vincent against Barbados. Compton 's reservations
about the federal scheme were followed by those of Vere
Bird of Antigua. The latter was of the opinion that the
federal government should not appropriate any power which
was formerly exercised by the territorial governments
unless the latter chose to relinquish those powers.
^^St. Clair Daniel, "St. Lucia Tough on Federal
Plan," Barbados Advocate , November 1, 1964.
^•^Appendix II to Draft Federal Scheme "Reservations
to Draft Federal Scheme," Barbados, 1964, p. 2.
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Later, Dominica objected through its chief, LeBlanc, to the
power Of taxation given the federal government. He was of
the opinion that banana producing countries like Dominica
would be most hurt by it.^^ He was only showing the true
nature of all Caribbean politicians, that they are unable
to see beyond the shores of their territories. They have
been unable to see a regional gain at the expense of the
individual territories. Every individual leader began to
object to some part of the very constitution they had
jointly devised and even accepted.
Quite obviously, many of these objections were
puerile and untenable. For example, Vere Bird of Antiqua
worried at one time that the federal government might ac-
quire the power to direct industries in the region. This
to him meant that Antigua's "industrialization" drive would
have been halted since it had more industries than some of
the other territories. Of course, the possibility of
this occurring was high but Antiqua was sure to benefit
if this was made a fact. Antigua was in such bad shape
economically that Britain had to give it money to salvage
42its sugar industry.
'^•'•Ibid
.,
42David Smithers, "Case of the Irksome Crumb,"
Barbados Advocate
,
April 15, 1965, p. 7. The fact was
that Antigua was operating its sugar factories very ineffi-
ciently, producing 125,000 tons of sugar in factories with
300,000 ton capacities.
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With these internal fights, the Eastern Caribbean
federation was never created, though it would have had a
better chance for survival than its i..ediate predecessor.
It is now generally accepted that the second attempt was a
fiasco because Britain refused to guarantee long term
finance for the scheme. It is more correct to assert that
it failed because the leaders were not committed to West
Indian federation. Barbados has since gone it alone, re-
ceiving no aid to sustain its independence. Likewise all
the remaining territories have achieved some form of inde-
pendence without a great amount of money aid from Britain.
The Failure of Federation
The reasons for the failure of the first federa-
tion are indeed many. Some observers have emphasized the
weak federal structure. Others have written about the in-
ability of the islands to handle the representation crisis,
such as Jamaica's inadequate representation in the first
venture. This does not hold true, for in 1961, Jamaica got
43While these pages were being written, the writer
redeived a memo from Dominica which indicated that Jamaica's
banana industry has had to be subsidized by a grant from
Britain in January 1973.
44Explanations for failure have fallen under three
main categories: The Sociological by Amitai Etzioni, Poli -
tical Unification (New York: Columbia University Press,
1965 ) the legalist constitutional by Jesse Proctor Jr.,
"Constitutional Defects and the Collapse of the West Indian
Federation," and those who emphasize the clash of per-
sonalities. Hugh Springer, Reflection s on the Failure of
the First West Indian Federation (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard
University Press, 1964).
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everything it had requested, such as the proposal to have
about fifty percent of membership in Parliament. still
others have emphasized the lack of a true West Indian
character to create a federal culture. This is partially
true but history has shown that federal cultures are
created after a federation is in progress. Gordon Lewis
has written that it is precisely an absence of a federal
culture which drives countries to federate.
Yet another group of theorists have explained the
failure by emphasizing geography. It is argued that the
islands were too far apart to develop any lasting bond.
But these theorists fail to take into account that geography
has not prevented either Alaska or Hawaii from joining the
American Union. Of course, because the distance did not
hamper Alaska's bid to join the ;ij-aerican union does not
mean that distance could not mitigate against the Caribbean
situation. In fact, it did hamper unity. The island
leaders did not know their counterparts in the other is-
lands. And besides, Jamaica did not want to associate
v;ith the smaller islands. Alexander Bustamante of Jamaica
continuously referred to his personal wealth in comparison
Gordon Lewis, Modern We^ t Indies
,
p. 369.
46Charles H. Archibald, "The Failure of the West
Indies Federation," World Today, (1962), pp. 233-242;
He cited geography as one of several reasons for the
failure.
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with the budget of say Montserrat/^ Furthermore, the
American comparison does not hold too much weight because
Alaska or Hawaii were no great burden to other members
of the American union while the smaller islands were to
Jamaica, Trinidad and even Barbados.
All these explanations are partially correct but
these obstacles could have been more easily surmounted
than three other obstacles which this writer has chosen
to highlight. The federal attempts failed because (11 the
Caribbean leaders did not want a federation, in spite of
their rhetoric to the contrary; (2) Jamaica and Trinidad
did not want to have a federal government which could
control customs, and (3) Trinidad did not want freedom of
movement of persons within the territories.
The leaders did not want federation. In this
writer's judgment, there were four key people in the first
federation. They were all shortsighted. Alexander Busta-
mante always wavered on the idea of federation. He was
concerned about his own political future and not that of
either Jamaica, his adopted home, or the West Indies.
During 1949 and 1955 he wanted federation because he had
no other program to present to Jamaicans. In 1961, he
47At all major meetings Alexander Bustamante
boasted that he carried more money in his fob (small
pocket) than the budget of Montserrat - based on inter-
view with E.O. LeBlanc, Premier of Dominica, during
Summer of 1972.
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began spealcing against federation because the ruling party
Of Norman Manley was for federation. Opposition to federa-
tion was a good idea since the ruling party had deceptively
made Jamaicans believe that they could receive more pros-
perity than they were receiving without federation. Thus,
when prosperity did not come, Bustamante blamed it on thl
federation. He convinced Jamaicans that their growing
economy would be hampered and was already hampered by
federation on several counts. in the first place, Jamaica
would receive less aid from Britain when the federation
was created since more funds would be given the less
developed islands. He was correct as the proposed allo-
cation of funds during the first five years of the federa-
tion shows. See Figure XII.
Clearly Jamaica and Trinidad stood to lose funds
under federation. Under these circumstances, Bustamante
had struck a responsive chord by "showing" Jamaicans that
federation was going to be even more a liability in the
future.
Norman Manley was equally shortsighted. By 1961,
he had already gained for Jamaica the control of the
federation by getting its allotment of representation
raised to fifty per cent. He thought it was a good idea
to let the people decide on the question whether Jamaica
should remain in the fold. Many had already warned Manley
that his referendum on the federal question was untimely
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Figure XIII British Aid to the British West IndianBefore and After Federation. (m
millions of dollars.)
Area Amount to be received Received betweenduring 1959-1964 1951-1960
Federal
Government 3.2
Dominica 1.0 16.5
St. Kitts
.9 5.0
St. Lucia
.9 14.5
Antigua
.68 17.0
Grenada
.54 6.0
St. Vincent
.54 12.5
Montserrat
.2 6.5
Barbados
.5 5.0
Jamaica
.25 31.5
Jamaica
dependencies
.15
Trinidad
.1 9.1
Source; Grants 1951-60 from The Nation (Port of
Spain, Trinidad), July 1, 1960.
Grants for 1960: West Indian Economist,
January, 1960, pp. 10-11.
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and unnecessary. He was merely allowing the demagogic
Bustamante to further his own political future. Similarly,
Eric Williams alienated many wculd-be backers of federation
by his arrogance. He chose not to be a part of the federal
machinery by not running in the first and only federal
elections, but wanted to run the federation from his home
in Trinidad. And, of course, Grantly Adams must be in-
cluded in the long list of incapable leaders the Caribbean
has produced. By default he was the first and only Prime
Minister of the federation, since both Manley and Williains
had chosen not to be part of the Federal Government. Adams
made many unclear statements which often required lengthy
explanations. For example, in 1961, after Jamaica had
reluctantly allowed the Federal Government to have the
power to levy taxes, Adams said openly that Federal taxa-
tion would become retroactive to 1958. This statement
was made without even consulting the leaders of Jamaica
and Trinidad; the two most reluctant partners of the
already sinking federation.
Apart from this general poor leadership, the
Caribbean leaders never wanted a federation in spite of
their perennial rhetoric to the contrary. In the first
place, the federation was not undertaken on West Indian
initiative. At the start, it was quite appropriately
called the British West Indian Federation. The word
"British" was later dropped when the West Indian leaders
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were beginning to show some signs of West Indian national-
ism. But dropping the word "British" was not enough to
sustain nationalism. it never lasted because all major
conferences dealing with the union took place in Britain.
As it was, the federation became dominated by the British,
who were going to be a part of it. The West Indian leaders
did not worry about that because they had no reason to
foster any form of union. They were not threatened by
any outside force. They could allow every major committee
dealing with their federation to be headed by the British.
Their lack of commitment was adequately shown by their
non-interest in federal elective office. All the pro-
federation giants, Manley, Williams, Vere Bird, chose to
remain in their secure positions at home. They could not
risk their political future by acquiring a larger con-
stituency, the West Indies, which they could not handle.
One cannot accept VJilliams' excuse that the federal con-
48stitution was too weak, thus precluding his participation,
It is true that Britain granted the constitution, but
Eric Williams had enough influence to change it. Pre-
viously, Norman Manley was the one who advised the influen-
49tials to run for federal office. But he was one of the
48Eric Williams, Inward Hunger : The Education of
a Prime Minister (London: The Trinity Press, lybyj, p.~T44.
4Q
Thomas Franck, ed., Why Federations Fail (New
York: New York University Prss, 1968), p. 183.
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first not to heed the advice and kept clear of federal
office. His excuse was that he had to remain in Jamaica
to prevent Bustamante from leading Jamaica out of the
federation. One cannot accept the excuse that Manley was
only a mouthpiece for Jamaican isolation. The low voter
turnout (60.8 per cent) during the 1961 referendum, ^°
which determined the fate of the federation demonstrates
that Jamaica could have been kept in the federation had
its leaders wanted to remain.
The lack of commitment to Caribbean unity among
the leaders showed itself in many other ways. First they
began quarrelling over how much federation would cost even
before they could decide on what type of federation they
wanted. As Thomas Franck has correctly asserted, once
one starts to inquire into the cost of an item which one
supposedly wants, the indication is that one cannot afford
4 4. 51 ^ ^It. To have any successful union, federation must be
A referendum was called in Jamaica by Norman
Manley, after he had already received the proposed federa-
tion which Jamaica wanted. But he felt he had the obli-
gation to ask Jamaicans if they still wanted federation.
The final results of the Jamaican Referendum were::
No. of Jamaicans against Federation 256,261 54.1%
" " " for " 217,319 45.9%
Report of the Chief Electoral Officer
,
Jamaican Referendum
,
September T57 1961, p. 2.
^^Franck, Why Federations Fail
, p. 183.
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an end in itself. All secondary considerations such as
cost to individual territories will eventually fall into
place as the primary consideration is unity leading to
independence. Thus, little wonder that the Eastern Carib-
bean Federation failed. it failed because Britain re-
fused to commit itself to its long range support. Had
the leaders been committed to what they liked to call
their freedom, they would have forgotten British aid and
declared independence. A unilateral declaration of inde-
pendence would probably have been quietly welcomed by
Britain, but the latter would have known that the Caribbean
would no longer be content to remain a colony. But many
Caribbean leaders have continued to delude themselves into
believing that their colonial status was and still is an
asset. For example, leaders in Dominica privately admit
that Britain's grants to Dominica are justifiable debts.
Publicly they maintain that Britain owes Dominica nothing
for past practices. The government of Dominica takes this
dual position to impress on Dominicans that the government
has done a great deal for Dominica, to get it off British
5 2Qrant-in-Aid. By implication, this is something the
Opposition cannot do.
52Based on an interview in Dominica.
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Caribbean leaders never talk about the real factor
which has kept the British Caribbean islands apart. m
each territory, an unquestionable leader has always emerged,
who enjoyed legitimacy because the masses looked up to
him. And, as the years went by, he began to own the careers
of many would-be leaders. He always showed his ability to
singlehandedly run the government for many years. He be-
came secure, especially as the power of the British Governor
dwindled. This state of affairs approximated the Latin
American form of personalismo - though a cult of personality
does not exist in the territories since no one leader has
been able to rule in absentia. But the dictatorial ten-
dencies of the individual are ably encouraged by the
pseudo-parliamentary and weak party systems. To leave
these safe positions of power in the separate islands and
to expose thexuselves to regional politics does not make
sense to the leaders on several counts. In the first
place, there has been no pressing reason, such as an out-
side attack, to make the leaders come together; not even
a communist Cuba seemed to threaten Jamaica sixty miles
away. Secondly, regional unity will lessen the bargaining
power of the individual leader in his attempts to lure
foreign business into his island. Any personal power over
business in each territory might terminate with federation.
Thirdly, in a larger unit, the prominence of the individual
leaders will be lowered. Thus, they must first be
decolonized to achieve Caribbean nationhood. They .ust
accept the fact that inter-island rivalry works to the
detriment of the region. When they can accept the fact
that the future of the Caribbean, if there is any, lies
in a strong federation, all other obstacles could be
surmounted. More than anything else, Caribbean leaders
have failed the cause of Caribbean unity because they
have put themselves above regional interests.
The uneven economic situation in the territori p.<.
I960. Another major difficulty deterring federation was
the economic disparity among the islands. During the
formative years of the federation, this received very
little attention. But increasingly, Jamaica and Trinidad
became industrialized, raising their standards of living
and leaving the other territories behind. Simultaneously
the smaller islands remained one crop economies and even
showed signs of not improving. The data for the
national incomes for the units of the federation in 1957
are shown in Figure XIII.
The gap between Jamaica and Trinidad on the one
hand, and Montserrat on the other, in Figure XIII, was
wide indeed, since Jamaica and Trinidad showed a reluc-
tance to share their wealth with less fortunate islands,
53Carleen O'Loughlin, Economic and Political Change
,
p. 4.
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Figure XlV
. Natiomal Income Figures for the Britishwest Indies - 1957,
Island Total in millions Per capita % of total
of B.W.I $ in B.W.I. West Indian
^ Income
Jamaica 821.8 510 54.6
Trinidad 471.5 612 31.3
Barbados 100.0 431 6.6
Grenada, St.
Lucia, St.
Vincent &
Dominica
(Windward Is.)
79.7 244 5.3
Antigua, St.
Kitts, Nevis,
Anguilla 15.9 284 1.1
Montserrat 2.8 195 0.2
Source: National Income Statistics
, The West Indies,
Federal Statistics Office, No. 1, 1960.
instead of helping, Jamaica had chosen to dominate the
banana market in Britain, and, in the process, to exclude
the smaller islands which relied, solely on bananas as ?.n
export crop. Jamaica did that when it had moved away
from agriculture as its main export industry. For exajmple,
in 1950, Jamaica's exports consisted almost entirely of
agriculture, but by 1960, bauxite and aluminium accounted
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for more than half of its exports.
Trinidad had followed a similar pattern of develoo-
.54
ment. The discovery of oil made it move away from its
reliance on sugar as a major export product; that was in
the wake of replacing Cuba as the main supplier of sugar
to the American market. And as an aside, Trinidad and
Jamaica were cutting their economic ties with Britain while
the smaller units remained tied to Britain. Jamaica's
and Trinidad's industrialization drive were sustained and
conditioned by United States business concerns. In the
process of switching major trade partners, Jamaica and
Trinidad got involved in a rivalry to promote their own
economic development. For this reason, in the midst of
West Indian unity talks in 1958, Jamaica announced plans
to set up an oil refinery to process crude oil from
Venezuela and not from Trinidad. Clearly^ the
cause of West Indian nationhood was taking secondary con-
sideration, as Eric Williams of Trinidad protested that
this move was threatening the Trinidad oil industry.
At the heart of the problem was the unwillingness
of Jamaica and Trinidad to shoulder the greatest share
of running the federation. It was their opinion that it
Amitai Etzioni, Political Unification , A Com -
parative s£udy of Leaders and Forces (New York: Holt,
Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1965), pp. 158-159.
' West Indian Economist, August 1958, pp. 17-22,
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was Britain's responsibility to pay the share of the
small islands to the federal venture. Williams once
entertained the idea that it wac the responsibility of
the wealthier islands to maintain the federation, but
this idea quickly evaporated when Jamaica decided to
leave the union. Williams then warned that the burden
was too much for Trinidad and dropped the idea. The
economic disparity among the islands forced Jamaica to
vote against a federal customs union.
If the federation had a chance, a customs union
among the islands was absolutely essential. It entailed
allowing the federal government to impose a tariff on all
goods which came from outside the Caribbean region, while
all movement of goods among the islands was to be duty
free. Jamaica protested because it felt that it would
have been most aff-cted, in that the high tariffs it had
imposed to protect its nascent industries would have had
to be removed. It is interesting to note that this came
in the wake of evidence to the contrary. This evidence
was inconclusive, but it showed that there could have
been less potential conflict between Jamaica's drive for
industrialization and the overall development of the
57
region. Secondly, the opposite was likely to happen.
5 f)
Eric Williams, The Economics of Nationhood (Port-
of-Spain, Trinidad: Government Printing Press, 1959).
5 7 . .
Report of the T^ade and Tariffs Commission ,
Part I, West Indies ( Port of Spain: Government of the West
Indies Printing Press, 1958), paragraph 66.
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It was true that cheaper labor cost in Trinidad could
have affected Jamaica's internal markets, but the
Eastern Caribbean islands were potential dumping grounds
for both Jamaica and Trinidadian goods. if anyone stood
to lose by a customs union, it was not Jamaica, but
rather the smaller non-industrialized islands like Dominica.
Besides, Jamaica had already won a compromise whereby a
customs union would have been gradually introduced over
a period of nine years. This would have given the Jamaican
economy, with adequate federal guidance, a transitional
cushion period. it would have brought Jamaica's develop-
mental goals closer to that of the West Indian nation.
In spite of all these considerations, the
Jamaican leaders used the customs union issue to destroy
federation. Gordon Lewis wrote that Jamaican business
elites did not want a customs union because the Federal
Government would have made them more responsive to pro-
ducing quality goods to remain in competition with other
5 8goods from the union. Customs union did threaten the
dominance of another set of highly entrenched people in
West Indian society, the businessmen. It would have made
them more regionally conscious and more responsive to the
needs of the highly impoverished Caribbean societies. It
58Gordon Lewis, Modern West Indies
, p. 377.
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would have forced them to drop their money conscious atti-
tudes they had picked up in their frequent trips to such
places as Puerto Rico and New York.
Freedom of movement as a deterrent to federation .
Closely associated with the economic disparity in the
islands was the freedom of movement of people among the
territories of the federation. The idea that this issue
could cause a breakdown in Caribbean unity may sound un-
real. It is hard to conceive of a political union where
the members of that union cannot move freely within the
units, but that was exactly what Trinidad wanted to do.
Trinidad's lower prices in goods, coupled with much lower
shipping rates had put it in a good position to dump goods
on the Eastern Caribbean markets. But Trinidad was un-
willing to accept some of the unemployed and unemployable
small islanders who bought most of these goods. The
rationale behind this refusal was the fact that Trinidad
had been able to employ most of its people who had been
willing to work and did even absorb a substantial amount
of immigrants. But it wanied to have the option to close
its doors to immigrants when it got crowded. It was of
the opinion that its nascent social services, such as
police and schools, should not be overburdened by large
numbers. If they were allowed to be burdened, Eric
Williams stood to lose his unquestionable hold over
Trinidad politics. Thus Trinidad, like Jamaica, made
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the Federal Government stay out of immigration policies,
immigration, like customs, was to remain the business
of the individual territories for some six years after
the federation was established. The Federal Government
was to assert itself in that sphere only gradually and
only on Trinidadian terms. These terms were that any
territory could refuse entrance to a member of another
territory on grounds of security.
Conclusion
The Federations of the West Indies failed because
they were forced unions. The islands have a great deal in
common, but this commonality has been hampered by the
desire of the leaders to retain their position of pro-
minance. The leaders have effectively kept the island
peoples apart, though these people get along well when they
are away from the Caribbean. And it is not because they
find themselves in a foreign country like the United States,
for Caribbean people live well there and in Britain. It
is the masses from the separate islands who have been kept
apart.
Caribbean leaders did not play politics with
federai-ion either, as it is sometimes charged, for they •
have little knowledge of what politics or a federation were
all about. They did not compromise or even try to
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communicate with p^nh r>+-hci»- tv. orn eac ot er. They adopted open diplomacy.
In practice, this meant they shouted at each other through
the press, the radio. In addition, Arthur Lewis cites the
example of the leaders securing binding resolutions from
their respective legislative as.-^emblies before discussing
the crucial issues with each other. In effect, the leaders
of the larger and more prosperous islands rarely worked
with their counterpart from the smaller islands as equals.
They did not know that federations drew people together,
but this togetherness generates more conflict than agree-
ment. They should have known that to accomplish anything
meaningful, they must concentrate on what they could
agree on, leaving disagreements to seek their own solutions
when the union got more stabilized. By then a federal
spirit would have grown to counteract all parochial feel-
ings. Each leader tried, with little success, to impose
his conception of federation to reflect the bias of the
individual country he represented.
In the final analysis, the federations of the
West Indies failed and will continue to fail because a
series of crises were not handled effectively. The "desireM
Pattern of behavior of the leaders of the Carib-
bean is aptly demonstrat d by the exchange between Sir
Grantly Adams and Albert Gomes, contained in "Extract from
a speech by the Prime Minister of the Federation of the
West Indies, Sir Grantly Adams, in the House of Represen-
tatives, 16 June 1958," Documents and Speeches on Common-
wealth Affairs 1952-1962 , ed. by Nicholas Monsergh (London:
Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 166-168.
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crisis was never tackled. The leaders never genuinely
wanted federation. They demonstrated that very well by
findino fault with every aspect of the federation but
refused to do something about the apparent defects. The
"participation" crisis could not be handled because the
leaders were never faced with this problem before, not
'
even on their own islands. They did not know how to
make West Indians partake in the federation in order to
solve the "identity" crisis. The inhabitants of the
larger units did not feel West Indian. The leaders who
could have made them feel that way, never rose to the
occasion to accomplish that feat. This was no setback
at the outset, since it could not be expected that a
feeling of being West Indian would emerge overnight. In
that case the leaders could have acted as a necessary
succor to help the individual islander make this not so
difficult transition. A federal union could have solved
the identity crisis. Finally, the "brother's keeper"
crisis was never solved. By this is meant the larger
islands refused to accept the responsibility to help the
smaller units develop. Since Federation was clearly an
initial liability to Jamaica and Trinidad, it was doomed
to failure. The islands were stronger individaully
,
they
broke up the union, and achieved their independence in-
dividually. A federal union of the types so far envisaged
would have weakened them. Under these circumstances,
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federation will always be a non-starter in the British
Caribbean; it is even more ludicrous to envisage a union
Of all the niembers of the Caribbean area; English, Dutch,
French, and Spanish.
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CHAPTER VII
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
An effort has been made in this case study to test some
hypotheses as they relate to a recently semi-independent coun-
try like Dominica. It was found necessary to review the lit-
erature dealing with what has been called political change.
From the literature this writer was able to extrapolate an ap-
proach which would meaninsfully assess the Dominican political
system. This explains why the systems approach was chosen to
carry out the study.
The systems approach is by no means complete, but it can
be made comprehensive. To an extent, it is dynamic and may ex-
plain, though superficially, the actions of some participants
of a political system. Its shortcomings lie in its inability
to explain why actions precipitate certain reactions. It also
assumes that all parts have specific roles to perform at criti-
cal stages to ensure the continuity of the system. But ap-
parently these roles cannot be accurately identified since all
the actors of the political system can never be identified.
What is being argued here is that an unidentifiable part of a
system may as critically important as an identifiable one.
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The very nature of this study of Dominica illustrates the
above point. Of all the actors in its political system, much
attention was paid to the Constitution, the Governor, the poll-
ticians, the parties, the Black Power Movement and some out-
side forces such as the politics of other countries. In effect,
many parts or actors of the system, such as trade unions and
the Roman Catholic Church, were not treated at great length.
This should not be taken to mean that they are not important.
They have been very important in the past but, in the judgment
of this writer, their importance relative to the actors analysed
is minimal.
Chapter I discussed the concept of political change. It
formed the theoretical setting for the study. Both Chapters
II and III reviewed the impact of colonialism on the colonized
society. Chapter II examined the role of the colonial consti-
tution in shaping the society, while Chapter III looked at the
social and psychological impact of colonialism. The political
parties of Dominica were reviewed in Chapter IV. Chapter V was
devoted to an analysis of the Black Power Movement. It was stu-
died because it is the only group which challenged the political
parties and their supportive groups in Dominica. Chapter VII
concerned itself with the several attempts at federation in
the British West Indies,
From all this one conclusion comes out clearly; Dominican
314socxety xs divided into two ca^ps. The boundaries of the two
may not be clearly defined, but this division seems to be a
continuation of the colonial situation.
During colonial times, the two camps were not always hos-
tile to each other. The European se^ or camp had effective,
ly co-opted the more educated Dominicans. The latter were ne-
ver part of the European camp, but they were given enough pri-
vileges to feel like the European. The educated Dominican
felt European. Consequently the Dominican found in the bur-
eaucracy became very supportive ofthG colonial administration.
The Governor was the head of this camp.
The other camp was made up of the local politicians. For
the most part, they were uneducated and sometLme irresponsible.
They usually came to power through confrontation and stayed in
power through similar means. They came from the rural areas,
\^ich made them unacceptable to the more educated urban element.
The bureaucrats often looked at them with contempt.
As the years went by these politicians were allowed to
wield a certain amount of power. But their roles vis-a-vis
the bureaucracy and Governor were never clearly defined. This
seemed to have been deliberate to ensure control of the colony.
Since roles were never clearly defined, the outside authority
always had -^he option to dictate the limits of one's pov/er in
any given situation.
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The colonial administration granted constitutions but al-
ways left the role of the politician vague. The constitutions
gradually allowed the election of the people^s representatives,
but went on to deny power to those elected. The colonial poll-
tician was sufficiently naive to believe that onee he was elec
ted by the people, he would run the s-ovemment.
The Governor, ably supported by the Colonial Office, saw
it differently. He continued to see himself as the ultimate
head of the government, regardless of the number of elected of-
ficials in the colony. He was even surer of his position, since
the Colonial Office continued to under^/rite the budget of the
colony. The intended result of that arrangement was to pro-
duce responsible government. The Governor had to instill in
the people, especially the emerging political elites, the idea
of national interest.
But things did not quite work out that way. The role of
the Governor frustrated the politicians. The politicians were
forced to remove the confrontation with the Governor from the
level of bargaining.
As the confrontation bett^een the colonial authorities and
the politicians came to a head, the former relinquished gra-
dually their hold on the colony.
In the process of decolonization, the structures which
maintained the colonial condition were not dismantled. The
succeeding "advanced" constitutions only became more precise in
:ino:
a
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outlining the specific roles of the two major power contenders
in the Dominican political system, the Governor and the leading
politician. The Governor transferred his power of appoint
members of the bureaucracy to the politician. In fact, the
1959 Constitution specifically stated that there had to be
politician, whose role xrould be that of head of state.
Thus the idea of personal government first personified in
the Governor, was now finding itself in the local politician.
In the same way the Governor had been the epitome of the colon^
ial system, the local leader is presently performing a simi-
lar role. He sets the goals of the Goverrjnent, and also sees
to their execution. He handpicks all his major personnel for
the bureaucracy. In addition, he sets the goals of the society.
He expects everyone to aspire to those ends. He has even cho-
sen the national dress. As expected only the Opposition Party
and its followers do not wear the national dress, probably in
defiance of the present Government.
The idea that an all powerful leader should emerge in a
colonial situation might not be all that bad. As was pointed
out in Chapter I, a powerful leader could be useful in handling
the identity crisis in a country. This could be particularly
useful in a place such as Dominica v/here the crisis of identity
has not he.m handled well. i
It is what the powerful leader does with the newly acquir-
ed power that concerns this writer. The tendency has been to
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use power to frustrate possible challengers. The colonial poll-
tictan used to accuse the colonial power of all the ills which
Plagued the society. With the disappearance of the colonial
power, the politician is forced tn ,r a o find a scapegoat. Thus the
ultimate leader in Dominica has seen an oppressor in the Ro-
man Catholic Church. Even the Opposition Party has fallen in
this role. Since the leading rubers of that party seem to be
very affluent, it becomes easy to portray them as oppressors
of the people,^
In effect, the unquestionable leader of Dominica has
shown the people their enemies. And he has shovm himself to be
their friend by opening the doors of Government to them.
Quite obviously, the people are in no way involved in the de-
cision mal^ng process. In fact, LeBlanc has developed an
actor
- audiece relationship with the people. He has started
a show which he must keep moving to keep the people sufficient-
ly entertained. This does not mean that the show is always
exciting; in fact, it could become intensely dull. But Le-
Blanc has developed such a reputation as being a great "actor"
he cannot go wrong
i
The tendency is to believe tiat that kind of relationship
is confined to the rural areas since the politicians are
from these districts. This relationship might be more appa-
rent in the rural districts, but some urban elements are very
^he leaders of the Labor Party are just as affluent as those
of the Freedom Party.
™.ch pert Of this actor
- audience relationship. They are .or^
reluctant to tail, about it because thoy are ashamed of that
reality. They are placed in a situation of having to accept
the politicians they once laughed at.
Everyone who wants to survive in the system is forced to
become part of the audience. And not only that, all must ap-
pUud ,,t all times. Since the locale of the performance is so
small, the one v*o does not applaud is likely to bo reprimand-
ed. The leader in Dominica has been made to believe that he
has done so much for the country that no one should challenge
him.
Very surprisingly, the unquestionable leadership LeBlanc
has maintained has not precluded his commitment to West Indian
Federation. Since comins to office in 19(^i , he has always sup-
ported West Indian unity, both in words and deeds. He xms the
first to spesk for a federation in 1962. In addition, although
he was not an original signatory to the Carifta Agreement of
1968, he accepted the agreement when approached.
LeBlanc joined the Caribbean Free Trade Association (Carif-
ta), even though Dominica stood to lose from that union. Ca-
rifta is not a common market, but it allov/s goods regionally
produced to be imported tax free in the British West Indies.
In 1971, LeBlanc was the first to sign the "Grenada Decla-
ration", ^-rtiich was intended to produce a federation of the
West Indies, The idea was short-lived as the opposition
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parties of the islands concerned nn^stered enough support to
defeat the proposal. LeBlanc was the last leader to withdraw
from the proposed union
i
How decs one explain that desire for unity? One would
expect that the safe position LeBlanc has carved out for hL...
self would negate his desire for a larger union, where he
would certainly be a subordinate.
There are several explanations for LeBlanc»s acting out
of character. First, it is typically Dominican to be self con-
tradictor^^. Second, Dominica is one of those few islands which
has not developed an identity yet. It comes out clearly in the
Dominican students study in Jamaica, Trinidad and Barbados.
Within a year the Dominican student takes on the ways of his
temporary home. He speaks like the people around him and may
even dress like them. On returning to Dominica, he passes
these on to his brothers. It is not being argued here that
the few Dominicans studying abroad are responsible for the lack
of identity in Dominica. The example simply demonstrates that
it is because of a lack of identity that the Dominican easily
falls prey to "alien" cultures.
A third reason for LeBlanc's drive to have West Indian
unity could be couched in his laiowledge of his o\m limitations.
He might be aware of the fact that he is unable to satisfy the
demands made on the political system. A West Indian Federation
could help solve some of the pressing problems.
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Lastly, Since LeBlanc may be coming to the end of his poli-
tical career, he could secure an appointive post in any fed-
oration, • He would be goins on record as the one Caribbean po-
litician most in favor of West Indian unity.
This is not to imply that all of Dominica is for any type
of federation. There are two groups who were opposed to the
Grenada Declaration, the Opposition Party and the Black Power
Movement. The Opposition claLmed that the Declaration was ne-
gotiated secretly. Both the people and the Opposition Party
were left out of the discussions leading to the Declaration.
The Black Power Movement was against the Declaration be-
cause it felt that the people were not consulted properly.
Further the Movement believed that a federation at that tiiTie
would only make it easier for the "imperialists" to control the
islands. The Movement reasoned that presently the "imperialists"
were forced to deal with the separate islands, a chore which
made it discourasins for concerted exploitation. In its view,
a federation would be a liability to the islands.
Presently the Movement believes that each island must first
have political independence. Then they can jointly consider
federation. With political independence, leaders of Dominica
will be able to control the economic life of the island. If
all the islands follow a similar pattern, unification can haA-a
meaning.
Of course, the leaders of the Movement are not that naive
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to believe that the present leaders of Dominica wiXl automati-
cally extend their control in the economy with the co,„in, of
political independence. The Kovement cautions that there n^st
be a fundamental change in attitude of present leaders. This
change involves a commitment which calls for sacrifices by all.
But on the idea of cxpectins all to malce sacrifices, the Move-
ment seems to be too idealistic.
This suinmary leads to one basic question - what are the
prospects for a stable society in Dominica? There is no question
that the present political climate is not a healthy one. Since
1967, v^en the island sot its last "advanced" constitution,
there have been no less than three major confrontations which
have reached crisis proportion. In one, the Defence Force was
alerted to contain the people. In the second, one of the only
two boys' schools closed do^^ because of racial problems. In
the third, one of the most productive estates closed down.
Presently anyone visiting Dominica is struck by the hidden ten-
sion which pervades the entire society.
The tension is further maintained by poor economic condi-
tions. Jobs have become scarce, XThile unemployment remains at
about thirty to forty per cent. The major crop, bananas, which
accounted for seventy per cent of the island's exports, is
virtually disaster,^
^^inistry of Agriculture, "Radio Address by the Minister."
In his talk the Minister revealed that Britain was about to
give $744,000 (BWI) to save Dominica's banana industry.
The social system is equally bad. The masses are keot in
their places and are continually told that things will be bett-
ter. The party system and other institutions such as the
Church and the bureaucracy continue to foster the inequalities
in the system.
As a result of the disparities, protest groups such as the
Black Power Movement develop. As was explained in chapter
V, the name of the group is a misnomer, since the perceived
oppressors are just as Black as members of the group.
Groups lilce the Movement seem to be endemic to colonial
and recently "liberated" societies. The movements are crea-
ted because the distinction between the haves and the have-nots
is easy to perceive.
The Dominican situation is further complicated by the fact
that the society is far from being integrated. The political
elites numbering no more than fifty, may form a closely knit
group to protect their vital interests. They may even receive
outside help from the British or the United States. But this
outside help can only provide temporary solutions to a grave
problem.
But why should confrontation remain a fixture of the
Dominican political process? rJhy does it always have to tal<e
a confrontation to attempt rectificrtion to obvious problems?
Confrontation will remain an important ingredient of the poli-
tical system because imaginative leaders have not been produced.
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Ironically the inherited system does not operate on the
crisis phenomenon. It calls for and demands a ,reat deal of
spirit, discussion, compromise and friendship. Unfortunately,
these qualities are alien to Dominicats politicians.
If the present system is failing, what are the alterna-
tives open to Dominica? In answer, there are several issues
to be considered. Firstly, the present system was not created
overnipiit, even though certain parts of it ^.ere hurriedly im-
posed. The social underpinnings of the present system began to
evolve as early as 1898, when Crown Colony Government was in-
troduced.
Secondly, political independence might not be the answer.
If history is any guide, the politically independent islands
of Jamaica and Trinidad are exhibiting the same problems as
Dominica, In fact, they seem to be worse off, they both have
experienced urban riots. Further, Dominca is not existing in
isolation. It can become independent and adopt any system of
government it desires. But it must take into account the po-
litical systems which surround it. Thus political independence
however exciting, could be more harmful. The poor economic
conditions seem to negate independence in isolation an3a^ay.
Because Dominica is intimately connected with its
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neighbors. does not preclude an attempt to uplift its poor.
Clearly the upliftins of the poor is in no way related to the
type Of political or economic system in a country. At least
the two Should not be related; a socxalist or capitalist sys-
tem in Dominica can be equally effective in dealing with the
problems of its poor. And the politicians would be the first
to admit that the two are not connected. This writer is not
even advocating that the politicians consult the people on all
the issues which beset Dominica. Chances are the people are
not interested. At the sa-^e time, it is not being argued that
the self appointed messiah should impose his system on Dominica.
The best political system for Dominica does not lie in ,*ether
it is democratic, autocratic or even socialistic. The system
which can tackle the problems of unemployment, social injus-
tices and the like seem to be the best suited for Dominica.
But on a more realistic and concrete level, the answer to
Dominica's problems lie in the Hest Indies and not necessarily
In Dominica. The West Indian islands could get together, pull
their resources together and solve their common problems. Too
much has been done for these islands. They can now manage
their own affairs; If only they are left alone, they might
come up with their own PWestindian" know-how.
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Professor Arthur Lewis had prepared and submitted
to the leaders of the "Little Eight" a document entitled
££2mals f^ an Eastern carihb^
the Territories of Anti^, Barbados. Do.lnlca, Grenada.
iJ^ntserrat. St. Kitts^s^AnaulUa, St. Lucia and St.
Vincent. He stressed at the beginning of the document that
"these proposals (are) merely a starting point for discus-
sions between the Governn,ents concerned. i have no official
authority for any of these proposals, and do not necessarily
myself feel coramitted to any of them."
The main features of Professor Lewis- proposals
for "a new independent state" were:
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ECONOMIC
^*
^ Governor-General for the Federationand the unit territories should not have Governors or
moni^rdutl::!' ^--^-^i-tenants to perform cer^-
b. The federal capital should be located in Barbados.
c. There should be a single chamber (therefore no senate
and each unit should elect one member per 40,000 popu-lation, with a minimum number one member per unit.
d. Provisions for amending constitution.
e. Provisions for accession of new units.
f. Provisions for freedom of movement.
g* Provisions for customs union as from the day the Fed-
eration comes into existence.
The transfer of services from Units to Federal Govern-
ment e.g.. Inland Revenue, Audit, Postal Service,
Judicial, Police, etc.
Freedom of the Federal Government to levy any kind of
tax.
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Commencement of the Feder.^^
secession from the West Thh °^ Jamaicanjnto effect. Provision forTy. ^^^^^^^ion comesto become the GovIrno?-Genera^^^^^^ °^ BarbadosProvision for an interim%^%^1,fCabinetf^^'^^-
.
Budget for first three ve^r^ ^r.lion to $14.5 million! ''^''^^ ^""^"^ "^^1-
Recommendation
-t-ha-t- +-v,^ tt j .
should continue to pay aran^f-'''"?^"'" ^^overnmentyears on a tapering'^SLisr
The secretary of state had also submitted a .e.orandu. con-
taining the Views Of the Colonial Office witK respect to pro-
1.
posed Federation
a.
E^°iisierM:t^ e"riu"stoT'" ^° ^^^^^ ^°h=r,n„„ Customs, movement of peoplebanking, currency, income tax, ports and h^bours.
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Methodology
The research for this study was carried out during
the summer of 1972. Previous to that I ^ept in touch with
the events in Dominica through the newspapers, personal
correspondence and direct contact with those who visited
the island from time to time.
During my stay in Dominica, many documents which
dealt with the political situation were made available to
me. I also had the good fortune of attending the national
party convention of the Freedom Party. From that meeting
I was able to observe the elites of the party in action in
dealing with the party members. In addition, I interviewed
twenty leading politicians, ten from the Dominica Labor
Party and ten from the Freedom Party.
Twenty leading businessmen were also interviewed.
An attempt was made to identify their party affiliation, to
ensure a balance appraisal of the two major parties. But
it became very difficult to solicit such information. A
few were frank enough to state their party affiliation, but
the great majority refused.
In a small society like Dominica, it is almost always
difficult to conceal one's party leanings, but businessmen
will try hard to do so. This is quite understandable con-
sidering that one's success or failure at business depends
on the type of tax incentive the politicians are willing to
offer. For example, I was reliably informed that the present
330
Government of Do.inica has raised the tariff on foreign
car imports to put a non-Governn,ent supporter out of busi-
ness. Tnere is no question that Dominican businessmen have
had to be very cautious in their dealings with the Govern-
ment.
This same caution exercised by the business ele^
ments was very evident when I tried to interview the elites
of the bureaucracy. The plan was to have them respond
directly to a questionnaire. But after the first encounters,
the series of "no comments" became very disconcerting. A
new approach had to be devised. I finally decided to dis-
tribute the questionnaire to sixty bureaucrats.
These bureaucrats were all heads of their departments
or divisions; some assistant heads were also included. Of
the sixty distributed, forty-five completed forms were
gathered. The uncollected ones were either conveniently
misplaced or kept for whatever reason. There was one in-
teresting case where the bureaucrat "lost" the questionnaire,
but was able to reproduce it to make the desired answers.
I can only conclude that this was done for self preservation.
If I did quote him by name, he would have been able to de-
fend himself by presenting what he actually wrote.
But of all the elites interviewed, the bureaucrats
proved the most difficult and uncooperative. I should add
here though, that I was able to gather a great deal of in-
formation through informal interviews with my friends, even
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though they too showed some hesitancy.
I spent a lot of time in the government buildings.
This made them very curious about my activities. In addi-
tion, talking with me gave the observer the impression that
they were very busy. After they had found out all they
had wanted to know, i was able to discuss their attitudes
and frustrations in Dominica. To an extent, these comments
apply to some of the politicians I interviewed.
Generally the politicians were easy to talk with.
My approach was to put them at ease first by asking them
to relate the good thing I "know" their parties were doing
for Dominica. They were particularly happy to set the re-
cord straight by showing that they were the ones who could
solve Dominica's problems. In their opinion, the real
enemy of the island were the other political party or the
Black Power Movement. But when it came to discussing their
own "faults," they were usually reluctant commentators.
Another approach which I found very rewarding was
to be where the politician would be delivering a speech.
He usually came over to say hello and showed interest in
the progress of my work. On such occasion the politician
-
was usually at ease and was able to talk at great length.
I was unable to carry any in depth interview of
the masses. I travelled around the island observing the
reactions of the people to current government policies. I
was fortunate to be present when both the St. Mary's Academy
and the Castle Bruce crises were co.ing to a head. Fro.
the St. Marys Academy crisis I was able to assess the
attitude of the students to the government's policy of non-
intervention in the crisis. I was able to do the same for
the Opposition Party and the Black Power Movement.
The inability of the political system to muster
the desired unity to handle this relatively minor crisis
was clearly shown. The Opposition together with its
supporters were delighted that the Government showed signs
of being unable to handle the crisis. The Government, on
the other hand, blamed its inability to handle the crisis
on the Opposition Party. The masses were of the opinion
that the Black Power Movement had driven the White Brothers
away from Dominica. The newspapers of Dominica agreed with
them.
During the Castle Bruce crisis, I was able to ob-
serve how the masses from one district could get united
behind one leader who was only articulating the demands of
the people for them. The Government erroneously concluded
that this leader was putting revolutionary ideas in the
people's heads. The people showed their lack of trust in
the Government and in especially their representative from
the district. It is important to relate here that both r.he
Government and the Opposition Party joined forces to deny
ownership to the people of the land under contantion.
In addition, both the Government and the Opposition blamed
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the Black Power Movement- fr^r- <-kment o the unrealistic demand of
wanting ownership of that land.
m my travels and in informal interviews with the
people. I was able to find out that some have the highest
regard for the present Government. It was particularly
hard to determine their party affiliation, but the rural
sector favored the Labor Party. m addition, the present
Government occupies all three seats from the urban areas.
But presently, the people are beginning to show concern over
the high cost of living and in the low prices for bananas.
The anxiety of the people are not sufficiently grave to
cause a major crisis.
Final Note on the Selection of Elites
"Elite" is being used here very loosely, anyone in
a leadership position in politics, the bureaucracy and
business is referred to as an elite. In a small island
like Dominica, these people will always know of the factors
which affect the island.
The political elites were chosen from the executives
of the two major parties. The secretaries of both parties
ere also helpful in identifying certain individuals who
re once involved in electoral politics. The twenty inter-
iewees related sufficiently well the political situation in
Dominica from their point of view.
It was a little more difficult to select the bureau-
cratic elites. No effort was made to distinguish precisely,
w
we
V
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between the "niH" ^r-,^ m .. ,old and "new" bureaucrat. It was only after
I had started to carry out the Interviews that I realized
that the two had different assessments of the problems of
Dominica,
The "new" bureaucrat seems to be more submissive
to the politicians because the former owes his position
to rhe latter. Be that as it may, the interviewed bureau-
crats were chosen on the basis of the job they held. For
this reason only assistant heads and heads of departments
were interviewed. Of the sixty bureaucratic elites origi-
nally approached for interviews, forty-five cooperated.
I used the Dominican Annual Statistical Digest to
select the business elites to be interviewed. I chose to
deal with the twenty richest businessmen in Dominica. I
was unable to speak with the foreign business elements
who own property in Dominica. Instead, I spoke with their
Dominican representatives. In addition, the Dominica Em-
ployers' Federation, which represents the interests of the
business elements in the Dominican society, provided me
with some valuable insights on the situation in Dominica.
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QUESTIONNAIRE USED FOR DOMINICAN ELITES
Bureaucratic Elites
1. When did you join the service?
^» Present post
4' 0?^.^^^"^ achievement of Statehood?
^nd'erend^nt^sL^e'^^^ '^^^'^^ instructions about a se.i--
5. Do you know if Ministers receive training on the same'^
LTeU^ien^'^ '"f T ministers Lrun^ualxTi^d
7 wLr^ f education to "be in charge of ministeries^
View thTLnr."" --^--r^ts do you thinkhhold ^h^'""v hat "Ministers a^e unqualified for their positions?
ft whi^ ^ \ ^^^^5^ number (c) the majority.
statehood^^""^ ^^""^ adjusting to associate
If you minister wished to pursue a line of action with
which yo'J Gisagreed, what would you. do (a) do it withoutquestion (b) press your point of view (c) take some
other course of action.
10. Which of the above would the majority of civil servantsfollow in your opinion?
11. regard s the ultimate head of state as
12. If you are given conflicting instructions bv you minister
and the premier, which course of action would you follow:
(a) obey your minister (b) obey the premier (c) con-
sult the pren^.ier?
13. When a new government comes to power, what action would
you recommend to a civil servant who has aligned himself
with a particular government, (outgoing).?
14. Could you cominent on the events of December 1971?
15. Hov/ do you the present role of the police?
16. In your opinion what will be their role in the future?
17. Would you say that the two party system is working in -
Dominica?
18. Why did you take the position you did?
19. V;ho is the real leader of the Labor and Freedom Parties?
20. In your opinion, hov; much pov/er does Armour have?
21. If elections were held now, which party would win? Why?
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23. Why did you answer the way you did?
24. What are the good and bad points of LeBlanc as a leader?
leaderf ^""^ ^^^^ -Carles as a
26. v;as Dominica under colonial rule? Why?
StatehooS?^°'°^''
government prepare Dominica for Associate
28. Is Dominica ready for full independence now? Why?
29. Does Britain owe Dominica grants with no strings attached?
30. In your opinion where has government wasted too rrrach ti.-e?
How could government have gone around these problems?
31. In your opinion what precipitated the split in Labor in
1970?
32. What does Black Pov/er mean?
33. Could you comment on the Grenada Declaration?
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Business Elites
What are your views
pects for Dominica?
concerning the general economic pros-
most
ws concerning the prospects for
nding? your
In what ways could they contribute more a) workinoharder, b) using more local products c) saving moi-ed) investing more at home e) making less demands for
wage increases f) any other ways?
Could you comment on the events cf Dec. 1971.
What has the Church done for Dominica?
How do you see the Police?
What will be its future role?
Could yoi: comment on Carifta and tell me how it has
affected your business?
Do you think that Dominica's problems can be solved in
the capitalist system?
Would you say that the two party system is working in
Dominica?
If you don't mind could you tell me for which party you
voted in the last election? Why?
Who is the real leader of the Labour and Freedom parties?
Can the parties do without either of them?
What arc' the good and bad points of LeBlanc as a leader?
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leader^ ^"""^ ^''^ P"^^""^^ ^^^^ Charles as a
15. What power does Ronald Armour wield?
16. If elections were held now which party would win. Why?
17. Why do you think people vote the way they do—because of
a) party b) leader c) other.
18a. In the final analysis do you think that government is
corrupt?
18b. Was Dominica betver under colonial rule? Why?
19. Did Crown Colony government prepare Dominica for Statehood?
20. I^ Dominica ready for full independence? Why?
21. What do you fear most if independence comes now?
22. Does Britain owe Dominica grants with no strings attached?
23. Could you comment on government's ways of making public
policy.
24. Name a few good policies of government since associate
statehood.
25. In what areas has government wasted too much time?
26. VJho is behind most of government's policies?
27. Should medical care be available to, all regardless of
ability to pay? VJhy?
28. Please comment on the educational system of Dominica.
29. Should secondary education be available to all? How would
you impliment such a program?
30. In your opinion why was there a split in labor in 1970?
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Political Elites
1. When did you get involved in politics?
2. What event or persons influenced you?
3. What are the major problems of this country?
4. How did you see the events of Dec. 16, 1971?
5. What should be the role of the newspaper?
6. VJhat has been the role of the Church?
.
7, What does Black Pov7er mean to you? --
8. v;hat is the present role -f the police?
9. Why did the first federation fail?
10. Could you comment on the Grenada Declaration?
11. Evaluate parliamentary government in Dominica
12. What should be the role of the civil sevant?
13. Is the two party system working?
14. What does your party stand for?
15. What does the other party stand for?
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16. Who is the real leader of Labour and Freedom?
Why?''°'''
^^^^^^^
^^'^ve mentioned?
18. Wh.t are the good and bad points of LeBlanc as a leacer?
19. Do the same for Miss Charles.
20. How powerful is Donald Armour?
21. If elections were held now, which party would win? Xhy?
.
Why do you think people vote the way they do? — Becauseof a) party b) leader c) other, specify.
22
23. khat do you regard as the most important: a) Dominicans
snoulQ elect any party or system of government thev want-b) they should choose a government t .at will attract - '
lot of foreign capital; c) they should elect a Government
that will encourage only local investments?
Why did you choose the one you did?
24. In the final analysis you think government is corrupt? '•"hy?
Be specific.
25. WgLS Dominica better under colonial rule? Why or why not?
26. Did Crown Colony Government prepare Dominica for Associate
Statehood?
27. Is Dominica ready for full independence?
28. What do. you fear most if full independence is given?
29. Does Britain owe Dominica aide with no strings attached?
30 i Could you comment on why Trinidid asked for independence?
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31. How do you see the making of public policy here?
32. Name a few good policies of government since 1957.
33. In which areas have government wasted too much time?
34. Who or what is responsible for this waste?
35. Who or what is behind most of government policies?
36. Should medical care be available to all recardless of
ability to pay? Why did you take such a position?
37. Could you comment on the educational system in this
country?
38. Should secondary education be available to all and free?
If you say yes, how would you implement such? 'Ahy did
you take such a position?
39. Why did the Labor Party split in 1970?
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